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California Supreme Court Survey
January 1984-July 1984

The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the
reader of the issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well
as to serve as a startingpointfor researchingany of the topical areas. The
decisions are analyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's
holding and the extent to which the court expands or changes existing
law. Attorney discipline cases have been omitted from the survey.

I. ATrORNEY'S FEES ....................................
Court rejects an exception to the American Rule
which would allow recovery of attorney'sfees by
plaintiffs who successfully sue a fiduciaryfor
fraud: Gray v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc .....
II.

CIVIL PROCEDURE ....................................

A.

B.

EII.

An offer of compromise made pursuant to
Civil Procedure Code section 998 may be
revoked: T.M. Cobb Co. v. Superior Court........
Defendants in class action brought by endusers of their productsfailed to justify
compulsive joinder of others in the chain of
distribution;fraudulent concealment may be
pled without showing that the cause of action
is barred by the statute of limitations: Union
Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court...................

CLASS ACTIONS ......................................

Plaintiffallowed to bring a class action suit
despite having alreadyobtained individual
relief. Kagan v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan
Association ..........................................
IV.

COMMERCIAL LAW ...................................

Voluntary sale of goods by owner at auction
following repossessionfrom lessee not a 'forced
sale" entitling owner to secretly bid at the
auction: Nevada National Leasing Co. v.Hereford..
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ................................

Environmental group permitted to encourage a
boycott of a newspaper's advertisersfor the

purpose of changing the newspaper's editorial
policies: Environmental Planning & Information
Council v. Superior Court............................
VI.

VII.

CONTRACT LAw ......................................
Hospital'smalpractice insurance contract
interpreted to exclude doctors hired by patients;
parol evidence admissible to aid in
interpretation:Garcia v. Truck Insurance Exchange.
....................................................
CRIMNAL LAw .......................................
A. Repeal of mentally disordered sex offender
program did not affect persons previously
committed pursuant to the program: Baker v.
Superior Court....................................
B. To be convicted of a criminal offense as an
aider and abettor the defendant must be
shown to have acted with knowledge of the
criminalpurpose of the perpetratorand with
intent or purpose of either committing, encouraging, orfacilitatingcommission of the offense: People v. Beeman ..........................
C. Felony practice of medicine without a license
not inherently dangerous and therefore will
not support convictionfor second degree
felony murder: People v. Burroughs..............
D. Court upholds the defendant's murder
conviction arisingfrom death of a co-felon
which occurred when police fired in response
to malicious conduct by the defendant: People
v. Caldwell ........................................
E. Court's refusal to instructjury on a lesser
uncharged but related offense violated due
process: People v. Geiger .........................
F. Defendant deprived of fair jury by use of voter
registrationlist; limitationsplaced on use of
multiple special circumstances in capital
cases: People v. Harris ...........................
G. Jury may consider sympathy for the
defendant when determining sentence in a
capital case: People v. Lanphear................
H. Trial court abused its discretion in not
referring a minor defendant to the Youth
Authority for a pre-sentencing report: People
v. Marsh ..........................................
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I.

The defendant's convictionfor second degree
felony murder reversed because the underlying
felony of child abuse was an integralpart of
the homicide: People v. Smith ....................
J. No errorfor court to impose sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole
when jury cannot decide on penalty; no
prejudice in prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges againstjurors who are opposed to
the death penalty: People v. Zimmerman .........
VIII.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ...............................

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Effective assistance of counsel includes
reasonably necessary ancillary defense
services and court may order a county to pay
for the services: Corenevsky v. Superior Court....
Constitutionalright to an interpreterprohibits
courtsfrom "borrowing"defendant's
interpreterto aid in examination of witnesses:
People v. Aguilar ..................................
Prosecutionfailed to justify a detention on
grounds that defendant was in an area known
for drug trafficking at night and that he
attempted to avoid the police: People v.
Aldridge ..........................................
Police must obtain a warrant before acquiring
a suspect's unlisted name and addressfrom
the telephone company: People v. Chapman .....
Defendant held to have been denied effective
assistance of counsel at probation revocation
hearing: People v. Shaw .........................
Supreme court establishes appropriate
appellate review when prosecution seeks to
have criminal charges reinstatedpursuant to
Penal Code section 871.5following disnissal
by a magistrate: People v. Slaughter .............
Defendant has not been "brought to trial"
unless the judge is available and preparedto
try the case to its conclusion; absent
exceptional circumstances,court congestion is
not good cause for failing to bring defendant
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to trial within the requiredtime limit:
Rhinehart v. Municipal Court ......................
H. Trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
sever separate murder counts: Williams v.
Superior Court ....................................
IX. DISCOVERY ...........................................
Information contained in traffic accident reports
required to be filed with the state may be
obtained through discovery: Davies v. Superior
Court ...............................................

X. DSsoLtrrIoN OF MARRIAGE ..........................
A. Judgment of dissolution of marriagewhich
providedfor termination of spousal support
could be modified to extend support payments
beyond the termination date: In re Marriage of
Vomacka .........................................
B. Maritalsettlement agreement releasing all
rights and obligationsof the parties held to
prevent recovery of life insuranceproceeds by
ex-spouse who remained the named
beneficiary of the policy: Life Insurance Co. of
North America v. Cassidy .........................
XI. EASEMENTS ..........................................
Party who acquired a prescriptive easement not
required to pay compensation or to bear costs of
removing obstruction of easement erected during
course of litigation over the easement: Warsaw v.
Chicago Metallic Ceiling, Inc ........................
XII. EDUCATION ...........................................
A. School districts may not chargefees for
extracurriculareducation programs: Hartzell
v. Connell .........................................
B. Temporary teacherunder Education Code
section 44920 entitled to preferential
employment rights: Taylor v. Board of Trustees.
..................................................
XIII. EMINENT DOMAIN ....................................
Loss of business goodwill flowing from
condemnation includes losses attributableto the
payment of higher rent: People ex re- Department
of Transportation v. Muller ..........................
XIV. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ................................
Restrictionsplaced on police officers during
their mealtimes entitled the officers to overtime
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XV.

XVI.

wages: Madera Police Officers Association v. City of
M adera .............................................
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ................................
Counties may restrict the use of certain
pesticides within the county despite state
approval of the pesticides: People ex ret
Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino .................
EQUAL PROTECTION ..................................

Parentsof a child placed in state facilitiesfor
public safety cannot be requiredto reimburse
the government for the costs of caringforthe
child: In re Jerald C ................................
XVII.

EVIDENCE ............................................
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XVIII.

XIX.

Presumption that child born in wedlock is the
issue of the mother's husband held not to
violate due process: Estate of Cornelous ........
B. Expert testimony regardingrape trauma
syndrome inadmissible to prove that a rape
has occurred: People v. Bledsoe .................
C. Admission of evidence of rape trauma
syndrome not error in this case because of
defendant'sfailure to adequately object to the
evidence: People v. Stanley ......................
D. Admissibility of evidence of prior uncharged
sex crimes determined the same way as evidence of non-sex crimes; prior convictions
may only be used once to enhance sentences:
People v. Tassell ..................................
FAMILY LAw .........................................
Father'signorance of his rights invalidates
agreementfor entry of judgment ordering child
support payments: County of Los Angeles v. Soto.
....................................................
GOVERNMENT AID ...................................
A. State must consider ineligible undocumented
alien children in a household when
determining the amount of AFDC benefits to
award to eligible children in the household:
Darces v. W oods ..................................
B. Income tax refunds are not income for
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purposes of determining the amount of aid
available under AFDC: Vaessen v. Woods ......
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A. City immune from liabilityfor damages
caused by motoristfleeing from police officers
attempting to make a traffic stop: Kisbey v.
State of California ................................
B. No liabilityfor failure to implement
regulationsregardingfirearms instruction
courses due to governmental immunity: Nunn
v. State of California ..............................
XXI. LABOR RELATIONS ...................................
Employer's unilateralpolicy changes in Arizona
violated Californiarequirements to bargain
with the employees' union since California
workers were affected by the change; unlawfully
dischargedemployees entitled to back pay for
days they would actually have worked for the
employer: Nish Noroian Farms v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Board .....................................
XXII. LAND USE ............................................
No exemption from subsequently enacted rent
controls was obtained because amounts
expended in reliance on approved subdivision
map were insubstantial: Santa Monica Pines, Ltd.
v. Rent Control Board ...............................
XXIII.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ..............................

Code of Civil Proceduresection 667.7 providing
for the periodic payment of judgments in
medical malpractice suits held constitutional:
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of
Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc .............................
XXIV. STATE REGULATION ..................................
Federallaw preempts the state regulation of offreservationsale or possession offish caught by
an Indian on his reservation: People v. McCovey.
....................................................
XXV. TAXATION ............................................
An otherwise tax exempt "occasionalsale" is
not taxable because the seller is a "unitary
business": Ontario Community Foundation, Inc. v.
State Board of Equalization ..........................
XX VI. TORTS ................................................
A. No error in jury instructionswhich spoke of
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XXVI.

XXVIII.

the exercise of reasonable care when plaintiff's
theory at trial againsta drug manufacturer
was not based on strict liability: Finn v. G.D.
Searle & Co ......................................
356
B. Owner of stolen vehicle may be liablefor
damages caused to third persons by the thief
if the theft was foreseeable under the
circumstances;party seeking a peremptory
writ must notify opposing party: Palma v. U.S.
Industrial Fasteners, Inc ...........................
357
C. Evidence of post-accident warnings
admissible in a strict liability suit;
inappropriatefor trial court to use remittitur
to reapportionliability among parties.
Schelbauer v. Butler Manufacturing Co ............
358
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION .....................
359
Worker terminatedfor goodfaith refusal to
perform work assignment which she felt
threatened safety of others held entitled to
receive unemployment insurance benefits:
Amador v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board..
359
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ...........................

Negligence of injured employee not imputed to
employer when determining employer's credit
for employee's recovery from a third party
tortfeasor: Rodgers v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board ......................................
I.

362

362

ATTORNEY'S FEES
Court rejects an exception to the American Rule
which would allow recovery of attorney'sfees by
plaintiffs who successfully sue a fiduciaryfor fraud:
Gray v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc.

In Gray v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 498, 674 P.2d
253, 198 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1984), the supreme court held, among other
things, that a party who successfully sues a fiduciary for fraud is
not entitled to recover attorney's fees. The plaintiff was, however,
entitled to a portion of his attorney's fees under the "tort of another" exception.
The plaintiff made an offer through the defendant, the seller's

real estate agent, to buy a piece of property. The defendant represented to the plaintiff that the seller had accepted the offer. In
reliance on this representation, the plaintiff incurred expenses in
preparing to move to the property. Subsequently, the defendant
informed the plaintiff that the seller had decided not to sell the
property.
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant and the seller.
The trial court determined that the seller had never accepted the
offer and therefore had not breached a contract, but that the defendant had violated its fiduciary duty to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was awarded damages against the broker, including attorney's
fees.
Under the American rule, codified in California Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021 (West 1980), each party pays his own attorney's fees unless a statute or agreement between the parties
provides otherwise. The courts have adopted several exceptions
to the general rule. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569
P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (awarding of attorney's fees
when benefit of litigation is conferred on others). In this case, the
trial court followed an exception adopted by the court of appeal in
Walters v. Marler, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1978),
which granted attorney's fees to plaintiffs who successfully sue a
fiduciary for fraud. The supreme court disapproved Walters, finding no justification for creating such an exception.
The court went on, however, to award the plaintiff part of his attorney's fees based on the generally accepted "tort of another" exception to the general rule. This exception grants attorney's fees
to plaintiffs who must prosecute or defend an action against a
third party as a result of the defendant's tort. In this case, the
plaintiff's suit against the seller was necessary due to the defendant's misrepresentation. Thus, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the portion of his attorney's fees attributable to his suit
against the seller.
II. CML PROCEDURE
A. An offer of compromise made pursuant to Civil
ProcedureCode section 998 may be revoked: T.M.
Cobb Co. v. Superior Court.
In T.M. Cobb Co. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 273, 682 P.2d 338,
204 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1984), the supreme court decided in the affirmative whether an offer of compromise made pursuant to Civil Procedure Code section 998 may be revoked prior to its acceptance
by the offeree. In order to decide the issue, the court looked to
the words of the statute in an effort to ascertain the legislature's
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intent. Nothing in the language of the statute resolved the question as to whether an offer made pursuant thereto is revocable or
irrevocable. However, general contract principles hold that an offer may be revoked by the offeror at any time prior to acceptance.
Consequently, the court determined that, had the legislature intended section 998 offers to be irrevocable, it would have expressly and unequivocally said so. Because the legislature did
not do so, the court applied general contract law and held section
998 offers to be revocable.
The court found further support for its holding by determining
that it supported the underlying policy of section 998, specifically,
the policy of encouraging settlements. The court logically reasoned that a party would be more likely to make a settlement offer pursuant to section 998 if he knew the offer could be revised
should new circumstances develop. Thus, more revocable offers
than irrevocable offers would be made, thereby increasing the
chance that settlements would result. In addition, the court believed its holding also supported the policy of compensating injured parties due to the fact that newly discovered information
might indicate greater culpability or greater damages. If an injured party had previously made an irrevocable offer which had
originally seemed just, he would then be locked into the offer
which would subsequently have become unjust. A holding that
section 998 offers were revocable would rectify the problem.
Section 998 also provides that a party who does not accept an
offer and later fails to obtain a more favorable judgment cannot
recover costs, and may, in the court's discretion, be required to
pay certain costs of the offeror. In order to prevent a party from
invoking the cost benefits of the statute, the court determined
that an offer revoked prior to acceptance no longer functions as
an "offer" for purposes of the cost benefit provisions of the
statute.
Finally, the court rejected the petitioner's argument that an irrevocable option is created when an offer is made pursuant to section 998. The court determined that mutual consent was a
prerequisite to the existence of an irrevocable option contract.
Viewing the offer objectively, the court found no consensual
agreement that the offer would be irrevocable since neither section 998 nor the offeror indicated that the offer would be
irrevocable.

B.

Defendants in class action brought by end-users of
their productsfailed to justify compulsive joinder of
others in the chain of distribution;fraudulent
concealment may be pled without showing that the
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations:
Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court.

On January 23, 1981, a class action was initiated on behalf of all
California indirect purchasers of industrial gas from the petitioners. The complaint, filed pursuant to California Business & Professional Code section 16750 (West 1978), alleged that the
petitioners had conspired to fix prices, and that the respondents,
as end-users, were indirectly injured when the illegal overcharges
were passed on to them through the chain of distribution. The petitioners demurred, claiming a defect of parties., and sought to dismiss the action for the absence of indispensible parties. They
also moved to strike the allegations of fraudulent concealment of
the conspiracy on the grounds of uncertainty. When the motions
were denied and the demurrer was overruled, the petitioners
sought a writ of mandate requiring the joinder of all intermediate
purchasers in the petitioners' chains of distribution.
In Union Carbide Corp. v. SuperiorCourt, 36 Cal. 3d 15, 679 P.2d
14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984), the supreme court was presented
with two principal issues. First, were the petitioner-defendants
entitled to joinder of persons in their chain of distribution at the
pleadings stage? The court held that in order to compel joinder at
the pleadings stage, the petitioners must demonstrate that there
was a "substantial risk" of "multiple liability." Having failed to
show more than a "theoretical possibility" that an absent party
might assert a claim, the petitioners were not entitled to compel
joinder.
The petitioners maintained that the pendency of a related federal antitrust class action in Illinois provided the necessary exposure to a substantial risk of multiple liability. The court rejected
this argument by distinguishing the classes involved in the two
actions. The federal class action was limited to the direct purchasers in the petitioners' chains of distribution. Pursuant to section 16750, indirect-purchasers in California were also allowed to
bring a state antitrust claim. Questions of whether illegal
overcharges were passed on to the respondents were wholly separate and irrelevant to the federal cause of action. Consequently,
the practical effect of adjudication on absent parties had not been
sufficiently proven to compel joinder at such an early stage in the
litigation. However, the court did not foreclose the possibility
that joinder may be required at a later point.

California Supreme Court Survey
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The second issue dealt with by the court was: where the complaint did not allege that it is barred by the statute of limitations,
must an allegation of fraudulent concealment be struck? The
court viewed this claim as mere "surplusage." Thus, the trial
court was not required to strike this claim or grant a demurrer on
this ground. Since the respondent could not fix the date when the
conspiracy began, but had alleged that injurious consequences
continued to the date the complaint was filed, the statute of limitations did not bar the complaint. At most, the damages could be
limited to the preceding four years-the applicable statutory
limit. Consequently, the writ was denied on both grounds.
III.

CLASS AcTIONS
Plaintiff allowed to bring a class action suit despite
having already obtained individual relief: Kagan v.
Gibraltar Savings & Loan Association.

In Kagan v. GibraltarSavings & Loan Association,' the following issue was presented: "[mlay a consumer who notifies a prospective defendant of class grievances under the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act and informally obtains individual relief, subsequently bring a class action for damages on behalf of herself
and as a representative of the class against the prospective
defendant?"2
I.

FACTS

Appellant, Eleanor M. Kagan, opened an Individual Retirement
Account (IRA) with Gibraltar Savings and Loan Association (Gibraltar) based on the representation that no management fees
would be charged.3 However, six months later, appellant received
a letter from Gibraltar informing her that a trustee fee would be
deducted from all IRA's.4 After repeated inquiries by appellant
1. 35 Cal. 3d 582, 676 P.2d 1060, 200 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1984). Opinion by Reynoso,
J., with Bird, C.J., Mosk, Broussard and Grodin, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Kaus, J., with Richardson, J., concurring. Richardson, J., Retired
Associate Justice of the supreme court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. Id. at 587, 676 P.2d at 1061, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
3. Gibraltar's promotional brochure stated: "No commissions. No establishment fees. No management fees." Id. While opening the account, appellant questioned the existence of an annual $7.50 combined trustee and sponsorship fee. She
was assured that it was Gibraltar's practice not to charge the customers the fee.
4. The fee was broken down into two parts: a $7.00 administration fee to be

and her husband,5 a Gibraltar vice-president replied that "[t]he
decision as to whether or not Gibraltar would pay the Trustee Fee
has always been made from year to year, with no guarantee that
'6
this benefit would be offered for longer than one year at a time.
Appellant's husband was subsequently charged the trustee fee in
1979 and 1980.
Pursuant to section 17707 of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
(Act),8 the appellant and her husband sent Gibraltar a demand
letter notifying it that a suit would be brought under the Act if the
requested relief was not granted within 30 days. 9 Within the prescribed time period, Gibraltar returned the $15 in trustee fees
charged to appellant's husband, advised them that no such
charges had been made to appellant's account, and promised to
remove all the disputed brochures from their various branches.
Approximately one month later, the appellant brought the present class action seeking actual damages of all fees actually depaid to Union Bank and a 50 cent fee to the California Savings and Loan League
for sponsoring the program.
5. Not only did the appellant telephone to state the proposed action was inconsistent with Gibraltar's promotional material, but the appellant's husband also
wrote the savings and loan's president. He alleged that the announced trustee fee
was inconsistent with Gibraltar's "representations made to myself, my wife and
other I.R.A. depositors." 35 Cal. 3d at 588, 676 P.2d at 1061, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
6. Id. at 588, 676 P.2d at 1062, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 40. The letter also stated that
all IRA participants were to be treated equally; therefore, the charges would be
deducted from their account.
7. CAL.CIV. CODE § 1770 (West Supp. 1984) provides in pertinent part:
The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to
result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer are unlawful:
(i) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.
(q) Representing that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or
other economic benefit, if the earning of the benefit is contingent on an
event to occur subsequent to the consummation of the transaction.
8. 1970 CAL.STATS. ch. 1550. Considered one of the most significant pieces of
consumer legislation in California:
It provides damages and injunctive relief to consumers damaged by specified deceptive practices on the part of merchants and sets forth the procedures to secure such relief. For the first time since 1872, the legislature
has recognized the class action concept, and for the first time in California
history it has allowed class actions as a procedural device in connection
with a specific statute.
Reed, Legislatingfor the Consumer: An Insider's Analysis of the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act, 2 PAC. L.J. 1, 2 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
9. CAL.Crv. CODE § 1780 (West 1973). Under this section, the consumer may
obtain actual damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages, or such other or inclusive relief as the court may deem proper. See CAl. CMv. CODE § 1782 (West 1973)
(requirement of at least 30 days notice prior to commencement of an action under
section 1780).
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ducted, declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent any future
fees being charged, punitive damages in the amount of $5 million,
and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.10
Gibraltar moved for a determination that the action lacked
merit" on the grounds that no damage had been done to the appellant pursuant to the Act; thus she was not a member of the
class she purported to represent. The trial court granted Gibraltar's motion "on the ground that [appellant] 'ha[d] not suffered
any injury or sustained any damage cognizable under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act.' "12 Appellant Kagan then appealed.

II. STANDING
An individual action may be brought by any consumer suffering
an injury from a practice declared unlawful under section 1770.13
A class action may be brought on exactly the same grounds provided "the unlawful method, act, or practice has caused damage
to other consumers similarly situated .
"14 Therefore, the
threshold question was which type of action did appellant
initiate?
Gibraltar contended that it had been notified of an individual
grievance. Consequently, since the association had provided the
consumer with an appropriate remedy within thirty days, the suit
could not be maintained.15 Since Gibraltar had refunded the
trustee fees charged appellant's husband, agreed not to charge
either of them said fees in the future, and agreed to remove the
challenged brochure, Gibraltar contended that appellant had not
suffered any damages under the Act.l6
10. 35 Cal. 3d at 589, 676 P.2d at 1062, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(c)(3) (West 1973). Gibraltar had originally moved
for summary judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437(c). However, the court viewed this as a section 1781(c) (3) motion since the Act expressly
excludes summary judgment motions in class actions. 35 Cal. 3d at 589 n.2, 676
P.2d at 1062 n.2, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 40 n.2.
12. Id. at 589, 676 P.2d at 1063, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
13. CAL CIV. CODE § 1780(a) (West 1973) provides that "[a]ny consumer who
suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a
method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by Section 1770 may bring an action against such person...."

14. CAI. Civ. CODE § 1781(a) (West 1973).
15. CAL CrV. CODE § 1782(b) (West 1973) states that "[e]xcept as provided in
subdivision (c)" which addresses class actions, where an appropriate remedy is
given within 30 days or agreed to be given within a reasonable time thereafter, the
individual consumer cannot continue his cause of action.
16. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.

However, the fact that appellant had received individual relief
did not necessarily disqualify her from representing the class. To
avoid a class action under the Act, the prospective defendant
must make reasonable efforts to contact every member of the
class, notify these similarly situated customers of the appropriate
7
relief, provide such relief, and cease the challenged conduct.'
Thus, unlike the relatively simple resolution of individual grievances
under section 1782, subdivision (b), subdivision (c) places extensive affirmative obligations on prospective defendants to identify and make
whole the entire class of similarly situated consumers. This clear distinction . . .and the legislative preference for effecting informal class relief
18
pursuant to subdivision (c), guide our following analysis.

Therefore, whether Gibraltar's remedial actions were sufficient
turned on the scope of the notice received.
The majority found that the appellant's notice was sufficient to
establish a class action.' 9 The appellant's demand letter explicitly
stated that the alleged violations extended to "other IRA depositors. ' 20 Thus, Gibraltar's ameliorative responsibilities extended
to the entire class of similarly situated consumers.
Having established a class action, the fact that the class representative has received an individual remedy is not in itself sufficient to disqualify the plaintiff.21 The legislative history of the Act
demonstrates a clear intention to avoid such "picking off" of prospective class plaintiffs. 22 Thus, the appellant's cause of action is
not defeated simply because of her prior settlement.
III.

STANDARD FOR CLASS REPRESENTATION

Before a class action will be allowed, it must be shown that it is
impracticable to join all class members, the predominant questions of law and fact are substantially similar for the entire class,
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1782(c) (West 1973).
18. 35 Cal. 3d at 591, 676 P.2d at 1063-64, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 41-42.
19. Justices Mosk and Richardson dissented because they believed that Kagan's demand letter only requested individual relief. Since such relief was obtained, she could not instigate a class action. Id. at 597-98, 676 P.2d at 1068, 200 Cal.
Rptr. at 46 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
20. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21. Gibraltar maintained that the individual settlement with the appellant removed her from the class she purported to represent. See La Sala v. American
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 875, 489 P.2d 1113, 1119, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 855 (1971)
("The requirement that the representative be a member of the class derives from
the principle that joinder of plaintiffs in a class action should consist of those sharing 'a well-defined "community of interest" in the questions of law and fact
involved.' ")
22. Section 1782(c) precludes class actions only where all the listed conditions
are met. '"The intent was to make certain that a person can commence a class action 30 days after he has made a demand on behalf of the class even if the
merchant has offered to settle his particular claim in accordance with section
1782(b)." Reed, supra note 8, at 19.
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the representative plaintiff's claim is typical of the class, and the
plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. 23 The sufficiency of all these conditions is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. 24 The supreme court noted that
should the trial court conclude that appellant will not fairly represent the interests of the class, it should provide appellant with the
opportunity to amend her complaint to establish a suitable representative. 25 Following these procedures, if a suitable representative has still not been provided, the trial court should notify all
26
the members of the class before dismissing the action.
Consequently, the case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
IV.

COMMERCIAL LAW
Voluntary sale of goods by owner at auction
following repossessionfrom lessee not a 'forced sale"
entitling owner to secretly bid at the auction: Nevada
National Leasing Co. v. Hereford.

In Nevada National Leasing Co. v. Hereford, 36 Cal. 3d 146, 680
P.2d 1077, 203 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1984), the supreme court faced the
issue of whether the voluntary sale by the owner-seller of repossessed leased goods constitutes a "forced sale" by the seller
within the meaning of California Commercial Code section
2328(4). The term "forced sale" is not otherwise defined in the
code.
The case arose after Nevada National leased three items of construction equipment and later repossessed them upon default by
the lessee. Rather than re-lease or sell the equipment outright,
Nevada National arranged to have it auctioned. In addition, Nevada National made a secret agreement with the auctioneer to
have its own employee bid on the equipment without the other
bidders' knowledge in an effort to raise the bidding prices. The
plan succeeded. Hereford bought all of the equipment and paid
the auctioneer. A dispute between the auctioneer and Nevada
National arose, however, and Nevada National did not receive
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(b) (West 1973).
24. Rosack v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 131 Cal. App. 3d 741, 750, 182 Cal. Rptr. 800,
805 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983). See generally 5 B. WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE-EXTRAORDINARY WRIs § 106 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).
25. La Sala, 5 Cal. 3d at 872, 489 P.2d at 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
26. Id.

payment. They brought suit and Hereford cross-complained
claiming an illegal auction. Hereford was awarded reformation of
the contract price pursuant to section 2328(4) as well as punitive
damages. The supreme court affirmed.
Under section 2328, the buyer at an auction for the sale of goods
is protected from undisclosed, competitive bidding by the owner
and seller of the auctioned goods. Unless the seller publicly
reserves the right to bid, he may not do so. Under section 2328(4),
a breach by the seller permits the buyer to either: (1) avoid the
sale, or (2) take the goods at the last good faith bid. The only exception to the rule is for a "forced sale," the rationale being that
otherwise sellers would all too often receive unfairly undervalued
prices. Consequently, Nevada National argued they were within
the "forced sale" exception.
The unanimous court, however, felt that the inapplicability of
the exception was "manifest." Nevada National's sale was clearly
voluntary and several other commercially reasonable alternatives
were available. Thus, whatever the definition of a "forced sale,"
Nevada National did not fall within it. In addition, because Nevada National had conspired to fraudulently raise the prices with
an intent to injure the successful bidder, the court ruled that malice was sufficiently established to justify an award of punitive
damages.
V.

CONSTrUTIONAL LAW
Environmentalgroup permitted to encourage a
boycott of a newspaper's advertisersfor the purpose
of changing the newspaper's editorialpolicies:
Environmental Planning & Information Council v. Superior
Court.
I. INTRODUCTION

In Environmental Planning & Information Council v. Superior
Court,' the supreme court ruled that a politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change is constitutionally protected free speech. The case arose when the
Environmental Planning & Information Council (EPIC), 2 in its
1. 36 Cal. 3d 188, 680 P.2d 1086, 203 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1984). Opinion by Grodin,
J., with Bird, C.J., Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, and Reynoso, JJ., concurring.
2. EPIC is a nonprofit corporation with a purpose of promoting "citizen participation in public affairs and, according to its articles of incorporation, 'conservation and preservation of, and general public appreciation for, the unique historical
and natural resources' of western El Dorado County." Its county-wide membership totals approximately 100. 36 Cal. 3d at 190-91, 680 P.2d at 1088, 203 Cal. Rptr. at
129.
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newsletter, criticized a local newspaper's editorial policies and
suggested that its readers not patronize the businesses which advertised in the newspaper. The supreme court held in favor of
EPIC.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In April of 1982, an EPIC newsletter to its members criticized
the editorial policies of the Foothill Times, an El Dorado County
newspaper published by Detmold Publishing Company. Specifically, the newsletter complained that the Foothill Times backed
the election of pro-development directors to the El Dorado Irrigation District, printed inaccuracies, and editorialized in "news" articles. The newsletter suggested four ways 3 to combat "this
outrageous situation."4 The first method was to become informed
by careful reading, discussion of environmental issues with
others, and attendance at Irrigation District meetings.5 The second method involved readers voicing their opinions in letters to
the editor.6 The third method was for readers to contact advertisers of the Times and request they discontinue advertising in the
paper. 7 A final suggestion was that the readers refrain from pa8
tronizing businesses who advertised in the Times.
Two weeks after the newsletter was distributed, Detmold filed
an action against EPIC alleging intentional interference with economic relationship and libel. Detmold sought damages and an in3. The newsletter concluded with a proposal that the four present directors
of the El Dorado Irrigation District be recalled. Id. at 191, 680 P.2d at 1088, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 129.
4. Id.

5. The newsletter stated: "'he most important step is for you to be informed.
An adequately informed citizenry is the only hope for curing bad government....
If you read newspaper articles thoughtfully, talk to people, and attend EID meetings, you'll develop a fair grasp of what's going on."' Id. (emphasis in original).
6. '"The newsletter suggested: 'Whenever something puzzles you or infuriates
you, urite a letter to the editor. Small letters are big tools. Encourage other concerned people to do the same.'" Id. (emphasis in original).
7. The newsletter continued: "'What about contacting businesses advertising
in the Foothill Times and requesting that they discontinue that advertising? Freedom of speech is one thing; vicious, irresponsible journalism is another....'" Id.
(emphasis in original).
8. The statement read: "[Plerhaps you would prefer not to patronize businesses that advertise in such a publication." Id. Attached to the newsletter was a
list of 80 advertisers that had been compiled from two issues of the weekly Foothill Times. The list cautioned: '"This is not a black list! No condemnation of these
businesses is implied! This list is merely for your convenience should you wish to
contact Foothill Times advertisers." Id.

junction restraining EPIC from further making or publishing
similar statements. The trial court issued an order to show cause.
Meanwhile, EPIC demurred to the complaint, which the court
sustained as to the libel cause of action only. EPIC also moved
for summary judgment. Before the hearing on that motion, the
court granted Detmold a preliminary injunction, then later dissolved the same.9 Ultimately, the trial court denied EPIC's motion for summary judgment.
EPIC then sought a writ of mandate and/or prohibition commanding the court to grant its motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals denied the petition. The supreme court,
which normally does not intervene at the pleading stage of a
pending action,10 stepped in and issued an alternative writ. The
court believed intervention was necessary to prevent the infringement of EPIC's constitutional free speech rights." The supreme
court determined that no material triable issues of fact existed
and therefore ordered that EPIC's motion for summary judgment
12
be granted.

III. ANALYSIS
The court assumed, for purposes of analysis, that triable issues
of fact existed as to whether EPIC intended a boycott and
whether the newsletter resulted in a boycott. Thus, the court's inquiry focused on whether the issues were material and looked to
substantive law.
Under the common law, an unjustified intentional interference
with the prospective economic advantage of another may subject
the actor to tort liability.13 Justification depends upon a balancing
of the interests between the parties.1 4 The court acknowledged
that meager authority existed concerning situations similar to
9. The preliminary injunction barred EPIC from "interfering or inducing
others to interfere" with Detmold's contractual relationships with its customers
and advertisers. The court dissolved the injunction one and a half months later
after EPIC had sought reconsideration and clarification. Id. at 192, 680 P.2d at 1089,
203 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
10. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 851, 479 P.2d 379, 385, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179,
185 (1971).
11. See Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672,
685, 586 P.2d 572, 578, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 264 (1978) (unnecessarily protracted litigation has a chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment rights), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 961 (1979).
12. 36 Cal. 3d at 190, 198, 680 P.2d at 1088, 1093, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 129, 134.
13. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 822-23, 537 P.2d 865, 868-69, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 745, 748-49 (1975). See B. WrrKi, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw §§ 392-397
(8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
14. Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 56 Cal. 2d 202, 206, 363 P.2d 310, 312, 14
Cal. Rptr. 294, 296 (1961).
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EPIC's. The court recognized, however, that under common law,
EPIC's actions-attempting to change a newspaper's editorial policies on public issues by means of a peaceful secondary boycottwere lawful.' 5
The inquiry, according to the court, did not end with common
law doctrine. The nature of the case called for a constitutional
analysis as well. For guidance, the court looked to the United
States Supreme Court decision in NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware
Co.,16 which involved first amendment limitations upon the power
of a state to regulate secondary consumer boycotts directed at
political objectives. The Claiborne Hardware Court held that
states have no right to completely prohibit an organized attempt
to force governmental and economic change by means of a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott.' 7 In addition, Claiborne
Hardware recognized a distinction between solely economic boycotts and political boycotts which the EPIC court found to be crucial in its own decision: economic activities may be regulated
whereas "expression on public issues 'has always rested on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.' "18
The court refused to distinguish Claiborne Hardware as Detmold suggested.19 The objective of the ClaiborneHardware boycott was to vindicate fourteenth amendment rights of equality
whereas the EPIC boycott sought only to address environmental
issues. The court, however, believed that in both cases the boycotts were politically motivated and designed to force governmental change. The court found it irrelevant that the two groups
sought to change different political situations. Moreover, the
court believed first amendment "content" rules forbade it from
distinguishing between the degree of protection afforded various
15. Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 405, 409, 106 P.2d 411, 413 (1940).
Detmold had relied upon a court of appeal decision, Holt v. Superior Court, 100
Cal. App. 2d 403, 223 P.2d 881 (1950), to support a contrary view. The court found
nothing in the Holt opinion which even supported its own holding let alone supporting Detmold's position. Consequently, the court disapproved Holt. 36 Cal. 3d
at 194-95 n.6, 680 P.2d at 1090 n.6, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 131 n.6.
16. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
17. Id. at 914-15.
18. Id. at 913 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). See 36 Cal. 3d
at 196, 680 P.2d at 1091, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
19. Detmold sought to distinguish the cases on the basis of the objective
sought by each of the boycotts. 36 Cal. 3d at 196-97, 680 P.2d at 1092, 203 Cal. Rptr.
at 133.

ideas. 20 Finally, the fact that the boycott was aimed against the
editorial policies of a newspaper rather than a government did not
dictate a different result. The court noted that Claiborne Hardware upheld a boycott which sought to influence private citizens
by means of political expression. 2 1 In addition, Detmold could not
claim infringement of its own constitutional rights since no gov22
ernmental action was implicated.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In this case, an environmental group sought to change the editorial policies of a local newspaper which supported pro-development governmental office candidates by means of a boycott
against businesses that advertised in the newspaper. A unanimous court upheld the use of nonviolent, politically motivated
boycotts and thereby assured special interest groups of the freedom to exercise their first amendment rights of free speech.
VI.

CONTRACT LAW
Hospital'smalpractice insurance contract interpreted
to exclude doctors hired by patients;parol evidence
admissible to aid in interpretation: Garcia v. Truck
Insurance Exchange.
In Garcia v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 36 Cal. 3d 426, 682 P.2d
1100, 204 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1984), the supreme court was required to
interpret an insurance contract made between an association of
hospitals and a medical malpractice insurance carrier. It also had
to decide whether parol evidence was properly admitted to assist
in interpreting the contract.
The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action for wrongful
death against a Dr. Lewis, who negligently treated the deceased,
and the hospital where the treatment was given. The hospital
was insured by the defendant insurance company through a contract specifically excluding coverage of doctors privately hired by
20. The court stated:
As in Claiborne Hardware, however, [EPIC's] activities constitute a
"politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change" and the fact that the change which they seek bears upon
environmental quality rather than racial equality, can hardly support a
different result. On the contrary, we are precluded by the First Amendment itself from gauging the degree of constitutional protection by the

content or subject matter or the speech: "(Tihere is an 'equality of status
in the field of ideas."'
36 Cal. 3d at 197, 680 P.2d at 1092, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)) (citations omitted).
21. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911-12 (1982).
22. 36 Cal. 3d at 197, 680 P.2d at 1092, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
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patients. Because Dr. Lewis was privately employed by the plaintiffs, the defendant denied coverage, relying on the exclusion. Dr.
Lewis, who had no insurance of his own, permitted a judgment to
be entered against him, and assigned his rights against the insurer to the plaintiffs.
The trial court permitted extrinsic evidence, in the form of testimony by the general counsel of the hospital association, concerning the key policy exclusion. The attorney testified that the intent
of the contract was to specifically exclude privately hired physicians from coverage. The trial court ruled that Dr. Lewis was not
covered by the contract.
The supreme court affirmed, holding that the parol evidence
was properly admitted by the trial court "to prove a meaning to
which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible."
The court also held that the trial court correctly interpreted the
contract's intent. Contrary to the plaintiffs argument, Lewis was
not a third party beneficiary to the contract because he neither
knew of the contract or relied on it to his detriment. Furthermore, even if Dr. Lewis was an intended beneficiary, the court
would not apply the rule that insurance contract ambiguities
should be resolved against the insurer because the evidence indicated equal bargaining positions between the parties.
VII.

CRIMINAL LAW
A.

Repeal of mentally disordered sex offender
program did not affect persons previously
committed pursuant to the program: Baker v.
Superior Court.

In Baker v. Superior Court,35 Cal. 3d 663, 677 P.2d 219, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 293 (1984), the supreme court held that the trial court had
jurisdiction to extend the commitments of three mentally disordered sex offenders ("MDSO") under former California Welfare
and Institutions Code sections 6300-6330 despite the fact those
provisions were repealed in 1981. The petitioners argued that if
the legislature had intended to permit extended commitments
under the program, it would have provided an express savings
clause. After reviewing the legislative history of the program and
the language of the repealed statute, the court determined that
the legislature did not intend to preclude extensions of commit-

ments after the date of repeal for those persons who were in the
program on that date.
Further, the petitioners contended that extension of their commitments was a denial of their right to equal protection of the
laws. However, the court found that prospective repeal of the
MDSO laws provided no significant constitutional problem. As
the petitioners were already subject to the program, their commitment became no more onerous because the MDSO program had
been repealed. Indeed, the legislature's concern for public safety
and adequate treatment of these offenders is preserved by prospective repeal of the program. Accordingly, while it was determined that the MDSO program did not warrant continuation, its
repeal did not affect any person under commitment prior to the
effective date of repeal.
B.

To be convicted of a criminal offense as an aider and
abettor the defendant must be shown to have acted
with knowledge of the criminalpurpose of the
perpetratorand with intent or purpose of either
committing, encouraging,orfacilitatingcommission
of the offense: People v. Beeman.*
I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE

In People v. Beeman,' the California Supreme Court held that
the standard California jury instructions (CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and
3.01)2 did not adequately apprise a jury of the criminal intent re3
quired to convict a defendant as an aider and abettor of a crime.
Specifically, the court was of the opinion that CALJIC No. 3.01
was ambiguous with respect to the necessary mental state con4
cerning the aider and abettor's own acts.
In the case itself, the defendant, Beeman, was alleged to have
been extensively involved in the planning of a robbery. The actual perpetrators of the robbery, two friends of Beeman, testified
that he had provided them with the address of "rich relatives" as
well as descriptions of the automobiles driven by members of the
family and of a diamond ring owned by the victim worth $50,000.
Article contributed by John R. Crews, Note & Comment Editor.
1. 35 Cal. 3d 547, 674 P.2d 1318, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1984). Opinion by Reynoso,
J., with Bird, C.J., Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, JJ., and Sater, J. (assigned by the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council) concurring. Separate concurring and dissenting opinion by Richardson, J., Retired Associate Justice of the supreme court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. 1 CAL. JURY INST. CRiM. §§ 3.00, 3.01 (4th ed. 1979). See infra note 8 and text
accompanying note 10 for content of the jury instructions.
3. 35 Cal. 3d at 560-61, 674 P.2d at 1326, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
4. Id. at 560, 674 P.2d at 1326, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
*
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Beeman was also said to have provided the perpetrators with a
floor plan of the victim's house and to have agreed to sell the jewelry for twenty percent of the proceeds.
Defendant Beeman's own testimony contradicted that of the
perpetrators of the crime "as to nearly every material element of
his own involvement." 5 Nevertheless, Beeman was convicted of
robbery, burglary, false imprisonment, destruction of telephone
6
equipment, and assault with intent to commit a felony.
II.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Prior to the rendering of the verdict, the defendant had requested that the jury be instructed that "aiding and abetting liability requires proof of intent to aid [the perpetrator in
committing the crime].' 7 This request was denied by the trial
court. After the jury submitted questions regarding the nature of
liability, they were instructed in accord with the standard instructions contained in CALIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01." Beeman again requested that these instructions be modified. This request was
5. Id. at 552, 674 P.2d at 1320, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 62. For example, Beeman testified that the floor plan he had provided of the victim's house was solely for the
purpose of comparing it to his brother's house. Id. at 553, 674 P.2d at 1321, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 63. He also stated that he did not expect the perpetrators to go through
with the robbery and that he had informed them that he did not want to be involved. Id. One of the perpetrators testifled that Beeman did in fact become angry when he discovered how much jewelry had been taken but then demanded
that "his cut be increased from 20 percent to one-third." Id. at 552, 674 P.2d at 1320,
199 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
6. Although Beeman was not present during commission of the robbery,
under California law accessories before the fact are treated as principals to the
crime itself. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 971 (West 1970). California Penal Code section 971 provides that:
The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal,
and between principals in the first and second degree is abrogated; and all
persons concerned in the commission of a crime, who by the operation of
other provisions of this code are principals therein, shall hereafter be
prosecuted, tried and punished as principals and no other facts need be
alleged in any accusatory pleading against any such person than are required in an accusatory pleading against a principal.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 971 (West 1970).
This becomes important in the court's conclusion that aiders and abettors must
possess a criminal "intent" beyond having mere knowledge of the perpetrator's
criminal purpose and acting in a manner that aids the perpetrator. See infra notes
17-25 and accompanying text.
7. 35 Cal. 3d at 554, 674 P.2d at 1321, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 63. As authority for the
propriety of this instruction the defendant cited People v. Yarber, 90 Cal. App. 3d
895, 153 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1979).
8. CALJIC provides:

denied on the basis that a "slightly different instruction at this
point would further complicate matters." 9
The standard jury instruction given, CALJIC No. 3.01, provides
that: "A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the
crime, he aids, promotes, encourages or instigates by act or advice
the commission of such crime." 10 Beeman objected to this instruction on the ground that it has the effect of substituting the "element of knowledge of the perpetrator's intent for the element of
criminal intent of the accomplice, in controvention of common law
principles and California case law."'" This, it was argued, would
allow a finding of guilt where the accomplice harbored neither the
same criminal intent as the perpetrators of the crime, nor a spe2
cific intent to assist them.'
The People, on the other hand, argued that CALJIC No. 3.01
was in fact consistent with California law.' 3 However, the court
The persons concerned in the commission or attempted commission of a
crime who are regarded by law as principals in the crime thus committed
or attempted and equally guilty thereof include:
1. Those who directly and actively commit or attempt to commit the act
constituting the crime, or
2. Those who, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the one who
does directly and actively commit or attempt to commit the crime, aid and
abet in its commission or attempted commission, or
3. Those who, whether present or not at the commission or attempted
commission of the crime, advise and encourage its commission or attempted commission.
[One who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that
to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he is
also liable for the natural and reasonable or probable consequences of any
act that he knowingly aided or encouraged.]
1 CAL. JURY INST. CRIM. § 3.00 (4th ed. 1979). See infra text accompanying note 10
for text of CALTIC 3.01.
9. 35 Cal. 3d at 554, 674 P.2d at 1321, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
10. 1 CAL. JURY INST. CRIM. § 3.01 (4th ed. 1979). That instruction also includes
the following optional language: "Mere presence at the scene of a crime and failure to take steps to prevent a crime do not in themselves establish aiding and
abetting." Id.
11. 35 Cal. 3d at 555, 674 P.2d at 1322, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
12. The defendant argued that this error deprived him of his constitutional
right to due process and equal protection of the law. Although the court ultimately concluded that the instruction constituted reversible error, it declined to
decide whether the error was of constitutional dimension. 35 Cal. 3d at 562-63, 674
P.2d at 1328, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 70. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
13. The prosecution actually offered three lines of argument supporting the
propriety of the jury instruction given. First, the prosecution argued that California requires nothing more than that an aider and abettor "have knowledge of the
perpetrator's criminal purpose and do a voluntary act which in fact aids the perpetrator." Second, the prosecutor contended that defendants would not be liable for
acts committed under duress or acts which inadvertently aid perpetrators because
of the limitation that the aider and abettor must knowingly aid and is responsible
only for the natural and reasonable consequences of their actions. Finally, the
prosecution argued that the proposed modification was unnecessary because proof
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rejected the prosecution's argument, utilizing the opportunity
both to clarify the required mens rea for aiders and abettors and
to propose jury instructions that would adequately reflect that
mental element.
III.

ANALYSIS

The court's essential task in Beeman was to resolve a conflict
between two lines of appellate decisions. The first line of cases,
exemplified by People v. Yarber,14 supports the proposition that
an aider or abettor must have an intent or purpose to assist in the
commission of the criminal offense in order to be convicted. 15 The
second line of decisions, however, suggested that the aider and
abettor need only act with knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal purpose.16
The problem the court encountered with this second line of decisions revolved around the well established principle that an
aider and abettor must have criminal intent in order to be guilty
of a criminal offense.' 7 Such intent, of course, must be proved by
the prosecution.' 8 However, cases suggesting that knowledge of
of intent can usually be inferred from aid with knowledge of the perpetrator's purpose. 35 Cal. 3d at 555-56, 674 P.2d at 1322-23, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 64-65.
14. 90 Cal. App. 3d 895, 153 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1979).
In Yarber, the defendant was alleged to have asked a minor to orally copulate
her husband and was later convicted under Penal Code § 288a(c). The jury was
given the standard instruction embodied in CALTIC No. 3.01. The court reversed
the conviction holding that the jury should have been instructed that "a person
aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, he intentionally aids, promotes, encourages or instigates
by act or advice the commission of such crime." 90 Cal. App. 3d at 916, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 887 (footnote omitted).
15. Id. See also People v. Petty, 127 Cal. App. 3d 255, 179 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1981);
People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 466 P.2d 961, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1970), cert. dismissed,
406 U.S. 912 (1972); People v. Vasquez, 29 Cal. App. 3d 81, 105 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972);
People v. King, 30 Cal. App. 2d 185, 85 P.2d 928 (1938).
16. People v. Ott, 84 Cal. App. 3d 118, 148 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1978); People v. Standifer, 38 Cal. App. 3d 733, 113 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1974); People v. Tambini, 275 Cal. App.
2d 757, 80 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1969); People v. Belenger, 222 Cal. App. 2d 159, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 918 (1963); People v. Masters, 219 Cal. App. 2d 672, 33 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1963);
People v. Ellhamer, 199 Cal. App. 2d 777, 18 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1962). These decisions
were apparently responsible for the language used in CALJIC No. 3.01 along with
a misinterpretation of Terry, 2 Cal. 3d at 362, 466 P.2d at 961, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1970); see also People v. Tewksbury, 15
Cal. 3d 953, 960, 544 P.2d 1335, 1340, 127 Cal. Rptr. 135, 140 (1976).
18. California Penal Code section 1096 provides, in pertinent part, that:
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and in the case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt

the perpetrator's criminal purpose is sufficient were grounded
upon a presumption of criminal intent that arose from such
knowledge. 19 This, according to the court, effectively removed the
element of criminal intent from the prosecution's burden of proof
20
in cases involving aiders and abettors.
As suggested by Yarber,21 the facts from which a mental state
can be inferred should not be confused with the mental element
that the prosecution must prove. 22 In other words, although
knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal purpose combined with a
voluntary act furthering that purpose may create an inference of
criminal intent on the part of an accomplice, such facts may not
give rise to a presumption affecting the prosecution's burden of
proof. Indeed, as the court noted, direct evidence of a defendant's
mental state is rarely available and inferrences of intent must
often be drawn from the conduct of the accused. 23 However, the
defendant's actions may arise from "some other purpose which
precludes criminal liability." 24 In failing to recognize this distinction, the standard California jury instruction (CALJIC No. 3.01)
could "'technically allow a conviction if the defendant knowing of
the perpetrator's unlawful purpose, negligently or accidentally
aided the commission of the crime.'"25
The result of the court's analysis is that CALJIC No. 3.01 is ambiguous enough to permit a conviction where a voluntary intentional act aids in a criminal offense but not where there is no
finding of intent to encourage or facilitate that offense. 26 To alleis satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal, but the effect of this
presumption is only to place upon the state the burden of proving him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1970); see also B. WrrKIn, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE §§ 339-341 (1963).

19. See supra note 16.
20. 35 Cal. 3d at 557-58, 674 P.2d at 1325, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
21. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 895, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
22. 35 Cal. 3d at 558-59, 674 P.2d at 1325, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
23. Id. The apparently erroneous instruction contained in CALJIC may generally be said to have the effect of creating a presumption of intent and thus removing that element from the state's burden of proof. The California Evidence Code
provides:
(a) A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be
made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in
the action. A presumption is not evidence.
(b) An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.
CAL. Evm. CODE § 600 (West 1966) (emphasis added).
24. 35 Cal. 3d at 559, 674 P.2d at 1325, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
25. Id. at 560, 674 P.2d at 1326, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (quoting People v. Patrick,
126 Cal. App. 3d 952, 967 n.10, 179 Cal. Rptr. 276, 286 n.10 (1981)).
26. 35 Cal. 3d at 561, 674 P.2d at 1326, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
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viate this problem the court set forth the following suggested
instruction:
[A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2)
the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the comaids, promotes, encourages or
mission of the offense, (3) by act or advice
27
instigates, the commission of the crime.

In effect then, the jury must find that the accomplice acted with
knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and with intent
to aid or facilitate that purpose.
IV.

THE REVERSAL

Although Beeman had argued that the erroneous jury instruction violated his rights to due process and to equal protection of
the law, the court avoided determination of whether the instruction amounted to constitutional error. It was determined that
under the facts of this case it was "reasonably probable that the
jury would have reached a result more favorable to the appellant
had it been correctly instructed upon the mental element of aiding and abetting." 2 8 Thus, the court found that reversal was required under the "normal" harmless error standard enunciated in
People v. Watson.29 However, the possibility was left open that
use of CALJIC No. 3.01 amounted to constitutional error and thus
requires application of the stricter harmless error standard enunciated in Chapman v. California.O Justice Richardson was of the
opinion that, under these facts, the error was harmless under the
Watson standard and therefore the conviction should be
affirmed. 31
C.

Felony practice of medicine without a license not
inherently dangerous and therefore will not support
conviction for second degree felony murder: People v.
Burroughs.

In People v. Burroughs,' it was plainly evident that the felony
27. Id.
28. Id. at 563, 674 P.2d at 1328, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
29. 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956) (error is harmless unless it is reasonably
probable that a judgment more favorable to the appellant would have been
reached).
30. 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (where error is of constitutional dimension reversal is required unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
31. 35 Cal. 3d at 563, 674 P.2d at 1328, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
1. 35 Cal. 3d 824, 678 P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1984). Opinion by Grodin, J.,

murder rule is strongly disfavored. The supreme court will take
whatever liberties are necessary in order to avoid applying it.
Lee Swatsenbarg was diagnosed by his family physician as suffering from terminal leukemia. After reading Burroughs' book2
and being told of his unorthodox treatment of cancer, which included vigorous abdominal massages, 3 he agreed to undergo treatment by the defendant, an unlicensed practitioner of healing arts.
Swatsenbarg died three and a half weeks into the treatment. During the treatment, Swatsenbarg experienced severe pain, vomited
frequently, and suffered from convulsions. 4 The evidence suggested that Swatsenbarg died of massive hemorrhaging resulting
from the abdominal massages. Burroughs was convicted of unlawfully selling drugs, compounds or devices for alleviation or
cure of cancer,5 felony practicing medicine without a license, 6 and
7
second degree felony murder.
In order to sustain a second degree felony murder conviction it
is necessary that the felony committed-in this case the unlicensed practice of medicine-be judged "inherently dangerous to
human life."8 After setting forth the judicial disfavor of the felony
with Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, and Reynoso, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring
opinion by Bird, C.J. Separate dissenting opinion by Richardson, J., Retired Associate Justice of the supreme court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of
the Judicial Council.
2. Burroughs was the author of Healingfor the Age of Enlightenment.
3. The defendant said that he had cured thousands of people of cancer. The
treatment also included consumption of a unique "lemonade" and exposure to
colored lights. 35 Cal. 3d at 827, 678 P.2d at 896, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
4. The defendant also told Swatsenbarg not to undergo the treatment suggested by his physician. Throughout his suffering, the defendant told Swatsenbarg that he would improve and that things were going along as planned. Id.
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1707.1 (West 1979).
6. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2053 (West Supp. 1984). The statute provides:
Any person who willfully, under circumstances or conditions which
cause or create risk of great bodily harm, serious physical or mental illness, or death, practices or attempts to practice, or advertises or holds
himself or herself out as practicing, any system or mode of treating the
sick or afflicted in this state, or diagnoses, treats, operates for, or
prescribes for any ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder, injury, or other physical or mental condition of any person, without
having at the time of so doing a valid, unrevoked or suspended certificate
as provided in this chapter, or without being authorized to perform such
act pursuant to a certificate obtained in accordance with some other provision of law, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not exceeding one year or in the state prison.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1984).
8. People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 795, 388 P.2d 892, 907, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 635
(1964). The standard was adopted because it most nearly fit the policy of the felony murder rule-that one who intends to commit a felony will be deterred if he
or she knows that any death resulting from the commission of the crime will invoke the rule. If the felony is not inherently dangerous, the actor cannot anticipate that a death will occur due to committing the felony, and he or she will not be
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murder rule, 9 the court proceeded in a roundabout manner to
hold that the felony committed is not inherently dangerous and
could not support the felony murder conviction.' 0
The court followed the accepted test" in determining that the
felony of practicing medicine without a license is not inherently
dangerous to human life. The court applied the two-step approach of first looking to the primary elements of the offense and
then looking to the factors raising the offense to a felony. At each
level, the court had to decide whether the felony is inherently
dangerous to human life. In so doing, the court was able to concentrate on the elements of the felony in the abstract, disregarding the specific facts of the case. 12 In its restrictive application
the court sought to show how the felony could be committed in
ways that are not inherently dangerous, thereby concluding that
the offense, in the abstract, is not inherently dangerous.
The primary element of the subject felony-the practice of
medicine without a license-was easily determined not to be inherently dangerous. The court noted that simple medical procedures are practiced every day by laymen which are absolutely
free from danger.
Factors raising the offense to a felony-"cicumstances or condeterred. People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 458 n.4, 406 P.2d 647, 650 n.4, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 7, 10 n.4 (1965).
9. "This court has long held the felony-murder rule in disfavor. 'We have repeatedly stated that felony-murder is a "highly artificial concept" which "deserves
no extension beyond its required application."' " 35 Cal. 3d at 829, 678 P.2d at 897,
201 Cal. Rptr. at 322 (quoting People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 462-63, 668 P.2d 697,
709, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 402 (1983) (quoting People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582, 414
P.2d 353, 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 (1966))). See also People v. Henderson, 19 Cal.
3d 86, 92-93, 560 P.2d 1180, 1183, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1977); People v. Washington, 62
Cal. 2d 777, 783, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965).
The court has previously found felonies which are seemingly more violent and
dangerous than the subject offense as not being inherently dangerous to human
life. See Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d at 86, 560 P.2d at 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 1 (felony
false imprisonment); People v. Lopez, 6 Cal. 3d 45, 489 P.2d 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44
(1971) (escape from penal institution); People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 489 P.2d
1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971) (possession of a concealable firearm by an ex-felon).
10. It is important to note that Burroughs' conviction was for second degree
felony murder. In California, this is a judicially created doctrine. 35 Cal. 3d at 829
n.3, 678 P.2d at 897 n.3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 322 n.3. In Dillon, the court held that first
degree felony murder is statutory, and could not be judicially abrogated. 34 Cal.
3d at 463, 668 P.2d at 709, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
11. The test was first articulated by the court in Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d at 93-94,
560 P.2d at 1184, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
12. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d at 458 n.5, 406 P.2d at 650 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.5;
Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d at 93, 560 P.2d at 1184, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 5.

ditions which cause or create a risk of great bodily harm, serious
mental or physical illness, or death"a--required greater analysis.
The court first dealt with the "or death" component by noting that
the statute was worded in the disjunctive, indicating that it could
be violated without creating risk of death. The court then concluded that the "risk of great bodily harm" element did not make
commission of the felony inherently dangerous. For support, the
court compared statutes similar to the one defendant was charged
with violating.' 4 Cases decided under those statutes held that one
could be guilty of inflicting "significant or substantial physical injury" by causing relatively minor injuries.' 5 Therefore, the court
concluded, one could conceivably be convicted of the subject felony for causing a relatively minor injury, and therefore the felony
of practicing medicine without a license is not inherently dangerous to human life.
Although the court reversed the conviction based on the trial
court's erroneous second degree felony murder instruction, it felt
compelled to advise the trial court on involuntary manslaughter
instructions which the defendant had requested. The court's conclusion concerning the felony of practicing medicine without a license created a peculiar situation concerning an involuntary
manslaughter instruction. Involuntary manslaughter, as described in Penal Code section 192,16 punishes one for a killing
committed during an unlawful act which is not a felony. It also
punishes one for a killing occurring during the "commission of a
lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or
without due caution and circumspection."' 7 The problem for the
court was that the killing of Swatsenbarg did not fall into either
category since it occurred during the commission of an unlawful
act which is a felony. The court came to the rational conclusion
that a homicide committed in the course of a non-inherently dangerous felony could support an involuntary manslaughter conviction if the felony was committed without due caution and
circumspection.18 This conclusion best fits the definition of man13. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2053 (West Supp. 1984). See supra note 6.
14. California Penal Code section 243(5) defines "serious bodily injury" in part
by listing injuries considered to be serious. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(5) (West
Supp. 1984). They include such things as fracture and concussion. California Penal Code section 12022.7 defines "great bodily injury" as "significant or substantial
bodily injury" for sentence enhancement purposes. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7
(West 1982).
15. People v. Johnson, 104 Cal. App. 3d 598, 609, 164 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 (1980)
(broken jaw); People v. Kent, 96 Cal. App. 3d 130, 136, 158 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (1979)
(broken hand).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1984).
17. Id.
18. 35 Cal. 3d at 835, 678 P.2d at 901, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
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slaughter: "the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice."19
In a lengthy concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bird argued that
California should judicially reject the doctrine of second degree
felony murder.20 The Chief Justice chronicled the history of the
felony murder doctrine, and noted that it has met substantial disfavor among commentators. 21 Additionally, she noted that second
degree felony murder has been rejected by statute in some
states 22 and judicially in another. 23 The rule was also rejected in
England by act of Parliament in 1957.24 Above all, the Chief Justice felt that the second degree felony murder rule does not recognize "the important relationship between criminal liability and
the accused's mental state." 25 A defendant's liability for murder,
Chief Justice Bird noted, is based more on the fortuitous events
as they unfold than on his or her moral culpability.
Justice Richardson was alone in dissenting. In his opinion, the
elements of the offense which made it a felony supported application of the felony murder rule. Specifically, Justice Richardson
pointed out that, unlike the cases on which the majority relied in
rejecting application of the felony murder rule, 26 the statute violated by Burroughs specifically required a risk of actual harm or
injury. Additionally, Justice Richardson noted that the purpose
and policy behind the felony murder rule is to deter those involved in committing felonies from killing negligently or accidentally.27 He felt that application of the rule to the statute in
question would further the goal of deterring illegal conduct.
Given the general disfavor of the second degree felony murder
rule, it was not surprising that the court concluded as it did. The
19. CAL.PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1984).

20. 35 Cal. 3d at 836, 678 P.2d at 902, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 327 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
21. Id. at 838, 678 P.2d at 903, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
22. The felony murder rule has been rejected by statute in Hawaii, HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 707-710 (1976), and Kentucky, Ky.REV. STAT. ANN.§ 507.020 (BobbMerrill Supp. 1982). It was abolished in Ohio as early as 1857. Robbins v. State, 8
Ohio St. 131, 188-90 (1857).
23. Chief Justice Bird noted with approval the ruling of the Michigan Supreme
Court in People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980), which rejected the
second degree felony murder rule.
24. Homicide Act of 1957, ch. 11, pt. 1.
25. 35 Cal. 3d at 850, 678 P.2d at 912, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 337 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
26. See supra note 9.
27. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d at 93, 560 P.2d at 1183, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 4.

immediate impact of the court's holding-that felony practicing of
medicine without a license will not trigger the felony murder
rule-is not substantial. However, given the Chief Justice's indepth concurring opinion, and a footnote in the majority opinion
indicating a reluctance to question the overall worth of the rule
for the present time only, the second degree felony murder rule
28
may be on the brink of collapse.
The court's discussion of involuntary manslaughter, standing
alone, is of little practical significance except to apply a common
sense approach to problems of statutory construction. However,
if the court later abolishes second degree felony murder, the
court's holding may indicate a willingness to accept involuntary
manslaughter charges where applicable.
D.

Court upholds the defendant's murder conviction
arisingfrom death of a co-felon which occurred when
police fired in response to malicious conduct by the
defendant: People v. Caldwell.

In People v. Caldwell, 36 Cal. 3d 210, 681 P.2d 274, 203 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1984), the supreme court declined to alter the law concerning
felons' liability for an accomplice's death occurring at the hand of
a police officer. Under People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402
P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965), the felony murder rule cannot be
invoked unless a felon commits the killing. However, under the
rule of People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr.
909 (1965), vacated, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), defendants can be guilty
of their accomplice's death, entirely apart from the felony murder
rule, if the conduct of any co-felon (except the deceased) was intentional, evincing a high probability that death would result, or
manifesting malice or a conscious disregard for life.
The court affirmed the convictions of Caldwell and his accomplice for the murder of a co-felon following an armed robbery of a
fast food restaurant and subsequent shoot-out with police. The
court determined that the accomplice's pointing a shotgun at police officers during a chase, and Caldwell's apparent possession of
a gun in a possibly aggressive position just after the high-speed
chase, in which he had been the driver, constituted malicious conduct. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury
to reasonably find that the defendants' conduct was a substantial
28. The court made clear that "the time may be ripe to reconsider [the second
degree felony murder rule's] continued vitality." However, the court chose not to

address the overall application of the doctrine inasmuch as the issue had not been
briefed or argued. 35 Cal. 3d at 829 n.3, 678 P.2d at 897 n.3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 322 n.3.
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factor in leading the police to shoot the deceased co-felon, and
was therefore a proximate cause of the deceased's demise.
The defendants' suggestion that the Gilbert test be set aside because it rid the prosecution of having to prove the defendants'
culpable state of mind was rejected. The court maintained its position that the necessary culpable mental state can be shown
where one or more co-felons engage in conduct in which it is
"highly probable" that death would result, thereby evincing a
"conscious disregard" for human life.
E.

Court's refusal to instruct jury on a lesser uncharged
but related offense violated due process: People v.
Geiger.

In People v. Geiger,' the court ruled that, under certain circumstances, the refusal of a court to instruct the jury on a lesser offense not charged but related to the charged offense constituted a
denial of due process.
The case against the defendant centered around a broken window at Jack's restaurant in Santa Cruz. Shortly after 3 a.m. on
October 26, 1981, the police responded to a call reporting sounds
of broken glass. They found a sliding glass service window broken, with blood on some jagged glass which remained in the window. An unopened envelope, addressed to Jack's, was found on a
counter outside the window. 2 Nothing else had been damaged or
taken.
Geiger emerged from behind a dumpster and approached the
officers. They observed that his hand was bleeding. When questioned about his presence at the scene, the defendant claimed to
be on his way home from the Dragon Moon Disco, even though
Jack's restaurant was not on a direct route between the disco and
the defendant's residence. No other persons were observed in the
area. Later tests revealed that defendant's fingerprints were on
several of the broken pieces of glass.
Geiger was charged with burglary and attempted burglary. His
attorney hypothesized that the defendant had broken the window
out of anger and frustration, and that he lacked any intent to steal
1. 35 Cal. 3d 510, 674 P.2d 1303, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1984). Opinion by Grodin, J.,
with Bird, C.J., Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, and Reynoso, JJ., concurring. Separate
dissenting opinion by Richardson, J.
2. It was the practice to push mail under the window when the restaurant
was closed, but not to leave any mail on the outside counter.

or to commit any other offense within the restaurant. It was established that the owner of the Dragon Moon Disco, whom the defendant had previously approached for work, had asked the
defendant to "help out" at the disco that evening. After the defendant had stayed after closing to help stock the bar, he was informed that he would not be paid for his work. It was also
established that the cash register at Jack's was regularly left open
and empty and was in full view of the service window. In accordance with her theory, the defendant's attorney requested that the
jury be instructed on the offense of vandalism. The court refused.3 The defendant was convicted of burglary.
The court first touched briefly on the federal due process issue,
noting that the United States Supreme Court has not explicitly
held that a defendant in a non-capital case has a right to jury instructions on a lesser included offense. 4 The court's ruling, however, was grounded on the due process requirements of the
California Constitution.
The premise from which the court began is that, "[p]rocedures
necessary to ensure reliabilty in the fact finding process when the
state participates in the deprivation of personal liberty are required by due process." 5 In considering whether instructions on
lesser offenses might be "necessary to ensure reliability in the
fact finding process," the court stressed the possibility that a jury
might convict a defendant of a charged offense, even if the prosecution failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt,
because the jury was convinced that the defendant had committed some offense. The possibility that a jury's actual practice will
diverge from theory creates a risk that the jury will bypass the
reasonable doubt standard, a risk which impermissibly undermines the fact finding process by which the state undertakes to
deprive a defendant of his personal liberty. The court noted that
the "all or nothing" approach adopted by the trial court in refusing to instruct on the lesser offense could not be rationally justified. Neither the state nor the defendant has any legitimate
interest in obtaining an acquittal when the defendant is in fact
3. The jury was instructed only on burglary and attempted burglary. Vandalism was not a "lesser included offense" of the burglary charge. An offense is a
necessarily included offense if the charged offense cannot be committed without
committing the lesser offense, or if the accusatory pleading describes the charged
offense in such a way that the lesser offense would necessarily have been committed if the charging allegations are true. Vandalism is not a necessarily included
offense of burglary, as defined by statute or as charged in the instant case. 35 Cal.
3d at 517 n.4, 674 P.2d at 1306 n.4, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 48 n.4.
4. The court cited Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1979), in which the United
States Supreme Court held that such instructions must be given in capital cases.
5. 35 Cal. 3d at 520, 674 P.2d at 1307, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
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guilty of some uncharged offense, or in obtaining a conviction
where all necessary elements of a crime have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. "Our courts are not gambling halls but
6
forums for the discovery of truth."
The court thus expanded the requirement that instructions be
given on lesser included offenses, holding that, upon the request
of a defendant, a court must instruct the jury on any "related" offenses, rather than only those lesser offenses considered to be included offenses under the statutory elements approach. 7 The
requirement that the defendant consent to the giving of such instruction avoids the constitutional dilemma which might arise if
the defendant faced conviction of an offense neither charged nor
necessarily included in a charged offense. 8 However, the court
ruled that a defendant is not entitled to "have the jury presented
with a shopping list of alternatives to the crimes charged. . .. "9
The defendant requesting such an instruction must fulfill three
burdens. First, it must be shown that there is some reasonable
basis upon which the jury could find that the defendant is guilty
of the lesser offense rather than the offense charged. Second, the
lesser offense must be "related" to the charged offense. Such will
be the case where the evidence offered on the original charge is
also relevant to the question of whether the defendant might instead be guilty of the lesser offense. Finally, such an instruction
need only be given where the defense theory would be consistent
with conviction for the related offense. The court noted that such
an instruction would not be required where the defense theory
amounts to a complete denial of culpability. The court held that
these requirements were met by Geiger, and reversed the
judgment.' 0
6. Id. (citing People v. St. Martin, 1 Cal. 3d 524, 533, 463 P.2d 390, 394, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 166, 170 (1970)).
7. See supra note 3.

8. The court noted that "[d]ue process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence
offered at his trial." 35 Cal. 3d at 526, 674 P.2d at 1312, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 54 (citing
People v. Lohbauer, 29 Cal. 3d 364, 367-68, 627 P.2d at 183, 184, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 453,
454 (1981)).
9. 35 Cal. 3d at 514, 674 P.2d at 1304, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
10. Justice Richardson dissented, arguing that the court's ruling constituted
an unwarranted interference with the discretion of the prosecutor to determine
the appropriate charges.

F.

Defendant deprived of fair jury by use of voter
registrationlist; limitationsplaced on use of multiple
special circumstances in capital cases: People v.
Harris.

In People v. Harris,' the California Supreme Court was forced
to confront the question of whether a criminal defendant is deprived of a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community when the exclusive source for drawing jurors is a
voter registration list. The court was also asked to determine the
propriety of using multiple special circumstances arising from the
same course of conduct both to trigger the penalty phase of the
trial and to be used by the jury in determining the penalty.
Harris and another man were convicted of murdering a married
couple who managed a Long Beach apartment complex. They
had intended to rob the couple of the monthly rent receipts which
were due on the day of the crime. However, before the defendant
and his companions arrived, the money had been deposited in the
2
bank.

I.

EXCLUSIVE USE OF VOTER REGISTRATION LISTS TO DRAW THE
JURY VENIRE

The defendant argued that the exclusive use of voter registration lists to draw the jury venire violated his right to an impartial
jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. 3 Specifically, he contended that the method for drawing juries systematically excluded Blacks and Hispanics who, compared
to Whites, register to vote in proportionally lower numbers, regardless of their eligibility. At the motion to quash the jury venire, the defendant presented evidence that the ethnic
composition of the venire at the Long Beach court was not repre1. 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1984). Opinion by Broussard,
J., with Bird, C.J., and Reynoso, J., concurring. Separate concurring opinion by
Grodin, J. Separate dissenting opinion by Mosk, J., with Richardson, J., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Kaus, J. Richardson, J., Retired Associate
Justice of the supreme court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the
Judicial Council.
2. Id. at 43-44, 679 P.2d at 435-36, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85. In addition to the
murders, the defendant and one companion were convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of burglary. Another companion was granted immunity from
prosecution in exchange for her testimony.
3. The sixth amendment to the federal Constitution guarantees a defendant
selection of a petit jury from a representative cross-section of the community.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (jury selection system disproportionately excluded women from jury service). Article I, section 16 of the California
Constitution makes the same guarantee. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 272, 583
P.2d 748, 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 899-900 (1978) (prosecution used peremptory challenges to improperly exclude Blacks from juries).
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4
sentative of the general population.
In its analysis, the court was required to determine whether the
defendant established a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement as set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in Duren v. Missouri.5 In order to establish a prima facie violation, the defendant was required to show three things: (1) that a
"distinctive" community group had been excluded; (2) that the
group's representation on the venire was not fair and reasonable
in relation to its numbers in the community; and (3) that the
group's underrepresentation was a product of systematic exclusion from the jury process. 6 The Attorney General conceded that
7
the first prong of the Duren test was met.
The second prong of the Duren test required the greatest
amount of analysis. The court had to respond to the Attorney
General's contention that the statistical evidence presented by
the appellant was flawed in that it improperly counted the ethnic
make-up of the total population when comparing it to the venire.
The Attorney General argued that in order to fairly determine
whether the subject group in the venire was a fair representation
of the community, the venire had to be examined vis-a-vis eligible
voters (those also eligible for jury duty), not the total population.8

4. The defendant's evidence consisted of a study conducted by a sociology
professor. The study's results indicated that over a three month period 5.5% of
those arriving for jury duty at Long Beach were Black and 3.4% were Hispanic.
(Ninety-eight percent of those arriving at the Long Beach court for jury duty participated in the survey.) However, 1980 census figures showed that the Los Angeles county population was 12.6% Black and 27.6% Hispanic. 36 Cal. 3d at 47-48, 679
P.2d at 438, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 787. No special provision was made in the analysis for
any disparity that may exist between population percentages for Los Angeles
County and those of the Long Beach area specifically. Section 203 of the Code of
Civil Procedure provides that no juror be required to serve more than 20 miles
from his or her residence, CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 203 (West 1982), so chances are
that the jury venire surveyed at the courthouse consisted of residents of the Long
Beach vicinity, and did not include many, if any, people living 20 or more miles
away.
5. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
6. Id. at 364.
7. 36 Cal. 3d at 50, 679 P.2d at 440, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 789. It was agreed that
both Blacks and Hispanics form cognizable groups because each "share[s] with
other members of their groups a common perspective arising from their respective
experiences as a group, and no other members of the community are capable of
adequately representing their perspectives." Id. at 50-51, 679 P.2d at 441, 201 Cal.
Rptr. at 790.
8. If it is true that Blacks and Hispanics have more children than do Whites,
then a greater proportion of those groups will be made up of persons not eligible
to vote because of their age. Additionally, the possibility exists that disproportion-

The court, although not directly countering the Attorney General's argument, cited the defendant's statistical evidence that
Blacks and Hispanics fail to register to vote in much greater numbers than the population as a whole, 9 simply suggesting that the
lower registration rates naturally lead to disproportionately lower
representation on jury venires.1O The court therefore determined
that a proper showing could be made that there was unfair representation of the distinctive group on the venire by comparing it to
the group's representation in the total population. The court's determination was supported by considerable authority."1
The court found little difficulty in determining that the third
Duren prong was met-that there was a systematic exclusion of
the distinctive group. In matters involving lack of fair representation of juries it is not required that an intent to discriminate be
proven.' 2 All that need be shown is that there was some system
by which the distinctive group was not fairly represented. And all
that\is required to show systematic exclusion is "that the disparity 'is inherent in the particular jury selection process utilized.' "13
Given the Duren test to show a prima facie violation of the fair
cross-section requirement, the court had to determine how to alloately more Hispanics than Whites are old enough to register to vote but may not
register to vote for some other reason, such as non-citizenship.
9. In 1978, 37.4% of Americans eligible to vote were not registered. 36 Cal. 3d
at 52, 679 P.2d at 441, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 790. The same year, 42.9% of Blacks and
67.1% of Hispanics were unregistered. Id. at 52 n.6, 679 P.2d at 441 n.6, 201 Cal.
Rptr. at 790 n.6. Although the statistics presented tend to show disproportionately
low registration among some minorities, they are not, for some reason, taken exclusively from the Los Angeles area. The court's conclusion though is clear: if
Blacks and Hispanics do not register to vote as frequently as Whites, they will be
underrepresented on jury venires.
10. The Attorney General also argued that the defendant's statistical evidence
was possibly skewed because it only surveyed those people who actually showed
up at the courthouse for jury duty, not the "original contact pool." The original
contact pool consists of all people contacted by the jury commissioner, using voter
registration lists. People who were contacted by the jury commissioner, but eventually did not serve on jury duty, for whatever reason, were therefore not included
in the survey conducted to determine the ethnic composition of the venire. The
court rejected this argument in summary fashion, determining that the representative character of the panel that tried the defendant was the proper survey group,
not the original contact pool. 36 Cal. 3d at 53, 679 P.2d at 442, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
11. The court's analysis was supported by the United States Supreme Court's
holdings in Duren, 439 U.S. at 364-65 (use of census figures to determine proportionate representation of women) and Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96
(1977) (use of census figures to show disproportionate representation of MexicanAmericans on grand juries).
12. "It is also clear from the cases dealing with racial discrimination in the selection of juries that the systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such an 'unequal
application of the law . . . as to show intentional discrimination.'" Castaneda,430
U.S. at 493 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299, 241 (1976)).
13. 36 Cal. 3d at 58, 679 P.2d at 446, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 795 (quoting Duren, 439
U.S. at 366).
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cate the burden of proof. The court determined that the initial
burden is upon a defendant to show that there is a prima facie violation. If that can be done (as here) "[t] he burden then shifts to
the state to demonstrate either that with more refined statistics,
the underrepresentation would be reduced to a constitutionally
insignificant disparity, or that there exists a compelling justification for the procedure which results in the underrepresentation."14 In using "more refined statistics" the state can show that
there is no disparity of constitutional significance or that even by
using multiple sources to draw juries that some level of disparity
5
is unavoidable.'
In Harris,the state made no attempt to present "more refined
statistics" or show that there was a significant state interest behind the exclusive use of the voter registration list as the source
for drawing jurors. Therefore, since a prima facie violation of the
defendant's right to a jury from a representative cross-section of
the community was made, the court held that the violation was
prejudicial per se16 and demanded reversal.' 7
II.

SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES FINDINGS

The court was also forced to rule on the propriety of the trial
court's use of multiple special circumstances.' 8 The defendant
14. 36 Cal. 3d at 45-46, 679 P.2d at 437, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 786. The court's opinion
is disappointingly void of rationale or authority for its conclusion. However, similar conclusions were reached in Duren, 439 U.S. at 368-69, and Castaneda,430 U.S.
at 497-98.
15. 36 Cal. 3d at 59, 679 P.2d at 446, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
16. Id. at 59, 679 P.2d at 446-47, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 795-96.
17. Id. at 59, 679 P.2d at 447, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 796. No determination was made
as to the retroactive effect of the court's holding. However, in light of the 1981
amendment to section 204.7 of the California Code of Civil Procedure which mandates the use of drivers license and state identification card lists in addition to
voter registration lists for selecting jurors, the court's decision may not have a substantial impact in practice.
18. Special circumstances, generally speaking, are used to justify a more severe penalty because they tend to indicate the heinous nature of a defendant's
conduct. In a case where the penalty may be death, the jury determines whether
the defendant is guilty of the crime and whether any special circumstances
charged by the state are true. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1984). Special
circumstances are enumerated in section 190.2 of the Penal Code. Id. § 190.2. They
can be charged based on who the victim was (e.g., police officer), what the instrumentality of death was (e.g., bomb), or what other crime was committed in conjunction with the murder (e.g., robbery). If the special circumstances are found to
be true, a special hearing is held where the trier of fact determines whether the
penalty should be death or life imprisonment without possiblity of parole. Special

was convicted of two murders, and special circumstances were
2
9
charged for commission of a burglary,1 commission of a robbery 0
and being personally present during, and having the intent to
commit, a multiple murder. 21 Each of the special circumstances
was found to be true in the guilt phase of the trial, thus triggering
the penalty phase where special circumstances were again
22
considered.
The court found that in appropriate cases multiple special circumstances can be charged. The defendant had argued first that
charging multiple special circumstances prejudiced the jury
against him since only one special circumstance is necessary to
trigger the penalty phase. He also contended that designating,
through legislation, factors to be considered by a jury in determining the penalty violated his eighth amendment right to have
the death sentence determined by the trier of fact. The court easily rejected these arguments. The defendant's first argument was
countered by the statute's plain language which permits charging
multiple special circumstances. 23 The court responded to the second contention merely by referring to previously accepted standards permitting some legislative guidance for juries in
24
determining a possible death sentence.
However, even though the court approved of charging multiple
special circumstances, it concluded that the cumulative use of
special circumstances was improper. The court agreed that "particular special circumstances found to be true in the guilt phase
become aggravating factors in the penalty phase." 25 Where, as
circumstances may also be considered in the penalty phase. Id. § 190.4. Although
each of the sections pertinent to this case has been amended in some form, all are
sufficiently similar to their previous form so as to make the court's holding
important.
19. Id. § 190.2(c)(3)(v).
20. Id. § 190.2(c) (3) (i).
21. Id. § 190.2(c) (5).
22. See supra note 18.
23. The former section 190.2 of the Penal Code specifically permitted imposing
a penalty of death or life in prison without possibility of parole "in any case in
which one or more of the following special circumstances has been charged and
specially found .. " CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2. Included in the list that followed
was each of the special circumstances with which the defendant was charged.
24. In People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 172-84, 599 P.2d 587, 604-12, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 298-306 (1979), the court analyzed and upheld the California death penalty legislation. Particular attention was paid to the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), which had upheld Florida's sentencing law. That legislation permitted the jury to consider several mitigating and aggravating circumstances in recommending the penalty. The Frierson
court found that the California statute was sufficiently similar to the Florida statute so as to pass constitutional muster. 25 Cal. 3d at 179-80, 599 P.2d at 607-08, 158
Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
25. 36 Cal. 3d at 62, 679 P.2d at 449, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
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here, the defendant was charged with more than one special circumstance (burglary and robbery) emanating from "an indivisi26
ble course of conduct having one principle criminal purpose,"
"the defendant's conduct is artificially inflated ..... 27 The result, urged the defendant, was a contradiction of the policy of using special circumstances to focus only on the defendant's
particular conduct at the time of the crime. Additionally, the
court concluded that the cumulative use of special circumstances
was inconsistent with the dictates of Penal Code section 654,28
29
which prohibits double punishment.
The court fortunately cured the problem presented when multiple special circumstances are charged, by restricting their use to a
non-cumulative nature. It determined that the prosecution could
charge and prove any special circumstances supported by the evidence, whereupon the jury determines in the guilt phase which of
the special circumstances were committed. However, to avoid the
possibility that the jury will give multiple special circumstances
too much weight in the penalty phase, "in those cases involving a
single act or an indivisible course of conduct with one principal
criminal objective, . . . the multiple special circumstances should
be considered [by the jury] as one." 30 The prosecution will also
be barred from referring to the individual special circumstances
found to be true during the guilt phase but merged during the
31
penalty phase.
26. Id. at 62, 679 P.2d at 449, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
27. Id.
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West Supp. 1984) provides:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the
same act or omission under any other.
29. People v. Beamon, 8 Cal. 3d 625, 639, 504 P.2d 905, 914, 105 Cal. Rptr. 681, 690
(1973) (Penal Code section 654 limits multiple convictions in "those instances
wherein the accused entertained a principal objective to which other objectives, if
any, were merely incidental.").
30. 36 Cal. 3d at 66, 679 P.2d at 451-52, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01.
31. Id. at 66, 679 P.2d at 452, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 801. In addressing a similar problem the court held that multiple murders permit the charging of only one special
circumstance. Without such a rule, a defendant who killed two victims could be
charged for the murder of each victim and a special circumstance for multiple
murder could be charged separately for each murder.
The court was also faced in the case with an evidentiary problem. The defendant argued that the trial court improperly refused to adimit into evidence poetry
that the defendant wrote while he was in custody. The court agreed, holding that

III.

CONCURRING OPINION

Justice Grodin registered a concurring opinion because he felt
additional evidentiary proceedings were needed to accurately determine whether the state could show that there was no disparity
of constitutional significance in using only voter registration lists
to draw the jury venires. The state, due to a lack of appellate guidance, was unaware of what it must show once the defendant
proved a prima facie violation. 32 However, Justice Grodin preferred a judicial resolution of the case over a stalemate, and because his view more closely aligned with that of the majority, he
concurred.
IV.

DISSENTING OPINIONS

Justice Mosk (with whom Justice Richardson concurred) and
Justice Kaus registered dissents. Justice Mosk argued that the
statistics presented by the defendant were insufficient because
they reflected the make-up of the total Los Angeles County area,
not, as they should have, the area around the Long Beach court.
Additionally, Justice Mosk argued that class distinctions are
found in virtually any method of selecting jury panels. Be it property tax rolls, drivers license records, or even telephone books,
there will be a class of people left out due to an inability to afford
that which is necessary to get on the list.
Justice Kaus also felt that the defendant did not show a prima
facie violation because the statistics used represented all of Los
Angeles County, and not Long Beach specifically. He also disapproved of allowing the prospective juror survey to concentrate on
those actually showing up for jury duty. He felt that the survey
should include those contacted for jury duty, i.e., those who did
not serve as well as those who did. Justice Kaus' view is that the
majority, in effect, disregarded the original contact pool as being
irrelevant.
in a penalty phase of a capital case that a defendant should be granted broad powers to introduce evidence relevant to his character. The court determined that the
poetry fit within the mental state exception to the hearsay rule, CAL. EvD. CODE
§ 1250 (West Supp. 1984), and additionally carried its own indicia of trustworthiness in that it was written to the defendant's daughter, and not in contemplation
of litigation.
32. Justice Grodin expressed some displeasure with the statistics presented
by the defendant. Although not fatal to the prima facie case, he felt that population statistics should be refined to reflect only those over age 18. He also thought
that the population of the Long Beach area would be more appropriate than that
of Los Angeles County as a whole.
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V.

CONCLUSION

It is doubtful that there will be substantial practical impact on
jury selection as a result of Harris. Statutory changes made since
Harris' trial require that jury venires be drawn from multiple
sources. 33 However, if the current system is constitutionally challenged as creating an unrepresentative cross-section of the community, future courts will have guidance for applying the proper
test and the state will understand what showing will be necessary
to overcome a defendant's prima facie case.
The court's ruling with respect to charges of multiple special
circumstances should have some practical impact. By eliminating
the cumulative use of multiple special circumstances, the court
has properly rejected a fundamentally unfair system. Analysis
will now focus on the defendant's actions at the time of the crime,
not on how many special circumstances can be drawn from a single course of conduct.
G. Jury may consider sympathy for the defendant when
determining sentence in a capital case: People v.
Lanphear.
People v. Lanphear,36 Cal. 3d 163, 680 P.2d 1081, 203 Cal. Rptr.
122 (1984), was an automatic appeal from a judgment in which the
death penalty was imposed. The supreme court had previously
heard the case and reversed the original judgment as to the penalty only. People v. Lanphear,26 Cal. 3d 814, 608 P.2d 689, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1980). On remand, the defendant was again given the
death penalty. On this appeal, the defendant argued that the trial
court erred by instructing the jury not to consider sympathy factors in imposing the penalty. The supreme court again reversed
as to the penalty, holding that the trial court's instruction was erroneous and directly contrary to principles set forth in People v.
Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983). The
court ruled that the jury is obliged to weigh both mitigating and
aggravating evidence in determining the defendant's penalty.
Where mitigating evidence raises the sympathies of the jury, the
jury is free to act in response to those sympathies.
33. See supra note 17.

H.

Trial court abused its discretion in not referring a
minor defendant to the Youth Authority for a presentencing report: People v. Marsh.

In People v. Marsh, 36 Cal. 3d 134, 679 P.2d 1033, 202 Cal. Rptr. 92
(1984), a sixteen-year-old was sentenced to life in prison without
possibility of parole after pleading nolo contendere to several
felonies, including kidnapping for ransom with bodily harm. The
defendant moved the trial court, unsuccessfully, for an order
striking the ransom with bodily harm allegations pursuant to section 1385 of the Penal Code. Only with those allegations as part of
the charge could the defendant's life sentence be imposed without possibility of parole. Without the allegations, the defendant
could have been eligible for commitment to the California Youth
Authority. The trial court's decision not to strike the ransom with
bodily harm allegation was made after reviewing the probation report and psychological reports and evaluations.
The defendant urged reversal on three grounds. First, the trial
court failed to refer him to the Youth Authority for evaluation
pursuant to section 707.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Next, he also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to strike the ransom with bodily harm allegations. Finally, he argued that sentencing a minor to life in prison
without possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.
The court held that the trial court erred by not referring the defendant to the Youth Authority for a pre-sentencing report and
evaluation. It determined that the trial court should have such a
report in re-evaluating the defendant's sentence. Upon re-evaluation, the trial court would have authority under Penal Code section 1385 to strike the ransom with bodily harm allegations based
on the rationale of People v. Williams, 30 Cal. 3d 470, 637 P.2d 1029,
179 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1981), which permits the trial court to strike
findings of special circumstances which could subject a defendant
to life in prison without possibility of parole. It made no difference that the defendant sought to have an allegation struck rather
than a special circumstance.
The court specifically declined to consider whether sentencing a
minor to life in prison without possibility of parole is cruel and
unusual punishment. Language of the court, however, suggested
that it would be open to consideration of the issue.
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I.

The defendant's convictionfor second degree felony
murder reversed because the underlyingfelony of
child abuse was an integralpart of the homicide:
People v. Smith.

In People v. Smith, 35 Cal. 3d 798, 678 P.2d 886, 201 Cal. Rptr. 311
(1984), the supreme court held that the defendant could not be
convicted of second degree felony murder for the accidental death
of her child which occurred as a result of a beating delivered by
the defendant.
The defendant's daughter died of head injuries sustained while
the defendant was beating the child. The defendant was tried on
charges of second degree murder, felony child abuse, and child
beating. The second degree murder charge was based on the
common law felony-murder rule which makes any homicide second degree murder if it occurs during the course of an inherently
dangerous felony. The trial court instructed the jury that felony
child abuse was an inherently dangerous felony. Based upon this
instruction, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder, as well as of the child abuse charges.
The supreme court reversed the murder conviction based on
the rule established in People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d
580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969). In Ireland,the court held that the felony murder rule does not apply when the underlying felony is an
integral part of the homicide. This rule was modified in People v.
Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971), to allow
application of the felony murder rule when the underlying felony,
although integral to the homicide, was committed with an "independent felonious purpose." The court stated that the child
abuse in this case was integral to the homicide since the beating
was the "very assault which resulted in death." Furthermore,
there was no independent purpose for the abuse. Thus, the trial
court erred under Ireland and Burton in instructing the jury on
felony murder, and the defendant's conviction for murder had to
be reversed.

J.

No errorfor court to impose sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole when jury
cannot decide on penalty; no prejudice in
prosecution'suse of peremptory challenges against
jurors who are opposed to the death penalty: People v.
Zimmerman.

In People v. Zimmerman, 36 Cal. 3d 154, 680 P.2d 776, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 826 (1984), the supreme court held that a sentence of life in
prison without possibility of parole, when imposed by the court
after a jury cannot decide on the proper penalty, does not violate
the United States Constitution's eighth amendment ban on cruel
and unusual punishment. It also determined that the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges and challenges for cause
against jurors with strong feelings against the death penalty is not
prejudicial to a defendant at the guilt phase of a trial.
Following Zimmerman's conviction for two counts of burglary,
rape, and two counts of first degree murder with special circumstances, the jury could not reach a unanimous decision concerning punishment. The trial court, as required by California Penal
Code section 190.4(b), imposed a penalty of life in prison without
possibility of parole.
The court noted the distinction made by the United States
Supreme Court between capital cases requiring individualized
sentencing and imprisonment and those not requiring individualized action. The defendant's argument that such a system does
not permit the sentencing authority to consider the mitigating circumstances that it would consider for a capital sentence was
found to have no merit. The court noted that even sentences of
life imprisonment without possibility of parole may be altered by
the court, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 1982), or commuted by
the governor, CAL. CONST., art. V, § 8.
The prosecution used peremptory challenges against jurors who
expressed reservations about voting for the death penalty, and
against persons who would automatically vote against the death
penalty. The court ruled that neither class of persons is "constitutionally cognizable" so as to deny the defendant of a representative jury; at least as to the guilt phase of the trial. Since the
penalty was set by the court, it was unnecessary to reach the
question of whether such action would constitute reversible error
as to the penalty phase.
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VIII.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A.

Effective assistanceof counsel includes reasonably
necessary ancillary defense services and court may
order a county to pay for the services: Corenevsky v.
Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

According to the United States Supreme Court, an indigent
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.' In California, the legislature has expanded that
right so as to include ancillary defense services. 2 However, the
parameters of precisely what constitutes "effective assistance of
counsel" and how the right may be enforced remain uncertain. In
Corenevsky v. Superior Court,3 the California Supreme Court further defined the concept, including its partial composition, funding, and enforceability. Effective assistance of counsel includes
reasonably necessary ancillary defense services such as jury selection experts and law clerks. Moreover, the court proclaimed
that these rights must be enforced, and a court order directing
payment for such services at county expense must be obeyed,
even if a county has not specifically appropriated funds for defense services. In the latter instance, a court may issue an order,
enforceable by the power of contempt, that a county auditor make
payment for the services out of any funds and do so without prior
approval from the county board of supervisors.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4
Corenevsky involved three consolidated cases, all of which
arose from various parts of the same factual situation. Corenev1. United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044 (1984); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
2. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 730 (West 1966) (providing court-appointed expert witnesses); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987(a) (West Supp. 1984) (providing court-appointed counsel in noncapital cases); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(f) (1) (West Supp.
1984) (providing "legal counsel and supportive services").
3. 36 Cal. 3d 307, 682 P.2d 360, 204 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984). Opinion by Mosk, J.,
with Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, Grodin, Lucas, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Bird, C.J. Lucas, J., assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial
Council.
4. During the course of this case, Corenevsky was represented by eight
different attorneys, including three public defenders who later became district
attorneys. Due to the resulting conflict, the district attorney excused himself. The
Attorney General replaced him. In addition, the public defender was excused

sky was charged with both murder and robbery. The district attorney sought the death penalty. A public defender was
appointed because Corenevsky was indigent. In the first case, defendant sought mandamus review of superior court orders denying him state-funded ancillary defense services and the assistance
of a second appointed counsel. In the second case, mandamus
was sought to compel the dismissal of all charges against the defendant because the county refused to disburse funds for courtordered ancillary defense services. The final case concerned a
writ of habeas corpus sought by the Imperial County AuditorController to review a superior court order holding him in contempt for failure to disburse county funds.
A.

Section 987.9 State Funding

Corenevsky filed a motion under Penal Code section 987.95 to
procure state funds in order to secure a second, more experienced
trial counsel. The motion was denied without a hearing. On appeal, 6 however, the court of appeal ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing. At the section 987.9 hearing, a second counsel was
appointed under state funding. Shortly thereafter, the supreme
court ruled in Keenan v. Superior Court7 that appointments of
second counsel did not fall within the state funding provision of
section 987.9, but rather came within the county funding provisions of Penal Code sections 987(b)8 and 987.2.9 The trial court
granted the second attorney's motion to be relieved after the
County Board of Supervisors refused payment for services. The
court also denied a motion by Corenevsky seeking dismissal due
to the lack of a second attorney; instead, the court forbade the
after abandoning the case and new trial counsel and appellate counsel were
appointed to represent Corenevsky.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West Supp. 1984) provides in pertinent part:
In the trial of a capital case the indigent defendant, through his counsel,
may request the court for funds for the specific payment of investigators,
experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense....
The fact that an application has been made shall be confidential and the
contents of the application shall be confidential.. . . The ruling on the reasonableness of the request shall be made at an in camera hearing.
Corenevsky waived his right to keep confidential the fact that a section 987.9 application had been made. The waiver was for the limited purpose of allowing the
court to hear public oral argument and publish an opinion. 36 Cal. 3d at 314 n.2,
682 P.2d at 363 n.2, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 168 n.2.
6. The proceeding had already been to the supreme court. The court granted
a hearing then retransferred to the court of appeal with directions to issue an alternative writ of mandate. Id. at 314, 682 P.2d at 363, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
7. 31 Cal. 3d 424, 640 P.2d 108, 180 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1982).
8. This section provides for the court appointment of counsel in capital cases.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 987(b) (West Supp. 1984).
9. This statute provides for the court appointment of counsel in noncapital
cases. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2 (West Supp. 1984).
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prosecutor from seeking the death penalty. This ruling was not
challenged.O
The defendant's remaining counsel filed a second section 987.9
motion for funds to employ defense investigators and to hire experts which the court denied because the matter was no longer
"capital." Therefore, relief under section 987.9 was inappropriate." Corenevsky sought writ review in the court of appeal maintaining that equal protection and effective assistance of counsel
would be denied unless the court construed the case to be "capital" within the meaning of section 987.9. The court of appeal denied the petition. The supreme court granted a hearing.
B.

County Funded Ancillary Defense Services

During the pendency of the foregoing proceeding in the court of
appeal, Corenevsky moved the trial court for county funds for investigators, law clerks, and four expert witnesses, including a jury
selection expert. The court granted the motions and ordered
funds for the witnesses and investigators,"' but denied funding
for law clerks.13
Corenevsky again fied for writ review in the court of appeal.
He argued he was constitutionally entitled to publicly funded ancillary defense services and that the partial denial of funding was
a denial of equal protection, due process, and effective assistance
of counsel. The court of appeal denied the petition. On the same
day, the county refused to pay for the court-ordered witnesses
and investigators. Once again, the supreme court granted a
hearing.
10. In fact, by letter to the trial court and opposing counsel, one of Corenevsky's former counsel deliberately chose not to challenge these three court rulings
as a tactical maneuver. 36 Cal. 3d at 317-18, 682 P.2d at 365, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
11. Section 987.9 applied only to "capital cases." See supra note 5.
12. Originally, the trial court had denied funds for investigators. However,
sometime prior to the case reaching the supreme court, the trial court reversed itself and ordered funding. Consequently, the supreme court declined to decide the
propriety of that part of the court order. 36 Cal. 3d at 320-21, 682 P.2d at 367, 204
Cal. Rptr. at 172.
13. The motions had been made pursuant to a number of statutes: CAL. EID.
CODE § 730 (West Supp. 1984) (appointment of experts); CAL. EvID. CODE § 731
(West 1966) (payment of court-appointed experts); CAL PENAL CODE § 987.6 (West
Supp. 1984) (partial reimbursement by state for cost of court-appointed counsel);
and CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8 (West Supp. 1984) (reimbursement by defendant for
legal assistance). The court ordered a total of $13,314 for defense services in this
order alone. 36 Cal. 3d at 315, 682 P.2d at 364, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 169.

C. Order of Contempt
Corenevsky filed a third writ of mandate in the court of appeal,
naming the People and the Imperial County Superior Court as respondents. The defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial
because of the continual refusals of the county to disburse funds
for the court-ordered defense services; therefore, he urged dismissal of all charges. The People countered that dismissal was inappropriate and that the proper remedy was enforcement of the
court order. The appellate court agreed and issued an order commanding the county auditor to pay for the court-ordered defense
services or show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
The court rejected the auditor's contention that because he was a
nonparty the court lacked jurisdiction.14 Nevertheless, the auditor
refused to disburse funds. Thereafter, the auditor was cited for
contempt, fined, and ordered to jail until he completed disbursement of the funds.
While execution was stayed, the auditor filed a petition for
habeas corpus and application for a stay in the court of appeal.
The trial court stay expired and the auditor was placed in jail.
Subsequently, the court of appeal denied the petition and the
stay. The auditor fied a second petition and request for stay in
the supreme court, both of which were granted.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Section 987.9 State Funding

In Sand v. Superior Court,'5 the supreme court unequivocally
stated: "In those murder cases . . . in which the death penalty
will not be sought, even though the offense charged is statutorily
punishable by death, section 987.9 is inapplicable." Inasmuch as
Corenevsky failed to challenge the trial court's order relieving the
second attorney and forbidding the prosecutor from seeking the
death penalty, he intentionally waived those claims as well as the
claim that the case should be considered "capital."' 6 Moreover,
only a case in which the death penalty may be imposed can be
called a "capital case." 17 Therefore, because section 987.9 applies
only to death penalty cases, all of Corenevsky's claims under the
writ of mandate seeking dismissal of charges were rejected and
the writ denied. However, the court noted, both statutory and
constitutional law may offer indigent defendants access to county
14.
section
15.
16.
17.

The court of appeal ordered the auditor to comply with Government Code
29122.
34 Cal. 3d 567, 572, 668 P.2d 787, 790, 194 Cal. Rptr. 480, 483 (1984).
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Sand, 34 Cal. 3d at 572, 668 P.2d at 790, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
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funds for "equivalent relief."'
B.

8

Propriety of the Orders

Evidence Code section 730 expressly provides for court-appointed expert witnesses.19 Evidence Code section 731(a) 20 and
Government Code section 2960321 require the county to pay for
those expenses. Those sections do not, however, provide for law
clerks or experts other than those enumerated. Nonetheless, the
court believed that the right to those services could be inferred
from Penal Code sections 987(a) and 987.8(f)(1),22 and more importantly, could be required by the constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. 23 The latter right is guaranteed by both the
federal and state constitutions. 24 Moreover, in California, that
right also includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary de25
fense services.
18. 36 Cal. 3d at 318, 682 P.2d at 365, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (citing Sand, 34 Cal.
3d at 575 &nn.3 & 4, 668 P.2d at 792 & nn.3 &4, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 486 & nn.3 &4).
19. Evidence Code section 730 provides in pertinent part: "When it appears to
the court, at any time ... that expert evidence is or may be required by the court
or by any party... the court... may appoint one or more experts..

.

. The court

may fix the compensation for such services... at such amount as seems reasonable to the court." CAL. EvD. CODE § 730 (West Supp. 1984).
20. Evidence Code section 731(a) provides in relevant part: "In all criminal actions ... the compensation fixed under section 730 shall be a charge against the
county in which such action ... is pending and shall be paid out of the treasury of
such county on order of the court." CAL. EVID. CODE § 731(a) (West Supp. 1984).
21. Government Code section 29603 provides in pertinent part: 'The sums required by law to be paid to . . . witnesses in criminal cases tried in a superior
court ... are county charges." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 29603 (West 1968).
22. According to the court in Sand:
Section 987, subdivision (a), provides for court appointment of counsel in
noncapital cases; section 987.8, subdivision (f)(1), provides that, based on
a defendant's present ability to pay, he may be required to reimburse the
court for "legal assistance" provided, and further defines "legal assistance
provided" to include: "legal counsel and supportive services including, but
not limited to, medical and psychiatric examinations, investigative services, expert testimony, and any otherform of services provided to assist the
defendant in the preparationand presentation of defendant's case."
Sand, 34 Cal. 3d at 575 n.3, 668 P.2d at 792-93 n.3, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 486 n.3 (emphasis
added).
23. 36 Cal. 3d at 319, 682 P.2d at 366, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
24. U.S. CONST., amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I,

§

15.

25. Keenan, 31 Cal. 3d at 428, 640 P.2d at 110, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 491; In re Ketchel,
68 Cal. 2d 397, 438 P.2d 625, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1968) (includes the right to counsel
and to expert assistance); Puett v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 936, 938-39, 158
Cal. Rptr. 266, 267 (1979) (includes the right to an investigator); People v. Faxal, 91
Cal. App. 3d 327, 330, 154 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134 (1979) (includes the right to ancillary
services).

The issue thus became whether Corenevsky had established
that the requested defense services were reasonably necessary in
reference to "'the general lines of inquiry he wishes to pursue,
being as specific as possible.' "26 Because of the difficulty of meeting this requirement at such an early stage in the proceedings, a
court should "'view with considerable liberality a motion for such
pretrial assistance.' "27
At the People's urging, the court reviewed the trial court's
granting of funds for a jury selection expert. Although the court
expressly disclaimed general approval of public funds for such experts, 28 the court upheld the order as being within the lower
29
court's sound discretion.
The order denying the requested law clerks posed a different
question. Corenevsky had sufficiently demonstrated to the trial
court that the law clerks were reasonably necessary rather than a
mere convenience. 30 Although an appellate court typically will
not second-guess such a trial court determination, 31 the court felt
this case differed from the norm. The lower court had not based
its ruling on a determination of necessity. Instead, the trial court
believed the request related to "staffing problems" and issued its
ruling under the mistaken view it was without authority to authorize such services. 3 2 Under these circumstances, the court determined that the denial of law clerks was error.
The auditor argued that sufficient funds had not been appropriated to cover the court-ordered expenses. Further, under Government Code sections 2912033 and 29121,34 the auditor would have
26. Faxe, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (1979).
27. Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1974).
28. 36 Cal. 3d at 321, 682 P.2d at 368, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
29. A trial court order is presumed correct. Therefore, it will be set aside only
upon an affirmative showing of manifest abuse. Denham v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.
3d 557, 564, 468 P.2d 193, 197, 86 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69 (1970).
30. 36 Cal. 3d at 321-23, 682 P.2d at 368-69, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74.
31. An order denying a motion will be reversed only when, "the circumstances
shown compelled the [trial] court to exercise its discretion only in one way,
namely, to grant the motion." Puett 96 Cal. App. 3d at 941, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
32. The trial court apparently believed that it had no authority to order public
funds for ancillary services other than for expert witnesses under Evidence Code
section 731. 36 Cal. 3d at 323, 682 P.2d at 369, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
33. Government Code section 29120 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the board and every other county or
special district official and person shall be limited in the making of expenditures or the incurring of liabilities to the amount of the appropriations allowed by the budget or as thereafter revised by addition,
cancellation or transfer.
CAL. Gov'r CODE § 29120 (West 1968).

34. Government Code section 29121 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, warrants issued, expenditures
made, or liabilities incurred in excess of the budget appropriations are not
a liability of the county or special district, but the official making or incur-
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been subject to personal liability for any disbursements in excess
of appropriated funds. Thus, under Government Code section
29130,35 only the board of supervisors had authority to provide for
the funds, and since they had refused to do so, the court order
could not legally be paid.
In rejecting this argument, the court noted that certain statutes, 3 6 as well as the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel, authorize courts to order defense services at county expense. 37 Those expenses are "county charges" which an auditor
is required to pay without regard to specific appropriations. 3 8
Consequently, because the legislature placed a duty on the auditor and the board of supervisors to pay such charges, the court rejected the separation of powers argument asserted by the
auditor.39 Moreover, the court subsequently used the separation
of powers doctrine as the basis for its ruling against the auditor,
stating: "the trial court alone has authority to determine-in camera-whether reasonable need for defense services has been
shown, and the county is powerless to review confidential defense
ring the expenditure in an amount known by him to be in excess of the
unencumbered balance of the appropriation against which it is drawn is
liable therefor personally and upon his official bond.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 29121 (West 1968).
35. Government Code section 29130 provides in relevant part:
Balances in appropriations for contingencies, including accretions from
cancellation of specific appropriations, and revenues from any source...
and charges for current services, which are either in excess of anticipated
amounts or are not specifically set forth in the budget, may be made available for specific appropriation by a four-fifths vote of the board....
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 29130 (West Supp. 1984).
36. See, e.g., supra note 2.
37. The court stated:
In all such cases the court-ordered services are "expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or convicted of crime and
committed to the county jail... andfor other services in relation to criminal proceedingsfor which no specific compensation is prescribed by law.
36 Cal. 3d at 324, 682 P.2d at 370, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 175 (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 29602) (emphasis added by the court).
38. Government Code section 29741(d) provides in relevant part:
The auditor shall audit and allow ... claims in lieu of, and with the same
effect as, allowance ...by the board of supervisors in any of the following
cases:
(d) Expenditures for charges incurred by the county pursuant to the
provisions of Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 29600) of this division.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 29741 (West Supp. 1984).
39. "The court transgresses no constitutional barrier when it orders a county
auditor to proceed in accordance with those statutory provisions." 36 Cal. 3d at
325, 682 P.2d at 371, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 176.

requests or to modify or veto that determination." 40 A county
may, however, challenge this type of court order within the court
4
system. 1
The court found further support for its ruling in Government
Code section 29122.42 That statute authorized the board of supervisors and the auditor to exceed appropriations and issue warrants against any budget when ordered to do so by the court.
Compliance with this statute would sustain the doctrine of separation of powers. 43 In conclusion, the court denied Corenevsky's
petition for mandate for dismissal of charges, believing that the
auditor would no longer refuse to comply witl the court order.
C. Propriety of the Contempt Order
Although prior case law required that an auditor be a party to a
mandate proceeding before he could be subject to contempt," the
court believed the cases so holding to be outdated and inapplicable. 45 Today, it is enough that a person has ;a chance to appear
before the court and defend his failure to comply with a court order.4 6 Moreover, because there was sufficient evidence to sustain
a judgment of contempt, the order was proper. As explained
above, the auditor had no legal reason to refuse to comply with
the court order; 47 thus, his noncompliance was sufficient for him
to be held in contempt. The auditor's writ of habeas corpus was
denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The supreme court in Corenevsky has further defined the
bounds of the statutory and constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Under both, an indigent defendant has the right
to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services at county expense, including experts, investigators, law clerks, and quite pos40. Id.

41. "Although the county is free to challenge court orders in the courts, it is
impotent to review and reject such orders on its own." ./1.(footnote omitted).
42. Government Code section 29122 provides in pertinent part:
The board shall approve no claim and the auditor shall issue no warrant
for any expenditure in excess of the budget appropriation therefor, except
upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction,for an emergency, or as
otherwise provided by law.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 29122 (West Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
43. 36 Cal. 3d at 326, 682 P.2d at 372, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
44. Ex parte Truman, 124 Cal. 387, 388, 57 P. 223, 224 (1899); Ex parte Widber,
91 Cal. 367, 370-71, 27 P. 733, 734-35 (1891); Sargent v. Cavis, 36 Cal. 552, 558 (1869).
45. 36 Cal. 3d at 327, 682 P.2d at 372, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
46. In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 148-49, 436 P.2d 273, 281, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 281
(1968).
47. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
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sibly, a second, more experienced counsel. These rights must be
enforced by court order. In turn, a duty devolves upon the county
auditor to pay these court-ordered "county charges" regardless of
whether specific funds have been appropriated for such services
and regardless of whether the county board of supervisors is in
agreement. Failure to pay these charges subjects the auditor to
personal contempt-including a fine and jail time. Should the
county disagree with the court-ordered expenses, its only remedy
is to challenge the order in the courts.
B.

Constitutionalright to an interpreterprohibits courts
from "borrowing"defendant's interpreterto aid in
examination of witnesses: People v. Aguilar.

In People v. Aguilar, 35 Cal. 3d 785, 677 P.2d 1198, 200 Cal. Rptr.
908 (1984), the supreme court held that a non-English-speaking
defendant has a state constitutional right to have his interpreter
available throughout the criminal proceedings, and, unless the defendant personally waives the right, failure to provide the interpreter requires reversal.
An interpreter was appointed for the defendant at his trial for
murder. During the trial the interpreter was "borrowed" by the
court, with the consent of defense counsel, to interpret the testimony of two of the People's witnesses. The defendant was convicted and later appealed on the grounds that his constitutional
right to an interpreter was violated.
Article I, section 14 of the California Constitution entitles nonEnglish-speaking defendants to have an interpreter "throughout
the proceedings." While the interpreter was interpreting for the
People's witnesses, the defendant was deprived of the ability to
communicate with his attorney or the court. The supreme court
held that this denied the defendant his constitutional right.
The court went on to determine that the defendant had not
waived his constitutional right by virtue of his attorney's consent.
The court stated that a personal waiver by the defendant was necessary. Since no such waiver had been given, the defendant's
conviction was reversed.

C.

Prosecutionfailed to justify a detention on grounds
that defendant was in an area known for drug
trafficking at night and that he attempted to avoid
the police: People v. Aldridge.

In People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 674 P.2d 240, 198 Cal. Rptr.
538 (1984), the supreme court held that evidence discovered during a patdown search of the defendant should have been excluded
because the defendant had been unlawfully detained.
During a nighttime patrol, a police officer drove into a liquor
store parking lot intending to conduct "field interviews" with everyone gathered in the lot. The officer conducted such interviews
on a routine basis. The defendant and some other men left the
scene and the officer called a nearby patrol car to have the men
stopped and interviewed. After he was stopped, the defendant
was subjected to a pat-down search in which a stolen handgun
was discovered. When the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the gun was denied, he pled guilty to receiving stolen
property and then appealed on the grounds that he was unreasonably detained and therefore any evidence discovered was
inadmissible.
The People presented three objective factors which they
claimed justified the defendant's detention: (1) it was nighttime;
(2) it was "an area of continuous drug transactions;" and (3) the
defendant sought to avoid the police. The supreme court considered these factors and determined that, whether examined separately or together, they did not justify the detention. The court
stated that there was nothing suspicious about being outside a liquor store at night and that persons may not be detained simply
because they are in a high crime area. Finally, the court determined that, under the circumstances, the defendant was justified
in leaving the area when he saw the police officer since the defendant was acquainted with the officer's routine practice of conducting field interviews of everyone in the parking lot. The court
characterized the defendant's "flight" as an attempt to avoid harrassment by the police. Since the People were unable to show
"objective, specific, and articulable facts" calling for detention, the
defendant's motion to suppress was improperly denied.
D.

Police must obtain a warrant before acquiringa
suspect's unlisted name and addressfrom the
telephone company: People v. Chapman.

Has a police officer violated a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy by obtaining the unlisted name and address of a
police suspect from the telephone company without a warrant?
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This issue was presented to the supreme cowt in People v. Chapman, 36 Cal. 3d 98, 679 P.2d 62, 201 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1984).
In the prosecution of defendants for conspiracy to commit bookmaking, the defendants, McGee and Chapman, contended that a
search warrant was issued pursuant to illegally obtained information. Consequently, the defendants moved to suppress all evidence resulting from that search. An informant had provided the
police with the phone number she called in order to place bets,
and the identity of the individual to whom she paid her gambling
debts. The police then contacted the phone company and obtained the name and address of the first defendant, McGee, from
the unlisted phone number without first obtaining a warrant. Relying on this information, the police swore out an affidavit and obtained a search warrant for defendant McGee's home and car.
Based on the evidence seized, the police aiTested both McGee
and Chapman-the man identified by the informant as the person
to whom she paid her gambling debts.
The entire case against defendant McGee was founded on the
unlisted phone number and the subsequent search of her home
made possible by information obtained from the telephone company. The court held that McGee had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the unlisted information which was protected under article 1, section 13 of the California Constitution and that a warrantless search to obtain that information was per se
unreasonable. Consequently, the search warnant was held invalid
and the trial court's order suppressing the evidence as to McGee
was proper. Defendant McGee's motion to set aside the information was therefore granted.
However, granting McGee's motion did not; necessarily require
that her alleged co-conspirator's motion also be granted. Chapman argued that since McGee was acquitted, all remaining conspirators must also be acquitted. The court determined that
granting McGee's motion could not be characterized as an acquittal. Since sufficient untainted evidence had been introduced to
hold Chapman on the charge of conspiracy to commit bookmaking, the trial court's order granting his motion to set aside the information was improper.

E.

Defendant held to have been denied effective
assistance of counsel at probation revocation
hearing: People v. Shaw.

In People v. Shaw, 35 Cal. 3d 535, 674 P.2d 759, 198 Cal. Rptr. 788
(1984), the supreme court granted the defendant's petition for
habeas corpus on the grounds that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel. In addition, the court discussed the duties
of a court interpreter.
The defendant's probation was revoked following his arrest for
robbery. The robbery charge was later dismissed. The defendant
appealed the revocation while also filing a writ of habeas corpus.
He claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel,
principally because of the attorney's failure to investigate the defendant's alibi defense.
An evidentiary hearing on the habeas corpus petition was conducted by a referee who concluded that the defendant's counsel
had failed to act with reasonable competence, but that the failure
did not deprive the defendant of a "potentially meritorious defense." See People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 732 (1979) (standards for measuring an attorney's
performance).
The supreme court agreed with the referee that the defense
counsel was not competent, but concluded, based on its own review of the record, that the defendant was deprived of a "potentially meritorious defense." For this reason, the defendant's
petition was granted and the judgment revoking probation was
vacated. Justice Broussard concurred in a separate opinion in
which he criticized the practice of holding probation revocation
hearings prior to trials.
The court added a cautionary note to counsel and courts to ensure that interpreters in court accurately translate verbatim all
questions and answers. Counsel in this case had failed to object
when an interpreter used the third person form in his translations, and although not prejudicial in this case, the court stressed
that verbatim translations were important.
F.

Supreme court establishes appropriateappellate
review when prosecution seeks to have criminal
chargesreinstatedpursuant to Penal Code section
871.5following dismissal by a magistrate: People v.
Slaughter.

In August of 1980, charges of murder 1 and possession of a con1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1984).
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cealable firearm by an ex-felon 2 were filed against Terry L.
Slaughter. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the murder charge against the defendant. 3 Arguing that "substantial evidence" had been presented, the
prosecution unsuccessfully sought to have the charge reinstated
pursuant to Penal Code section 871.5.4 In People v. Slaughter,5 the
supreme court determined the applicable standard of review of a
magistrate's ruling pursuant to section 871.5.6
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 22, 1980, a uniformed security guard was killed while
parked at a vacant gas station in Oakland.7 A subsequent police
investigation determined that the victim had been shot with a .22
caliber bullet and that his .38 caliber pistol and wallet were missing.8 Twelve days later, the defendant, in possession of the sto2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021 (West Supp. 1984).

3. The charge was dismissed pursuant to Penal Code section 871, which provides in pertinent part: "If, after hearing the proofs, it appears either that no public offense has been committed or that there is not sufficient cause to believe the
defendant guilty of a public offense, the magistrate shall order the complaint dismissed... ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 871 (West Supp. 1984).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 871.5 (West Supp. 1984) provides in pertinent part:
(a) When an action is dismissed by a magistrate pursuant to Section
859b, 861, 871, 1008, 1381, 1381.5, 1385, 1387, or 1389, or a portion thereof is
dismissed pursuant to those same sections which may not be charged by
information under the provisions of Section 739, the prosecutor may make
a motion in the superior court within 15 days to compel the magistrate to
reinstate the complaint or a portion thereof and to reinstate the custodial
status of the defendant under the same terms and conditions as when the
defendant last appeared before the magistrate.
(b) Notice of the motion shall be made to the defendant and the magistrate. The only ground for the motion shall be that, as a matter of law, the
magistrate erroneously dismissed the action or a portion thereof.
(c) The superior court shall hear and determine the motion on the basis
of the record of the proceedings before the magistrate. If the motion is litigated to decision by the prosecutor, the prosecution is prohibited from refiling the dismissed action, or portion thereof.
5. 35 Cal. 3d 629, 677 P.2d 854, 200 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1984). Opinion by Broussard,
J., with Mosk, Kaus, Grodin, and Richardson, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting
opinion by Bird, C.J., with Reynoso, J., concurring. Richardson, J., Retired Associate Justice of the supreme court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of
the Judicial Council.
6. The applicable standard for review was a question of first impression for
the court. Id. at 633, 677 P.2d at 855, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
7. He was shot through the passenger window in his car from the direction of
a residence next door to the vacant gas station. Id. at 634, 677 P.2d at 855, 200 Cal.
Rptr. at 449.
8. There was no evidence that either the gas station or the neighboring residence were burglarized.

len .38 caliber pistol, was arrested while driving a stolen car. 9
In a recorded statement to the police, the defendant admitted
that he and Edward Forward had committed a series of burglaries
in the Oakland area.10 On the morning in question, Forward had
selected a home near the gas station to burglarize, while the defendant remained in the car as lookout." A short time later, the
defendant heard several gun shots. The defendant contended
that Forward never mentioned the shots. He learned about the
guard's death later that day from a news broadcast.
Although the defendant indicated he had participated in the
scheme solely out of fear of Forward,12 he continued the burglary
operation until threatened by Forward on August 2nd. That night
he stole Forward's car in order to return to Los Angeles. When
the car broke down, he abandoned it and stole another car. In
changing cars, the defendant took along his belongings and those
of Forward, including several fur coats and a .38 caliber pistol. 3
Shortly thereafter, the defendant was stopped and arrested south
of Santa Barbara.14
Based on the defendant's statement, the police obtained a
search warrant for Forward's apartment. The search resulted in
the recovery of a considerable amount of stolen property, a pistol,
and the parts to a .22 caliber rifle.
At the preliminary hearing, the defendant's statement, the
property seized pursuant to the search warrant, and the objects
found in the defendant's stolen car were all introduced into evidence. Based on this evidence, the magistrate held the defendant
to answer solely on the section 12021 weapons offense.' 5 In refusing to bind him over on the murder charge, the magistrate stated:
"I think any murder liability would be a vicarious liability as
pointed out in [defense counsel's] memorandum, but even that is
stretching too far. I do not see where there could be a holding or9. The defendant contended that he was not aware of the origins of the gun,
only that "the gun was hot and that it came from a dead man." 35 Cal. 3d at 635,
677 P.2d at 856, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
10. He stated that they were doing "four or five a night burglaries," for approximately two weeks before the killing. Id.
11. The defendant maintained that Forward selected and burglarized all the
houses, leaving Slaughter in the car as a lookout.
12. The defendant alleged that he had come to Oakland to visit his cousin, and
then met Forward, and that he cooperated in the burglaries only out of fear of Forward. Id. at 634, 677 P.2d at 856, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
13. The .38 caliber pistol, discovered under the right front seat in the defendant's stolen car, was later found to have belonged to the slain security guard. Id.
14. The defendant was interrogated the next day and freely admitted to the
series of burglaries. Id. at 635, 677 P.2d at 856, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
15. Id.
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der on the [murder] charge."
Consequently, the prosecutor filed a "Motion to Compel Reinstatement of Complaint."17 Relying on section 871.5, the prosecution could, under specific circumstances,1 8 compel reinstatement
of the complaint where the magistrate, "as a matter of law,. . . erroneously dismissed the action or a portion thereof."19 The prosecutor argued that the standard of review applied to section 73920
was applicable to section 871.5 motions. Therefore, reinstatement
would be permitted "whenever there exists a reasonable interpretation of the evidence which would support the charge." 21 He
maintained that the evidence reasonably supported the view that
the security guard had been shot in the perpetration of an attempted burglary, in which case the defendant would be guilty of
murder under the felony murder rule as an accomplice. 22 Nevertheless, the superior court denied the motion and the prosecutor
16. Id. See supra note 3.
17. Id. at 635, 677 P.2d at 856, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
18. A motion pursuant to section 871.5 is only proper when (1) an action is dismissed pursuant to certain specified sections of the Penal Code, including section
871, supra note 3, and (2) the dismissed action may not be charged by information
under section 739. Supra note 4. See infra note 20 for a discussion of Penal Code
section 739.
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 871.5(b).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 739 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part:
When a defendant has been examined and committed... it shall be the
duty of the district attorney ... to file
... an information against the defendant which may charge the defendant with either the offense or offenses named in the order of committment or any offense or offenses
shown by the evidence taken before the magiArate to have been
committed.
Section 739 allows the prosecution to include dismissed charges in the information, but only if they are transactionally related to the charges to which the defendant has been held to answer. Parks v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 609, 241 P.2d
521 (1952). The defendant may challenge the information under Penal Code section 995. The standard of review used by the court in acting on such a challenge is
the section 739 standard of review. 35 Cal. 3d at 633, 677 P.2d at 855, 200 Cal. Rptr.
at 449. This level of review is discussed infra in notes 24-32 and accompanying
text.
In this case, the prosecutor could not include a charge of murder in the information against the defendant because the alleged murder was not transactionally related to the weapons offense for which the defendant was held to answer. Thus,
the only way the prosecution could reinstate the murder charge was through an
871.5 motion. 35 Cal. 3d at 636 & n.4, 677 P.2d at 856-57 & it.4, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 450-51
& n.4.
21. 35 Cal. 3d at 636, 677 P.2d at 857, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
22. The first degree felony murder rule is codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 189
(West Supp. 1984). See People v. Medina,'41 Cal. App. 3d 438, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133
(1974), for a review of the common law origins of this rule.

appealed. 23
II.

SECTION 739 STANDARD OF REVIEW

Enacted in 1980, the California legislature intended section 871.5
to be an alternative to section 739 as a method for challenging a

magistrate's preliminary ruling.24 Since section 871.5 provides no
express standard of review, the court began by analyzing the
scope of judicial review under section 739.25
The primary role of the magistrate at a preliminary hearing is

to determine if "it appears from the [preliminary] examination
that a public offense has been committed, and there is sufficient
cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, [in which case] the
magistrate must make or indorse on the complaint an order"
holding the defendant over for trial.26 Thus, the burden on the
prosecution is to demonstrate that there was some rational
ground to assume an offense had been committed and that the defendant was guilty of

it.27

Clearly, the magistrate has no jurisdiction to make a decision
on the merits of the case; his limited function is to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts and determine the credibility of different
witnesses. 28 His power to decide factual disputes is merely to facilitate his determination of sufficient cause. 29 However, the
scope of judicial review under section 739 is dependent upon the
magistrate's exercise of this power. If the magistrate makes findings of fact supported by substantial evidence, those findings are
23. 35 Cal. 3d at 636, 677 P.2d at 857, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
24. See Vlick v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 3d 992, 180 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1982).
Section 871.5 "reflects legislative consideration of a comprehensive method of disposing of issues of law upon which a magistrate's dismissal of a felony complaint
is based" and "a method by which [the People] could obtain speedy review by the
superior court of a dismissal by the magistrate based upon a legal ruling." Id. at
998, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
25. 35 Cal. 3d at 636, 677 P.2d at 857, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (West Supp. 1984). 'The term 'sufficient cause' is
generally equivalent to 'reasonable and probable cause,' that is, such a state of
facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused." People v.
Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 667, 511 P.2d 609, 612, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 660 (1973). See
also Williams v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1144, 458 P.2d 987, 80 Cal. Rptr. 747
(1969); People v. Hampton, 116 Cal. App. 3d 193, 172 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1981) (court of
appeal held defendant must challenge sufficiency of evidence on which magistrate
bound him over to trial); Iungerich, Reversing Perfect Trials, California Style:
Time for a Re-evaluation of the Effect of Errors in PretrialCommitment Proceedings, 48 L.A. B. BULL. 88 (1973).
27. This was clearly distinguishable from the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard required for conviction. Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 582, 477
P.2d 131, 133, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 277 (1970).
28. Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d at 667, 511 P.2d at 612, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
29. Id.
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conclusive on appeal. 30 Where the magistrate does not render
findings of fact, the dismissal should receive the independent
scrutiny appropriate to questions of law.31 "Absent controlling
factual findings, if the magistrate dismisse[d] a charge when the
evidence provide[d] a rational ground for believing that defendant is guilty of the offense, his ruling [was] erroneous as a matter
32
of law, and will not be sustained by the reviewing court."
III.

THE STANDARD APPLIED

The majority adopted the section 739 standard for reviewing
motions made pursuant to section 871.5.33 Applying the general
principle that the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of
existing judicial decisions and to have enacted subsequent legislation in accordance therewith,34 the court concluded that "the
Legislature, in referring to error 'as a matter of law,' did not intend to enact a new and different standard, but to incorporate the
section 739 standard for review of dismissal orders." 35 Conse30. See Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 660, 483 P.2d 1241, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1971) (while a prosecutor may challenge a magistrate's finding that the evidence
is legally insufficient, he may not ignore the magistrate's factual findings); People
v. Salzman, 131 Cal. App. 3d 676, 684, 182 Cal. Rptr. 748, 753 (1982).
31. 35 Cal. 3d at 639, 677 P.2d at 859, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 453. In support of this
contention, the court relied on Pizano v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 128, 577 P.2d
659, 145 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1978) (where the magistrate dismissed a charge of murder
for absence of malice, the court termed the magistrate's finding a legal conclusion,
instead of a finding of fact, and allowed reinstatement of-the murder count); People v. Beagle (II), 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972) (since the magistrate in that case made no express finding of fact, the court was not required to
examine the record for substantial evidence supporting the magistrate, but instead held the ruling erroneous as a matter of law); Jones v. Superior Court, 4
Cal. 3d at 666, 483 P.2d at 1244, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (since the magistrate had made
specific findings that the victim had consented to sexual intercourse and that no
acts of sodomy or oral copulation had occurred, these charges should not have
been included in the information).
32. 35 Cal. 3d at 639-40, 677 P.2d at 859, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
33. The court found especially instructive the requirement that dismissed
charges only be reinstated when they were "as a matter of law ... erroneously
dismissed." CAL. PENAL CODE § 871.5 (West Supp. 1984). This was because the
very same language was used in section 739 review. See, e.g., People v. Beagle (H),
6 Cal. 3d 441, 458, 492 P.2d 1, 11-12, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 323-24 (1972). The only case
which has discussed the section 871.5 standard of review is People v. Salzman, 131
Cal. App. 3d 676, 182 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1982). This case involved a dismissal following
a suppression hearing in which express findings of fact were made. The ruling
was upheld based on the substantial evidence test.
34. See Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 200, 288 P.2d 12, 22 (1955); Favalora
v. County of Humboldt, 55 Cal. App. 3d 969, 973, 127 Cal. Rptr. 907, 911 (1976).
35. 35 Cal. 3d at 640, 677 P.2d at 860, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 454.

quently, the court viewed section 871.5 as a viable alternative to
section 739, enacted to deal with situations where section 739's
36
transactionally related requirement could not be met.
In applying this standard to the defendant's case, the record
presented no conflicting evidence, and no findings of fact were
made. The sole issue raised by the magistrate's order was one of
law: "whether the evidentiary record contained facts sufficient to
show sufficient cause to hold defendant for murder." 37 Indisputably, the record showed that a conspiracy to commit burglary had
existed, that the guard was robbed and killed near the site of the
planned burglary, and that the guard's gun was in the defendant's
possession. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to reasonably infer that Forward shot the security guard during commission of the
burglary he and the defendant had planned. 38 On such a record,
the court held it was an error "as a matter of law," not to hold the
defendant to answer; therefore, the order denying the prosecu39
tor's motion to reinstate the murder charge was reversed.
IV.

THE DIsSENT

After reviewing the legislative history of sections 739 and
41
871.5,40 the dissent reviewed the plain meaning of the statute.
The choice of the phrase "as a matter of law" was deemed to be
significant because this language has been a well recognized standard of appellate review.42 "Thus, a dismissed felony complaint
(or portion thereof) may be reinstated under section 871.5 only if
the magistrate erred in ruling on a material issue of law or if, as a
factual matter, there [existed] no reasonable construction of the
36. See supra note 18. The defendant argued that the legislature considered
but rejected the exact standard of review employed under section 739. However,
the court determined that the "subsequent elimination of [such language did] not
prove the Legislature intended to reject the section 739 standard of review; it may
have simply eliminated an unnecessary detailed exposition of that standard." 35
Cal. 3d at 641-42 n.8, 677 P.2d at 861 n.8, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 455 n.8.
37. 35 Cal. 3d at 643, 677 P.2d at 862, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
38. The court found these facts sufficient to provide a rational basis for believing the respondent was guilty as accused. See supra note 26.
39. 35 Cal. 3d at 643, 677 P.2d at 862, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
40. Id. at 644-46, 677 P.2d at 862-64, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 456-58 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
41. Id. at 647, 677 P.2d at 865, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 459 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Bird contended that the statute had a clear and unambiguous meaning;
therefore, there was no need to indulge in statutory construction. See, e.g., Solberg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 182, 198, 561 P.2d 1148, 1158, 137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 470
(1977).
42. See generally 6 B. Wrnun, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE-APPEAL § 209 (2d ed.
1971). This argument rests on the fundamental rule of construction that once the
courts have construed the meaning of a particular phrase, the legislature will incorporate that definition when subsequently using the same language. City of
Long Beach v. Payne, 3 Cal. 2d 184, 44 P.2d 305 (1935).
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evidence before the magistrate which [could have supported] the
43
dismissal."
The dissent found support for this reasoning in the legislative
history of section 871.5. Since the legislature specifically considered and deleted language adopting the section 739 standard, this
arguably indicated that the legislature did not intend to adopt
that standard of review." Moreover, this interpretation of legisla45
tive intent was not in conflict with current California case law.
In addition, the prosecution of felony offenses is limited by article I, section 14 of the California Constitution. 46 The standard for
prosecution of felonies is by indictment or "after examination and
commitment by a magistrate." 47 The dissent viewed the commitment process as necessarily involving questions of fact within the
sole discretion of the committing magistrate.48 "A magistrate may
not be compelled to issue an order of commitment that [was] inconsistent with his or her reasonable view of the evidence."4 9
Contending that the legislature was fully aware of the constitutional principle involved, the dissent argued that the language of
section 871.5 represented a deliberate choice to limit the authority
of prosecutors to appeal dismissed offenses.0
43. 35 Cal. 3d at 649, 677 P.2d at 866, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 460 (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). This holding relied on the proposition that where more than
one inference can be drawn from the facts, the appellate court could not substitute
its deductions for the trial courts. Crawford v. Southern Pac. Co., 3 Cal. 2d 427, 45
P.2d 183 (1935).
44. 35 Cal. 3d at 650, 677 P.2d at 867, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 461. But see supra note 36
and accompanying text.
45. In People v. Salzman, 131 Cal. App. 3d 676, 684, 182 Cal. Rptr. 748, 753
(1982), the court stated that:
[Rlules of appellate review also [applied] to motions to reinstate a complaint under section 871.5. Hence, the power to judge the credibility of
witnesses, to resolve conflicts, to weigh the evidence, and to draw factual
inferences was vested in the magistrate hearing the motion to suppress at
the preliminary examination. On review under section 871.5, the superior
court [was] bound by the magistrate's findings if they [were] supported
by substantial evidence.
46. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
47. Id.
48. The basic functions of the magistrate-weighing evidence, judging the
credibility of witnesses, and drawing factual inferences-involve "a question of
fact within the province of the committing magistrate to determine, and neither
the superior court nor an appellate court may substitute its judgment as to such
question for that of the magistrate." De Mond v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 340,
345, 368 P.2d 865, 867, 19 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (1962).
49. 35 Cal. 3d at 653, 677 P.2d at 869, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 463 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
50. Id. at 653-54, 677 P.2d at 870, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 464.

Finally, the dissent considered whether there was "a reasonable
view of the preliminary hearing evidence in the present case
which justifi[ed] this magistrate's refusal to hold respondent to
answer for murder. . . ,"51 The prosecution relied on the felony
53
murder rule5 2 and alternatively on an aiding-and-abetting theory
as the basis for criminal liability. The dissent viewed the evidence in support of these theories in the light most favorable to
the magistrate's ruling because "a magistrate's dismissal may be
overturned only if no substantial evidence supports it."54 The dissent concluded that the magistrate's dismissal was supported by
substantial evidence and therefore would affirm the denial of the
prosecution's motion.
V.

CONCLUSION

The distinction between the majority and the dissent turns on
the proper role of the magistrate in the preliminary hearing.
Clearly, section 871.5 provides an expeditious procedure for reviewing the magistrate's findings. 55 Absent an expressed finding
of fact supporting dismissal, the majority affirmed the reinstatement of the charge where "sufficient cause" is present.5 6 This
holding is consistent with the basic purpose of a preliminary
hearing, to present such facts "as would lead a man of ordinary
caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a
57
strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused."
G.

Defendant has not been "brought to trial"unless the
judge is available and preparedto try the case to its
conclusion; absent exceptional circumstances, court
congestion is not good causefor failing to bring
defendant to trial within the required time limit:
Rhinehart v. Municipal Court.

In Rhinehart v. Municipal Court, 35 Cal. 3d 772, 677 P.2d 1206,
51. Id. at 654, 677 P.2d at 870, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1984) provides in pertinent part: "All
murder which is . . . committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate
... burglary... is murder of the first degree...."
53. An aider and abettor may be convicted of a crime he did not contemplate
"to the extent (1) of his knowledge or (2) of the natural and reasonable consequences of the acts which he aided or encouraged." People v. Beltran, 94 Cal. App.
2d 197, 207, 210 P.2d 238, 243 (1949). See People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d at 547, 560, 674
P.2d 118, 125, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 67 (1984).
54. 35 Cal. 3d at 662, 677 P.2d at 875, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 469 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
55. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 26.
57. Taylor, 3 Cal. 3d at 582, 477 P.2d at 133, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
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200 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1984), the supreme court held that a defendant
has not been "brought to trial" when a trial court impanels a jury
but does not proceed with trial due to court congestion. Furthermore, court congestion was not good cause for postponing trial beyond the period required by statute.
California Penal Code section 1382 requires that, absent good
cause, the charges against an accused must be dismissed if he is
not "brought to trial" within a specified time period. The time period is based upon the charges, the court having jurisdiction, and
the defendant's custodial status. A jury was impaneled in the defendant's trial for driving while under the influence of alcohol on
the last day allowed by section 1382 for bringing the defendant to
trial. The actual trial was then put off for several days due to congestion in the municipal court's calendar. The defendant moved
for dismissal pursuant to section 1382, but the motion was denied
by the municipal court. The superior court, however, issued a
peremptory writ of prohibition which the prosecution appealed.
The supreme court looked to precedent from court of appeal decisions to fashion a definition of "brought to trial." The court concluded that, for purposes of section 1382, a defendant is not
brought to trial unless the judge is available and prepared to try
the case to its conclusion. Furthermore, the court must commit
itself to the trial, the parties must be prepared to proceed, and the
prospective jury panel must be summoned and sworn. Since the
court in this case was not ready to proceed with the trial, the defendant was not properly brought to trial pursuant to section 1382.
The prosecution argued that the congestion in the court calendar constituted good cause for violating section 1382's time limits.
The supreme court stated, however, that court congestion would
not constitute good cause except when it results from "exceptional circumstances." See People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 606
P.2d 738, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1980). After reviewing the facts in this
case, the court determined that there were no exceptional circumstances behind the congestion. Thus, the charges against the accused should have been dismissed.
H.

Trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sever
separate murder counts: Williams v. Superior Court.

In Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 683 P.2d 699, 204
Cal. Rptr. 700 (1984), the supreme court held that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion to sever

separate murder counts where the incidents giving rise to the
charges occurred nine months apart.
Williams was charged with murder, two counts of attempted
murder, and a related conspiracy count stemming from a June,
1981, shotgun shooting. He was also charged with the drive-by
murder of a pedestrian in March, 1982. The only similarity between the incidents was that they were possibly gang related. In
both cases there was considerable doubt as to the identity of the
person doing the shooting.
The court determined that the trial court abused its discretion
under section 954 of the California Penal Code in denying the defendant's motion to sever the murder counts. Because the
charges were so marginally related, there would have been little
cross-admissibility of evidence. Also, evidence introduced to
prove one count would have the effect of acting as inadmissible
character evidence in the other count. The crimes were too dissimilar to permit evidence of a common plan or scheme. CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1966).
The supreme court decided that, although the trial court is
given substantial discretion in deciding the joinder of charges,
where the prejudice to the defendant outweighs the probative
value of hearing the charges together, the matters should be severed. The potential prejudice to Williams was substantial; there
was a strong chance that the jury would view the evidence of
gang related killings cumulatively to the detriment of the defendant. Since both of the prosecution's cases were not strong, the
jury could apply some of the evidence from a strong case to a
weaker one, or simply aggregate the evidence. Finally, joinder
would give rise to requiring the jury to decide if special circumstances were present, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1984),
thereby opening the door to a possible death penalty.

Ix. DISCOVERY
Information contained in traffic accident reports
required to be filed with the state may be obtained
through discovery: Davies v. Superior Court.
The court was presented with the dichotomy of liberal discovery versus "privileged" information in Davies v. Superior Court,
36 Cal. 3d 291, 679 P.2d 35, 204 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1984). In a personal
injury action against the State of California, the plaintiff, during
discovery through interrogatories and a request for production of
documents, sought information, collision diagrams, and traffic collision reports concerning prior and subsequent accidents occur-
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ring at the same location as that involving the plaintiff's singlevehicle accident.
The state refused to provide the information sought, asserting
that California Vehicle Code sections 20012 and 20014 made the
information confidential and therefore privileged. Section 20012
provides that specified accident reports must be kept for the confidential use of state agencies except that the report must be disclosed to any person with "a proper interest therein." Section
20014 provides that all specified reports must be kept for the confidential use of certain state agencies only.
Looking to the language of the statutes, the court ruled that the
use of the term "confidential" did not create a "privilege" as that
term is used in the Evidence Code, CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 911-960
(West Supp. 1984), and in the discovery statutes. Instead, the Vehicle Code sections merely excluded from evidence at trial only
those statutorily "required" accident reports, such as those to be
made by a driver, passenger, or witness to an accident, and statements contained in those reports.
The court then determined that the legislative intent underlying
the assurance of confidentiality extended to motorists under section 20012 in the context of a request for discovery. In so doing,
the court ruled that the legislature intended to protect the privacy
of reporting parties by keeping confidential only identifying information; other information contained in the reports is often available from other sources. Moreover, discovery of an accident
report might lead to discovery of a highway defect and encourage
remedial measures. Consequently, data generated from section
20012 reports in which indicia of identity have been excised is not
confidential. Thus, a party in an action arising out of a highway
accident at the same location may discover the information without a prior showing that the data sought indicates a common
cause contributed to the other accidents.
X. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A.

Judgment of dissolution of marriagewhich
providedfor terminationof spousal support could
be modified to extend support payments beyond
the terminationdate: In re Marriage of Vomacka.

Where an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage
provided a specific date when the supported ;pouse's right to re-

quest support would terminate, did the trial court have jurisdiction to extend support payments beyond that date? The case of
In re Marriage of Vomackal gave the California Supreme Court
the opportunity to review this issue. In concluding that the trial
court did indeed have jurisdiction, the court reviewed and applied
the basic policies favoring flexibility in spousal support: assurance that the supported spouse will become self-supporting,
resolving ambiguities in the way spousal support agreements and
orders are interpreted in favor of support, and retention of fundamental jurisdiction to modify and extend support orders during
2
the time frame provided by the decree.
On August 24, 1979, William Vomacka, appellant, and Joyce
Vomacka, respondent, stipulated to the provisions and entry of an
interlocutory decree of dissolution of marriage. The order provided for a division of property, child custody and support, and
awarded the respondent $275 a month in spousal support. 3 The
spousal support provision was to remain effective until the death
of either party, the respondent's remarriage, further order by the
court, or August 1, 1982, whichever occurred first. The order also
provided for the termination of the court's jurisdiction to modify
4
spousal support.
In 1982, the respondent sought and obtained an order increasing
her spousal support to $600 per month. As modified, the support
order was to continue until the death of either party, the respondent's remarriage, or further judicial order. Recognizing that the
support order, as modified, required appellant to continue the
payment of support beyond September 1, 1984, the trial court held
that an agreement to terminate spousal support must contain explicit langage to that effect.5 Since the clause merely terminated
the respondent's right to ask for support, and did not "explicitly"
address termination of support, the trial court held that the lan1. 36 Cal. 3d 459, 683 P.2d 248, 204 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1984). Opinion by Reynoso,
J., with Bird, C.J., Kaus, Grodin, and Agretelis, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Mosk, J., with Brossard, J., concurring. Agretelis, J., sitting under
assignment by the Chairperson of the Judiciary Council.
2. Id. at 474, 683 P.2d at 258, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
3. Id. at 461, 683 P.2d at 249, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
4. 'The Court shall retain jurisdiction regarding spousal support until September 1, 1984, at which time Joyce's right to request spousal support from William shall terminate forever." Id. at 462, 683 P.2d at 249, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 569
(court's emphasis omitted).
5. Id. The trial court relied on In re Marriage of Moore, 113 Cal. App. 3d 22,
169 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1980). "[N]o waiver of right can be inferred from a written stipulation except where an intentional relinquishment of the known right is explicit,
the terms and scope of the waiver are spelled out and the express reason for the
waiver set forth." Id. at 28, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 622 (citing City of Ukiah v. Fones, 64
Cal. 2d 104, 410 P.2d 369, 48 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1966)).
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guage did not absolutely terminate her right to receive support on
September 1, 1984.6
Relying on California Civil Code section 4811, subdivision (b),7
the appellant contended that the parties had the right to, and did
in fact agree to, the nonmodiflable termination of support on September 1, 1984. In support of this contention, the appellant cited
California Civil Code section 4801, subdivision (d),8 which recognizes the use of property settlement agreements to fix a date terminating support,9 unless the court retains jurisdiction. The
appellant maintained that the jurisdictional provision demonstrated the clear intent of the parties to terminate the respondent's right to request support and the couit's jurisdiction; and
therefore, the agreement of the parties should be upheld.10
The supreme court began its analysis by applying the unequivocal specific language test." Since no independent evidence of an
oral or written contract which prohibited modification was offered,
6. 36 Cal. 3d at 462, 683 P.2d at 249, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
7. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4811(b) (West Supp. 1984) provides:
(b) The provisions of any agreement for the support of either party
shall be deemed to be separate and severable from the provisions of the
agreement relating to property. All orders for the support of either party
based on the agreement shall be deemed law-imposed and shall be
deemed made under the power of the court to make the orders. The provisions of any agreement or order for the support of either party shall be
subject to subsequent modification or revocation by court order, except as
to any amount that may have accrued prior to the date of filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or revoke, and except to
the extent that any written agreement, or, if there is no written agreement, any oral agreement entered into in open court between the parties,
specifically provides to the contrary.
See Vomacka, 36 Cal. 3d at 464 n.2, 683 P.2d at 251 n.2, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 571 n.2, for a
detailed analysis of the legislative history leading up to § 4811(b).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(d) (West Supp. 1984) provides: "An order for payment of an allowance for the support of one of the parties shall terminate at the
end of the period specified in the order and shall not be extended unless the court
in its original order retains jurisdiction."
9. Clearly, such agreements are favored to litigation in this state; therefore,
they are binding on the court absent a showing of fraud or compulsion. Adams v.
Adams, 29 Cal. 2d 621, 624, 177 P.2d 265, 267 (1947). See 6 B. WrrIK, SUMMARY OF
CAimi oRA LAW, Husband and Wife §§ 189, 5057 (8th ed. 1974).
10. 36 Cal. 3d at 463, 683 P.2d at 250, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
11. Whereas the earlier cases stressed the fact that no magic words were
necessary and appeared willing to infer intent to make spousal support
nonmodiflable from general language, the most recent cases have emphasized the need for specific unequivocal language directly on the issue of
judicial modification.
In re Marriage of Hufford, 152 Cal. App. 3d 825, 834, 199 Cal. Rptr. 726, 731 (1984).

the court held that section 4811(b) was inapplicable.' 2 In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the court retains jurisdiction over the spousal support agreement at least until the end of
the period specified in the agreement.13
The appellant contended that the trial court's jurisdiction ended
absolutely on September 1, 1984.14 This argument is based on section 4801, subdivision (d), which requires the court to provide in
the original order for the retention of jurisdiction. 5 Since the
trial court did not expressly reserve jurisdiction over spousal support, the appellant maintained that the trial court's jurisdiction
should be controlled by the original stipulated interlocutory order
providing for termination on September 1, 1984.
Acknowledging that the goals of section 4801, subdivision (d),
are best served by an explicit statement of retention, the court
held that several policy factors favor the view that jurisdiction
may be retained by reasonable implication.16 First, an order
which absolutely terminates spousal support will be overturned
absent a showing the spouse will be self-supporting on that
date.' 7 Moreover, the burden of proof is on the party seeking ter12. 36 Cal. 3d at 465, 683 P.2d at 252, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 572. The court commented
on the absence of trial court transcripts in the record on appeal; consequently,
there was no foundation for the appellant's argument that the parties had entered
an open agreement in court.
13. This view is consistent with the concern over judicial erosion of the statutory policy favoring modifiability of spousal support and the possibility of being
misled by seemingly inocuous boiler plate provisions in inferring the intent of the
parties. See CAL. FAM. L. REP. 1304 (1980). As a result of this concern, the courts
have held that a specific provision is required to preclude modification by judicial
action. Fukuzaki v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 454, 457-58, 174 Cal. Rptr. 536,
538 (1981); In re Marriage of Nielsen, 100 Cal. App. 3d 874, 877, 161 Cal. Rptr. 272,
274 (1980).
14. 36 Cal. 3d at 465, 683 P.2d at 251, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
15. See supra note 8.
The evident purposes of Civil Code section 4811 were to dispose of the abstruse and unprofitable jurisprudence which had grown up around the
concepts of integration and severability and establish a legislatively declared social policy that contractual provisions for the support of a spouse
be subject to modification by the court in the light of changed circumstances unless the parties explicitly agree to preclude such modification.
The utility of this policy is obvious. Even in the absence of inflationary
distortions, the parties to a marital settlement agreement can hardly anticipate and provide for unexpected changes of circumstance which may
invalidate the expectations reflected in the agreement. Despite the public
interest in reserving for judicial redetermination on the basis of changed
circumstances contractual provisions for support, the Legislature left it
open to marital partners to preclude judicial modification by inserting in
the agreement a specific provision to that effect.
In re Marriage of Nielsen, 100 Cal. App. 3d 874, 877-78, 161 Cal. Rptr. 272, 274-75
(1980) (citation omitted).
16. 36 Cal. 3d at 467, 683 P.2d at 253, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
17. See In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 453, 573 P.2d 41, 52, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 139, 150 (1978).
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mination to demonstrate that the supported spouse is financially
self-sufficient.18 The court found that the appellant had not met
that burden of proof.19
A second policy favoring the implied retention of jurisdiction to
modify is that any ambiguity in a marital property agreement
must be resolved in favor of the right to spousal support. 20 In
reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on In re Marriage
of Moore.21 In Moore, the parties had entered a stipulated separation agreement which made no statement reserving the court's jurisdiction to extend support. The court held that there could not
be a waiver of wife's right to support absent an expressed reference in the agreement. 22 Further, the burden was on the party
claiming a waiver to show that there was no ambiguity in the language. 23 Again, the court held that the appellant failed to meet
his burden of proving that the respondent unambiguously waived
her right to spousal support beyond September 1, 1984.24
A third policy also supported an interpretation of the agreement to allow modification. "ILl anguage in a spousal support order suggesting that modification of its terms will be permitted [is]
routinely interpreted as a retention of the court's fundamental jurisdiction to modify and, upon a proper factual showing, to extend
the spousal support provisions contained therein." 2 5 In Vomacka,
the decree provided for modification by the court, but only until
September 1, 1984.26 It was pursuant to this clause that the re18. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dennis, 35 Cal. App. 3d 279, 285, 110 Cal. Rptr.
619, 622 (1973); In re Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 897, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295,
304 (1972). These cases held that the party seeking to terminate support payments
has the burden of proof.
19. 36 Cal. 3d at 469, 683 P.2d at 254, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
20. In re Marriage of Moore, 113 Cal. App. 3d 22, 28, 169 Cal. Rptr. 619, 622
(1980) (citing with approval the basic proposition set forth in Estate of Coffin, 22
Cal. App. 2d 469, 471, 71 P.2d 295, 296 (1937)).
21. 113 Cal. App. 3d 22, 169 Cal. Rptr. 619.
22. Id. at 28, 169 Cal. Rptr. 622.
23. The burden is on the party claiming a waiver to prove it by evidence
that does not leave the matter doubtful or uncertain Lnd the burden must
be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that does not leave the matter to speculation. This rule particularly applies to cases involving a right
favored in law such as, in this case, the right to retain lawful property entitlements and support.
Id. at 27, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 621 (citations omitted).
24. 36 Cal. 3d at 470, 683 P.2d at 255, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
25. Id.
26. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.

spondent sought modification in 1982.27 As the trial court ex-

pressly retained jurisdiction until 1984 to modify spousal support,
it necessarily also retained its fundamental jurisdiction to extend
spousal support beyond that date.28 Thus, the trial court properly
extended spousal support beyond September 1, 1984, and "until
further order of the Court." 29
As the trial court was found to have jurisdiction to modify the
interlocutory judgment of dissolution, the trial court's 1982 modification order was affirmed. 3o Given the court's concern with judicial erosion of the statutory policy favoring modifiability of
support orders, 31 the court places the burden of proof clearly on
the parties' shoulders. Not only must the property settlement
agreement explicitly terminate the court's jurisdiction, but the
parties must also assure that the supported spouse can adequately meet his financial needs. 32
B. Marital settlement agreement releasing all rights and
obligations of the parties held to prevent recovery of
life insuranceproceeds by ex-spouse who remained
the named beneficiary of the policy- Life Insurance Co.
of North America v. Cassidy.
In Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Cassidy, 35 Cal. 3d
27. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
28. 36 Cal. 3d at 471, 683 P.2d at 256, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 576. This conclusion is
supported by In re Marriage of Keeva, 66 Cal. App. 3d 512, 136 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1977),
in which the trial court continued hearings on modification beyond the date
spousal support was to terminate pursuant to the original decree. The continuation of the matter beyond the original termination date manifested the court's intent to deal further with the matter and "was inconsistent with an intent that
support terminate [at that] time." Id. at 518, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 85. See also In re
Maxfield, 142 Cal. App. 3d 755, 763, 191 Cal. Rptr. 267, 271 (1983). This case provided
that where the court expressly reserved jurisdiction to modify support until a specific date, it retained the fundamental jurisdiction to extend spousal support beyond that date. "[The court] did not purport to limit the nature of the relief it
could grant provided it acted within the jurisdictional period." Here, the appellant
attempted to distinguish this case on two grounds: (1) that the Maxfield court's
jurisdiction was based on the term "award," and (2) that the court must unambiguously indicate reservation of jurisdiction. However, the court termed the former argument "without merit," and held the latter contention to be "an example of
preferable, not mandatory, draftsmanship." 36 Cal. 3d at 472-73, 683 P.2d at 257-58,
204 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
29. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. "If the court was without jurisdiction to award spousal support past September 1, 1984, its retention of jurisdiction until that date to [respondent's] requests for support would be meaningless."
36 Cal. 3d at 471, 683 P.2d at 256, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 576 (relying on Dahlstet v. Dahlstet, 272 Cal. App. 2d 174, 77 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1969), and Lassiter v. Lassiter, 256 Cal.
App. 2d 81, 63 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1967)).
30. 36 Cal. 3d at 474, 683 P.2d at 258, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
31. See supra note 13.
32. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
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599, 676 P.2d 1050, 200 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1984), the supreme court concluded that the appellant's designation as beneficiary of her former spouse's life insurance policy was supecceded by a marital
settlement agreement which comprehensively disposed of all the
rights and obligations of the marriage. In determining the scope
of the settlement agreement, the court acknowledged the distinction between a spouse's community property interest in a life insurance policy and an expectancy interest in such a policy.
The California courts have not construed the general terms of a
marital settlement agreement to constitute an assignment or renunciation of expectancies unless the language of the agreement
clearly expresses such an intention. While there was no dispute
that the appellant had released her community interest in the policy, she contended that the marital settlement agreement did not
constitute a waiver of her right to receive the policy proceeds.
This was because the agreement did not specifically mention the
policy or expectancy interests in general.
In the case at bar, the various clauses of the agreement were
read together to determine that the appellant's expectancy interest in life insurance policies was implicitly released. In reaching
this conclusion, the court found both the sweeping nature of the
agreement's language and the representation of both parties by
counsel to be persuasive. The court also relied on testimony of
the deceased's business manager. In an effort to show the state of
mind of the deceased, the manager testified that he had been directed to remove the appellant's name as beneficiary from all life
insurance policies. This testimony was relevant in that it established that the appellant remained the beneficiary on the policy
only because of inadvertence and contrary to the express wishes
of the deceased. Thus, appellant was not entitled to the proceeds
of the insurance policies.
XI.

EASEMENTS
Party who acquired a prescriptive easement not
required to pay compensation or to bear costs of
removing obstruction of easement erected during
course of litigation over the easement: Warsaw v.
Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc.

Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 676
P.2d 584, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984), provided the supreme court

with the opportunity to review whether one who acquires a valid
prescriptive easement over neighboring property may be required
to compensate the owner of that property.
This action for injunctive and declaratory relief was initiated
when the defendant began construction of a warehouse on his
property. For a number of years, the plaintiff had used part of the
defendant's property to provide access to loading docks on the
plaintiff's property. When the defendant began grading his property in anticipation of construction, access to the plaintiff's facility
was effectively blocked. The trial court denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. Consequently, the defendant
proceeded with, and completed construction of, the warehouse
during the course of litigation.
The trial court eventually found the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement to be present, and ordered the defendant to remove that portion of the building which interfered
with the easement. On appeal, the defendant contended that equitable principles dictated that the plaintiff either compensate the
defendant for the fair market value of the easement, or subsidize
the defendant's costs of relocating the structure. After reviewing
the historical basis of California Civil Code section 1007, the court
found no basis for requiring the plaintiff to pay compensation:
"plaintiffs herein have acquired a title by prescription which is
'sufficient against all,' including defendant." The basic policies
behind prescriptive easements-reducing litigation, protecting
possession, and preference for use over disuse of land-are promoted by such a finding.
In determining whether the plaintiff should help defer the costs
of relocation, it was argued that a court of equity could make such
an order in the case of an "innocent" encroachment. However,
since construction took place while the suit was pending, the encroachment was deemed willful. Consequently, removal by the
defendant was ordered without regard to the disproportionate
hardship to the defendant.
XII.

EDUCATION
A.

School districts may not chargefees for
extracurriculareducation programs: Hartzell v.
Connell.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the unique' case of Hartzell v. Connell,2 the California
1. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
2. 35 Cal. 3d 899, 679 P.2d 35, 201 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1984). Majority opinion writ-
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Supreme Court announced a significant interpretation of the California Constitution's "Free School" guarantee and shared an enlightening account of the constitutional role played by education.
The issue facing the court was whether a public high school district could charge fees for participation in "extracurricular" educational programs. The court determined that school districts
must offer all educational programs-whether curricular or extracurricular-free of charge to students. This unprecedented ruling,
however, may have the unintended effect of forcing financially
overburdened school districts to cancel extracurricular activities
thereby depriving rather than enhancing student participation.
The court's opinion centered upon the fee policy of the Santa
Barbara School District (hereinafter "District"). Due to budgeting problems, 3 the District implemented a plan whereby students
were required to pay "participation" fees for certain athletic, theatrical, and musical extracurricular activities.4 None of the affected activities netted students credit toward graduation.5 The
District, however, considered all of the activities to be "important
educational experiences." 6
Due to the importance of these activities to the students' educational development, the District provided a fee-waiver program in
an effort to guarantee all students wishing to participate an opportunity to do so. 7 Although not all of the students who applied
ten by Bird, C.J., with Broussard and Reynoso, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring opinions by Bird, C.J., Mosk, J., and Grodin, J. Separate dissenting opinion by
Richardson, J. (Retired Associate Justice of the supreme court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council).
3. Proposition 13, which was passed in 1978, limited the power of local governments to increase tax rates or enact new taxes. Due to a decline in revenues,
Santa Barbara found it necessary to cut its school budget.
4. Specifically, the District required students to pay $25 for each athletic
team on which they participated and $25 per category for any activity falling
within each of the following four categories: (1) dramatic productions (e.g., plays,
dance performances, and musicals); (2) music-vocals (e.g., choir or madrigal); (3)
music-instrumentals (e.g., orchestra, marching band, and drill team); and (4)
cheerleading. Thus a student who participated in football, tennis, choir, and the
orchestra was required to pay $100. 35 Cal. 3d at 902-03, 679 P.2d at 37, 201 Cal.
Rptr. at 603.
5. Although the teachers of the credit courses often supervised the extracurricular activities, they were instructed to disregard students' performances when
grading credit courses. The effectiveness of this prohibition was not discussed by
the trial court. 35 Cal. 3d at 903 &n.3, 679 P.2d at 37-38 & n.3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 603 &
n.3.
6. Id.
7. The student would be granted a "scholarship" upon a showing of financial
need. This program was supplemented by an "outreach" program in an effort to

for a fee-waiver received one, the imposition of the fees did not
prevent any student from participating in the affected activities. 8
Nevertheless, Barbara Hartzell, a mother of two school-aged
children, joined forces with the Coalition Opposing Student Fees 9
in a taxpayers' action challenging the District's fee policy. As
plaintiffs, the group sought declaratory and injunctive relief
claiming the policy violated the California Constitution'O and the
California Adminstrative Code." The trial court denied all relief.12 On appeal, the supreme court reversed.
IL

A.

CASE ANALYSIS

Administrative Code Section 350

One of plaintiffs' contentions was that title 5, section 350 of the
California Administrative Code (hereinafter "section 350") barred
the District's fee policy. Section 350, promulgated by the State
Board of Education, provides: "A pupil enrolled in a school shall
not be required to pay any fee, deposit, or other charge not specifically authorized by law."' 13 The District argued that section 350
would exceed its constitutional and statutory base if construed to
bar the fee policy.
The court handily rejected this contention, citing California Education Code section 33031 as section 350's statutory basis.14
Moreover, the Department of Education had previously interpreted section 350 as prohibiting participation fees in athletics
ensure that no student was prevented by the fee from participation in the affected
extracurricular activities. Id. at 904, 679 P.2d at 38, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
8. Seventy-seven students were granted waivers; four were denied, but allowed to delay payment. Id.
9. The Coalition included the following groups: AfroAmerican Community
Services, American Civil Liberties Union, Black Action Committee, Casa de la
Raza, Community Action Commission, Gray Panthers, National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, Network, and the Social Concerns Committee of the Unitarian Church. Id. at 904 n.5, 679 P.2d at 38 n.5, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 604
n.5.
10. The group claimed the fee policy violated CAL.CONST. art. IX, § 5 [hereinafter "the free school guarantee"], and art. I, § 7, and art. IV, § 16 (equal protection
guarantees).
11. The group claimed the fee policy violated title 5, section 350 of the California Administrative Code.
12. The trial court reasoned that none of the activities covered by the fee policy were "integral" to credit courses. 35 Cal. 3d at 904, 679 P.2d at 38, 201 Cal. Rptr.
at 604.
13. CAL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 5, § 350 (1984).
14. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 33031 (West Supp. 1984) authorizes the State Board of
Education to "adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of this
state ... for the government of the ... day and evening secondary schools .. "
In addition, a note to section 350 cited the free school guarantee as its constitutional authority. 35 Cal. 3d at 914, 679 P.2d at 45, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
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and other school-sponsored activities. 5 Therefore, the court determined, the issue was whether the Department's interpretation
was reasonable.16 Believing it was reasonable, the court held:
"Section 350's ban on fees [clearly] falls well within the State
Board's discretion."' 7 The court concluded that the State Board
had the "general power" to make such an interpretation.I8 Thus,
the court found absurd the District's contention that section 350
would be valid only if fees were independently prohibited by a
constitutional or statutory provision.19
The District's next argument claimed Education Code section
3516020 nullified section 350 and permitted the fee policy. Section
35160, however, is limited in scope to those acts "Which [are] not
in conflict with ... any law. .. "21 The District's fee policy
clearly conflicted with section 350.22 Nevertheless, the District
contended section 350 was not a law and therefore its fee policy
was a proper exercise of local authority permitted by section
35160. Chief Justice Bird found this claim without merit and recognized that if an administrative regulation was not a "law" under
15. The Department of Education believed that section 350 prohibited participation fees for athletic and school-sponsored activities. CAL. DEP'T OF EDUCATION,
FEES, DEPOSIT, AND CHARGES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF CALIFORNIA, GRADES K-12
AND ADULT SCHOOLS 1-2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FEES]. The Legislative Counsel also believed section 350 barred participation fees for school-sponsored extracurricular activities. School Fees: Extracurricular Activities, Op. Cal. Legis.
Counsel, No. 18293 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Extracurricular Activities]. See
also School Fees, Op. Cal. Legis. Counsel, No. 17036 (1979) (section 350 prohibits
fees for musical instruments and special uniforms used in extracurricular activities as well as fees required for athletic teams or club dues) [hereinafter cited as
School Fees].
16. "The sole function of this court is to decide whether the department reasonably interpreted the legislative mandate.'" 35 Cal. 3 at 914, 679 P.2d at 45, 201
Cal. Rptr. at 611 (quoting Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel, 69 Cal. 2d 172, 176, 444 P.2d
79, 82, 70 Cal. Rptr. 407, 410 (1968)).
17. 35 Cal. 3d at 915, 679 P.2d at 45, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 611. In addition, the court
believed that the free school guarantee mandated a prohibition against fees for educational extracurricular activities. See infta notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
18. See San Francisco v. Hyatt, 163 Cal. 346, 352, 125 P. 751, 753 (1912).
19. "To hold, as defendants urge, ... would be to eliminate any role for administrative discretion." 35 Cal. 3d at 915, 679 P.2d at 45, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
20. California Education Code section 35160 provides as follows:
[T] he governing board of any school district may initiate and carry on any
program, activity, or may otherwise act in any manner which is not in conflict
with or inconsistent with, or preempted by, any law and which is not
in conflict with the purposes for which school districts are established.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160 (West 1978).

21. Id.
22. 35 Cal. 3d at 916, 679 P.2d at 46, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 612.

section 35160, local school districts could act in derogation of all
regulations--even to the extent of repealing them. 23 The majority
found no support for the District's position in the legislative history of section 35160. On the contrary, the court found support for
its holding in opinions by the Legislative Counsel and the Depart24
ment of Education.
In conclusion, the court believed section 350 to be a valid exercise of authority delegated to the State Board by section 33031
and undiminished by section 35160.25 Therefore, a public high
school that imposes fees for participation in noncredit educational
programs violates Administrative Code section 350.26
B. The CaliforniaConstitution's "FreeSchool" Guarantee
The majority opinion should have begun and ended with a discussion of section 350. The majority, however, pressed forward
and decided the constitutional free school issue. 27 This portion of
the opinion was unnecessary in light of the court's ruling that the
fees were already barred by section 350.28 Moreover, because it
was unnecessary, the decision of the constitutional issue was contrary to long-established principles of constitutional con29

struction.

The issue facing the court was whether extracurricular activities fall within the free education guarantee. 30 This issue was one
of first impression in California. Thus, the court looked to judicial
interpretations in other United States jurisdictions with similar
23. Id.
24. Extracurricular Activities, supra note 15, at 3-4; School Fees, supranote 15,
at 3; FEES, supra note 15, at 6.
25. 35 Cal. 3d at 917, 679 P.2d at 47, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
26. "The imposition of fees as a precondition for participation in educational
programs offered by public high schools on a noncredit basis violates... the prohibition against school fees contained in title 5, section 350 of the California Administrative Code." Id.
27. The court actually discussed the constitutional issue prior to section 350.
However, as the court conceded, the decision of the constitutional issue was completely unnecessary to the opinion: "[E Iven if article IX, section 5 is assumed not
to bar the fees, it is clear that title 5, section 350's ban on fees falls well within the
State Board's range of discretion." 35 Cal. 3d at 915, 679 P.2d at 45, 201 Cal. Rptr. at
611.
28. The court will not decide constitutional questions when other grounds are
available and dispositive of the issues. Fullerton Union High School Dist. v. Riles,
139 Cal. App. 3d 369, 384, 188 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (1983). For the reason why decision
of this issue was unnecessary, see supra note 27.
29. The court will not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before it. People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 3d
663, 667, 547 P.2d 1000, 1003, 128 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (1976).
Federal law is in accord. See Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975) (the
Supreme Court is reluctant to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily).
30. 35 Cal. 3d at 905, 679 P.2d at 38, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
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constitutional provisions. The court distilled and considered two
distinct approaches.
The first approach restricted the free school guarantee to programs which are "essential to the prescribed curriculum." 31 This
approach did not extend the right to education to activities
"outside of or in addition to the regular academic courses or curriculum of a school." 32 As a result, student; had no right to par33
ticipate in free extracurricular activities.
The second approach extended the free school guarantee to all
activities which constitute an "integral fundamental part of the elementary and secondary education," or which amount to "'necessary elements of any school's activity.' "4 Courts utilizing this
approach included within the right to attend school the right to
participate in extracurricular activities. 35 Therefore, participation
fees for extracurricular activities in those jurisdictions were
unconstitutional.

36

After examining these approaches, the court undertook an examination of the role played by education in the overall constitutional scheme to determine if either approach was in accord with
a reasonable interpretation of California's fiee school guarantee.
Chief Justice Bird canvassed the theory and purpose of education
from the birth of the United States to the California Constitutional Convention of 1878-1879 and on to the present. From this
enlightening research the court gleaned that education bestows
upon democracy extensive political,3 7 economic, 38 and social
31. Smith v. Crim, 240 Ga. 390, 391, 240 S.E.2d 884, 885 (1977). See also Paulson
v. Minidoka County School Dist. No. 331, 93 Idaho 469, 472, 463 P.2d 935, 938 (1970).
32. Paulson, 93 Idaho at 472, 463 P.2d at 938 (footnote omitted).
33. Smith v. Crim, 240 Ga. 390, 391, 240 S.E.2d 884, 885 (1977). See also Granger
v. Cascade County School Dist., 159 Mont. 516, 499 P.2d 780 (1972).
34. Bond v. Ann Arbor School Dist., 383 Mich. 693, 702, 178 N.W.2d 484, 487
(1970). See also Moran v. School Dist. #7, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972).
35. 350 F. Supp. at 1184.
36. Bond, 383 Mich. at 698, 178 N.W.2d at 486; Pacheco v. School Dist. No. 11, 183
Colo. 270, 516 P.2d 629 (1973).
37. "Indeed, education may well be 'the dominant factor in influencing political participation and awareness.'" 35 Cal. 3d at 908, 679 P.2d at 41, 201 Cal. Rptr. at
606.
38. "[EJducation . . .also prepares individuals to participate in the institutional structures ... that distribute economic opportunities and exercise economic power. Education holds out a 'bright hope' for the 'poor and oppressed' to
participate fully in the economic life of American society." 35 Cal. 3d at 908, 679
P.2d at 41, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 607.

benefits.39
In view of the prominent role education thus plays in society,
the court rejected the first approach. 40 That approach failed to
properly assess the actual educational value of any given school
program. 4 1 On the other hand, the second approach focused on
the educational character of the activities in question. 42 Thus, the
43
concept of education is not severed from its purposes.
Again borrowing heavily from other jurisdictions, the court determined that extracurricular activities constitute an integral
component of public education." Consequently, the court held
that all educational activities, curricular and extracurricular, fall
within the free school guarantee. 45 Since the Santa Barbara programs were educational, the imposition of participation fees was
unconstitutional.46 In response, the District argued that its fee
waiver program cured the constitutional defect. 47 In holding that

no financial burden may be placed on the right to education, 48 the
court declared: "Educational opportunities must be provided to
all students without regard to their families' ability or willingness
49
to pay fees or request special waivers."
III.

SEPARATE OPINIONS

Although only three justices joined the lead opinion, a majority
of the court concurred in both the holding concerning the free
school guarantee and the holding concerning section 350. Those
justices who subscribed to the majority view but did not join
39. "[E] ducation serves as a 'unifying social force' among our varied popula-

tion, promoting cohesion based upon democratic values." Id.
40. "[T]he first [approach] is insufficient to ensure compliance with California's free school guarantee." Id.
41. Instead, the approach deferred to the School Board's decision as to
whether to offer any given program for formal academic credit. Id. at 908-09, 679
P.2d at 41, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
42. Id. at 909, 679 P.2d at 41, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
43. Id.
44. The court further indicated that extracurricular activities are "'generally
recognized as a fundamental ingredient of the educational process.'" Id. at 909,
679 P.2d at 42, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (quoting Moran v. School Dist. #7, 350 F. Supp.
1180, 1184 (D. Mont. 1972)).
45. 35 Cal. 3d at 911, 679 P.2d at 43, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
46. Id.
47. Specifically, the District contended that the free school guarantee
amounted "merely to a right not to be financially prevented from enjoying educational opportunities." Id.
48. The court declared: "In guaranteeing 'free' public school, article IX, section
5 fixes the precise extent of the financial burden which may be imposed on the
right to an education-none." Id. (citing as support Bond v. Ann Arbor School
Dist., 383 Mich. 693, 700, 178 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1970); Granger v. Cascade County
School Dist., 159 Mont. 516, 528-29, 499 P.2d 780, 785-86 (1972)).
49. 35 Cal. 3d at 913, 679 P.2d at 44, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
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Chief Justice Bird's lead opinion wrote separately merely to express their personal views concerning education.5 0
On the other hand, Justice Kaus wrote separately to indicate
that he concurred only in the holding that the District's fee policy
violated section 350. In view of this determination, Justice Kaus
believed the decision of the constitutional question unnecessary.5 1 The section 350 holding had already brought finality to the
case. Moreover, "there are weighty reasons for not embarking on
[this] constitutional journey."5 2 The most significant reason cited
53
was the difficulty of predicting the practical effect of the ruling.
The ruling would likely foreclose future legislative options and
54
might de facto invalidate certain existing statutory provisions.
Justice Kaus advocated that the court exercise caution, limiting
itself to the question before it, and considering the particular set55
ting in which the fee was imposed.
In an unusual deviation, Chief Justice Bird wrote separately to
concur in the lead opinion which she had authored. In her concurrence, Chief Justice Bird reiterated many of her views concerning education. The point of the separate opinion, however,
was to advance as additional support for the majority holding the
view that the District's fee program violated the constitution's
equal protection guarantee.5 6 The argument had been raised by
57
the plaintiffs and rejected by the trial court.
Justice Richardson dissented. He analyzed California precedent construing the free school provision and determined that the
first approach considered by the majority was applicable rather
50. Justices Mosk and Grodin both believed that education is most important
to the individual. Justice Mosk disliked the lead opinion's "sugar-coating of inspirational quotations." 35 Cal. 3d at 917, 679 P.2d at 47, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 613 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). Justice Grodin defended the court's decision of the cGnstitutional issue. Id. at 919 n.1, 679 P.2d at 48 n.1, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 614 n.1 (Grodin, J.,
concurring).
51. "[TIhere is no need to reach the broad constitutional question." Id. at 920,
679 P.2d at 49, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 615 (Kaus, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. Id.

54. Justice Kaus cited a number of California Educational Code sections as
apparently being invalidated: sections 32220 to 32224 (insurance for athletic
teams); 35330 (field trips); 35335 (school camps); 39804 (transportation costs); and
48909 (liability for willful pupil misconduct). 35 Cal. 3d at 920-21, 679 P.2d at 49-50,
201 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16 (Kaus, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 921, 679 P.2d at 50, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 616 (Kaus, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 921, 679 P.2d at 50, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 616 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
57. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

than the second approach. 58 Specifically, the free school guarantee applied only to activities falling "within the prescribed course
of study."59 By definition, extracurricular activities do not fall
within the foregoing definition. Therefore, participation fees for
extracurricular activities are constitutional.60 Justice Richardson
also believed section 350's absolute ban on all fees for school activities was neither consistent with, nor reasonably required to effectuate the purpose of the free school guarantee. 61
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Hartzell, the supreme court determined that extracurricular
school activities are important educational experiences. Thus, the
Santa Barbara School District's fee policy for participation in extracurricular activities violated section 350's ban on fees. The
court went further, however, unnecessarily deciding a potentially
far-reaching constitutional issue and thereby violating rules of
constitutional construction.
The effects of this decision may be widespread and varied. The
immediate effect may be a de facto repeal of certain educational
statutes which authorize the imposition of fees on students. The
more far-reaching effect, though, may be to foreclose legislative
and school board options. As a result, some financially strapped
school districts may end up cancelling certain extracurricular activities altogether. In those school districts which will be able to
keep their programs, however, students will be able to enjoy the
right of free participation in every educational activity.
B.

Temporary teacher under Education Code section
44920 entitled to preferential employment rights:
Taylor v. Board of Trustees.

The principle issue in Taylor v. Board of Trustees, 36 Cal. 3d 500,
683 P.2d 710, 204 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1984), was whether the preferential employment rights granted under California Education Code
section 44918 to certain temporary and substitute teachers apply
to temporary teachers hired under California Education Code sec58. 35 Cal. 3d at 928-30, 679 P.2d at 55, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 621-22 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting) (citing Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971)).
59. 35 Cal. 3d at 930, 679 P.2d at 56, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 622 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).

60. 'Thus, I see no impairment of the constitutional right to attend free
schools by an activity fee program ...limited to extracurricular activities." Id.
61. Consequently, Justice Richardson believed section 350 to be invalid. Id. at
934, 679 P.2d at 59, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 625 (Richardson, J., dissenting). Justice Richardson discussed the other arguments raised by the plaintiffs in the trial court and
rejected all.
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tion 44920. In October of 1980, a permanent employee of the respondent school district was granted a leave of absence and the
appellant, Taylor, was hired under the provisions of section 44920.
During that school year, the appellant served at least seventy-five
percent of the regular school days required of a certified employee and thus came within the requirements of section 44918 for
preferential employment rights. However, when the school district filled the seven vacant probationary positions for the following year, it gave no preferential hiring right to Taylor. The district
hired those it felt most qualified for each position. The appellant
contended that his employment in 1980-81 qualified him for preferential hiring rights and sought a writ of mandate to compel his
employment as a probationary teacher and to pay him various
back salary benefits.
Both the court of appeal and Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion
viewed the two statutes as mutually exclusive. While section
44918 regulates those teachers who served for seventy-five percent
of a year, section 44920 provides for a narrower and strictly defined group of temporary teachers-those hired to replace regular
teachers granted a leave of absence. Since the regular teacher being replaced indicated an intention to return to his particular position, there was no preferential connection between the
temporary teacher's assignment and the new job opening. To allow the temporary teacher in this situation special preference
would defeat the best interests of the students. The dissent maintained that the school board should be allowed to select the best
qualified applicant rather than be compelled to select an individual who possesses qualifying credentials merely because he held
another temporary position with the district the prior year.
In rejecting this argument, the majority opinion focused on the
plain meaning of the statute. "Any such [substitute or temporary] employee shall be reemployed for the following year to fill
any vacant positions in the school district for which the employee
is certified. . . ." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44918 (West 1978). Since the
appellant had met the seventy-five percent requirement, the only
remaining question was whether the appellant was qualified for
any or all of the district's vacant positions.
This holding was consistent with the court's view that the legislature intended to strictly limit the scope of the district's discretion in hiring. In order to deny an applicant who was otherwise
qualified under section 44918, the district must demonstrate that

he does not hold the appropriate teaching credentials or that he
lacks both the academic preparation and experience in the subject matter. Consequently, the trial court judgment was reversed
and the case remanded to determine if Taylor was qualified for
any or all of the available positions.
XIII.

EMINENT DOMAIN
Loss of business goodwill flowing from condemnation
includes losses attributableto the payment of higher
rent: People ex reL Department of Transportation v.
Muller.

People ex rel. Departmentof Transportationv. Muller, 36 Cal. 3d
263, 681 P.2d 1340, 203 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1984), presented the court
with its first opportunity to interpret the provisions of section
1263.510 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes compensation for lost business goodwill in eminent domain proceedings.
The court held that goodwill includes losses attributable to payment of higher rent at the site of relocation.
The condemnee, a veterinarian, did not suffer from a loss in patronage as a result of his move, but was subject to higher rents.
Section 1263.510, enacted during a time of rapidly increasing real
estate prices, was designed to fully compensate business enterprises forced to relocate due to eminent domain actions. The statute defines goodwill as "benefits that accrue to a business as a
result of its location." In so doing, the court determined, the legislature intended to compensate condemnees for having to pay
higher rents as well as for losing patronage as a result of a forced
relocation.
XIV.

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Restrictions placed on police officers during their
mealtimes entitled the officers to overtime wages:
Madera Police Officers Association v. City of Madera.

Can the limitations placed upon police officers' mealtime breaks
become so restrictive as to convert the mealtime into worktime?
The court answered this question in the affirmative in MaderaPolice Officers Association v. City of Madera, 36 Cal. 3d 403, 682 P.2d
1087, 204 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1984). The Association brought a class action on behalf of all police officers, sergeants, and dispatchers in
the City of Madera, seeking declaratory relief and payment for
past overtime wages for mealtime.
A mealtime break in police jargon is called a Code 7. In the
City of Madera, police officers have no right to a Code 7 at any
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particular hour. Each day, the watch commander chooses the
particular hour for a Code 7. As a result, officers may not schedule in advance or keep personal appointments during a Code 7.
Moreover, officers are "on call" during Code 7 and must respond
to emergencies as well as handle citizen complaints if interrupted
while eating. While on Code 7, officers must leave a telephone
number or address so they can be contacted whenever necessary.
Finally, officers may not conduct personal business while in uniform; thus, as a practical matter, they are prevented from changing to street clothes because they must be ready to respond
immediately to an emergency call, or else face the possibility of
disciplinary action.
The court approached the issue with a two-step analysis. First,
the court determined "whether the restrictions on off duty time
are primarily directed toward the fulfillment of the employer's requirements and policies." In view of the many restrictions placed
on Code 7 time, the court quickly determined that those restrictions were primarily for the benefit of the employer. Second, the
court looked to "whether the employees' off duty time is so substantially restricted that they are unable to engage in private pursuits." Once again, the court recounted the restrictions. Officers
were effectively prevented from conducting personal business. In
some instances, officers who worked at the stationhouse were not
even allowed to leave the building. In sum, the restrictions were
so constraining that they converted mealtime into work time as a
matter of law. Under local law, the officers were thus entitled to
overtime compensation for Code 7 time.

xv.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Counties may restrict the use of certain pesticides
within the county despite state approval of the
pesticides- People ex reZ Deukmejian v. County of
Mendocino.

In 1979, the voters of Mendocino County approved a ballot initiative measure prohibiting aerial spraying of phenoxy herbicides
throughout the county.' The stated purpose of the ordinance was
1. The initiative was prompted by a 1977 event in which a company sprayed
phenoxy herbicides over a 500 acre target area. The spray drifted three miles from
the intended site, and school buses were accidentally sprayed. In Mendocino
County, the primary use of phenoxy herbicides is in reforestation.

to preserve food and water supplies from contamination.
In a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by the attorney general, the trial court determined that the Mendocino
County ordinance, as approved, was invalid because it was preempted by state law. On appeal, the supreme court held in People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino2 that neither state
law nor federal law preempted the ordinance, and that the county
could properly determine for itself whether or not a particular
pesticide could be used in the county.
I.

STATE PREEMPTION

The statutory authority for regulating pesticide spraying is embodied in the California Food and Agriculture Code. 3 Sections
11401-12121 concern pest control operations. Sections 14001-14098
deal with restricted materials. The Director of the Department of
Food and Agriculture is empowered to establish a list of restricted materials for use in pesticide spraying. 4 The director is
also charged with the duty of adopting regulations governing the
business of pest control. 5 The agriculture commissioner of each
county 6 "may adopt regulations applicable in his or her county
which are supplemental to those of the director" 7 concerning pest
control operations. However, each regulation made by county
commissioners must be approved by the director before it can become operative. 8
No person may use any material restricted by the director without first obtaining a permit from the county agriculture commissioner 9 who is charged with considering several locally relevant
factors in deciding whether to issue a permit.10 Given the level of
state control over pesticide spraying, the court was forced to determine whether the legislature intended to "fully occupy" the
2. 36 Cal. 3d 476, 683 P.2d 1150, 204 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1984). Opinion by Broussard, J., with Bird, C.J., Mosk and Reynoso, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting
opinions by Kay, J., and Kaus, J., with Grodin, J., concurring in Part II of the dissent of Justice Kaus. Kay, J., was sitting under the assignment of the Chairperson
of the Judicial Council.
3. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the California
Food and Agriculture Code.
4. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 14004.5 (West Supp. 1984).
5. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 11502 (West 1968).
6. Each county's agriculture commissioner is appointed by the county's
board of supervisors. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 2121 (West 1968).
7. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 11503 (West Supp. 1984). Prior to the 1971
amendment of this section, the county commissioner's authority was to "adopt
regulations in addition to those adopted by the director."
8. Id.
9. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 14006.5 (West Supp. 1984).
10. Among the local conditions the commissioner must consider are:
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area, and hence preempt the Mendocino County ordinance.'
If state law fully occupies a regulated area, regardless of its degree of local concern, 12 either expressly or by implication, it cannot be supplemented by local legislation.13 Inasmuch as the state
had not expressly prohibited local governments from regulating
the use of phenoxy herbicides, there was clearly no expressed
preemption.14
To determine whether state law had fully occupied the area by
implication, the court turned to the test established in In re Hubbard.i5 Under that test, an area of regulation is fully occupied if:
(1) there is a clear indication of exclusive state concern; (2) partial coverage by general law indicates "that a paramount state
concern will not tolerate further or additional local action;" or (3)
the local regulation's detrimental effects on transient citizens of
the state outweighs its benefits to the community.
The court turned to section 14007 of the code, which mandates
that use of pesticides, even by permit, is conditioned upon compliance with the "law and regulations."' 6 Armed with this statute,
(a) Use in vicinity of schools, dwellings, hospitals, recreational areas
and livestock enclosures.
(b) Problems related to heterogeneous planting of crops.
(c) Applications of materials known to create severe resurgence or secondary pest problems without compensating control of pest species.
(d) Meteorological conditions for use.
(e) Timing of applications in relation to bee activity.
(f) Provisions for proper storage of pesticides and disposal of
containers.
Id.
11. The court had no difficulty in determining that, standing alone, the
Mendocino County ordinance was a valid exercise of police powers. 36 Cal. 3d at
484, 683 P.2d at 1154-55, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 901-02. Counties are required to adopt
measures designed to promote the health and safety of their residents. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 450 (West 1979).
12. In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 125, 396 P.2d 809, 814-15, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 39899 (1964) (overruled on other grounds in Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 63
n.6, 460 P.2d 137, 141 n.6, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 469 n.6 (1969)); Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 681, 349 P.2d 974, 979, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (1960).
13. Lancaster v. Municipal Court, 6 Cal. 3d 805, 807-08, 494 P.2d 681, 682, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 609, 610 (1972).
14. It is noteworthy, however, that the director is specifically required to adopt
regulations governing the use of 2,4-D. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 14033 (West
Supp. 1984). This was one of the pesticides banned from use by the county
ordinance.
15. 62 Cal. 2d at 128, 396 P.2d at 814-15, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99.
16. Section 14007 provides: "Every permit which is issued under the regulations adopted pursuant to this chapter is conditioned upon compliance with the
law and regulations and upon such other specified conditions as may be required

which was apparently designed to guarantee the efficacy of all
other forms of legislation, the court determined that the newly
passed ordinance was such a "law" with which sprayers would be
forced to comply. Therefore, only pesticides which were not on
the list of restricted materials could be sprayed in Mendocino
County.
To further support its position, the court noted that it was required that local concerns be addressed in determining spraying
activities.17 Additionally, noted the court, the language of section
14007 contemplated a need to harmonize relevant sections of the
Food and Agriculture Code with laws and regulations contained
in other codes-particularly those dealing with regulations of air
pollution and water quality since they relate to the purpose of the
subject ordinance.' 8
The court found it simple to conclude that, by encouraging that
local concerns be considered, the legislature could not have felt
that state concerns were so important as to fully occupy the area
of pesticide spraying. Therefore, the first two portions of the Hubbard test failed. The third part failed as well. Regulation of
spraying in Mendocino County had little, if any, effect on the
state's transient citizens. There could be no problem with the law
being detrimentally unpredictable.
II.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

An intervening party supporting the respondent19 argued that
the Mendocino County ordinance was invalid because it was preempted by federal legislation, specifically, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act2O (FIFRA) as amended by the
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 197221 (FEPCA).
The court was forced to review FIFRA and the history of the 1972
amendment to determine if Congress intended that local entities
are not to be involved in pesticide regulation.
Since there was nothing in FIFRA or FEPCA which expressly
prohibited local involvement, the court examined the legislative
history of FEPCA in order to determine congressional intent. The
to accomplish the purposes of this chapter." CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 14007
(West Supp. 1984).
17. See supra note 10.
18. The court noted that, generally, local regulation in the field of air pollution
and water quality predominates. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39002,
40001 (West 1979).
19. The intervening party supporting the respondent was the California Forest
Protective Association. Several groups and individuals intervened in support of
the appellants.
20. Ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982)).
21. PuB. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982)).
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only relevant language in the 1972 amendment permitted states to
regulate, to some extent, federally registered pesticides. 22 The
legislative history of FEPCA failed to reveal a consensus of clear
intent on the part of Congress to permit or deny local intervention. The House Committee on Agriculture rejected the idea that
political subdivisions of the states be permitted to regulate pesticides. 23 The Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry expressly commented in its report that local authorities should not
be permitted any degree of control. 24 However, the bill then went
to the Senate Committee on Commerce which expressly deemed
that regulation be permitted. 25 The Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee registered its objection to the Commerce Committee's stand.26 Before the bill was passed, the Commerce
Committee's language encouraging local regulation was specifi27
cally omitted.
Based on the legislative history, the court was unwilling to suggest definite federal preemption over local regulation. Additionally, the court refused to accept the application of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius28 (i.e., since Congress allowed supplemental
regulation by states, it excluded additional regulation by local jurisdictions). Therefore, because Congress expressly gave states
power to regulate, and did not expressly deny it to local authorities, the court felt it should recognize "the ordinary view that
states are free to distribute regulatory power between themselves
and their political subdivisions."29

III. DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Kay dissented from the court's opinion, arguing that
22. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1982).
23. H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971).
24. S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4008.
25. S. REP. No. 970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972),
& AD. NEWS at 4128.

CONG.

reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE

26. S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 11 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.
& AD. NEWS at 4066.
27. Description of Agriculture and Commerce Committee Staff, Substitute for
Text of H.R. 10729, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972), 118 Cong. Rec. 32257, 32258 (1972).
28. A rule of statutory construction indicating that where exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be implied or presumed. See Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190, 195, 553 P.2d 537, 539, 132
Cal. Rptr. 377, 379 (1976).
29. 36 Cal. 3d at 492, 683 P.2d at 1160, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
CODE CONG.

state law had preempted the local ordinance. He relied primarily
on the language of section 1150330 which makes regulations
adopted by county commissioners subject to the approval of the
State Director of Food and Agriculture. Justice Kay noted that
providing such statutory authority "is a clear expression of state
supremacy." 3 1 He supplemented his opinion with a policy argument suggesting that permitting local regulation creates piecemeal legislation that might be detrimental to the overall
regulation of the agriculture industry.
Justice Kaus disagreed with the majority on both the state and
federal preemption issues. 32 Like Justice Kay, Justice Kaus felt
that by making regulations imposed by county commissioners
subject to the state director's approval, the broad authority for
permitting or rejecting pesticide spraying was intended to rest
with the state, not local entities. He felt that the practical effect of
the decision would be to give local entities the power to reject in
piecemeal fashion the broad policy dictates of the state.
Justice Kaus reviewed the same legislative history of the federal law as had the majority. He argued that the most explicit
statements of whether local regulation should be allowed were
made by those committees which objected to such regulation.
Justice Kaus ultimately noted that the final form of the bill
adopted was that which the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry had urged. Therefore, felt Justice Kaus, the committee report of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry should carry
the greatest weight in interpreting Congress' intent; that committee's report was the most adamant in its rejection of local
regulation.
IV.

CONCLUSION AND IMPACT

The potential impact of the court's decision could be substantial. As Justice Kaus noted in his dissenting opinion, counties
will have the power to reject for themselves pesticide use approved for statewide use. The decision seems to substantially dilute the authority of the Director of Food and Agriculture to set
broad policy. Perhaps the primary issue that remains to be determined is whether counties will be able to regulate the use of certain pesticides by administrative edict. Based on the court's
reasoning that a voter-passed initiative resulting in a county ordinance is a "law" under section 14007, with which sprayers must
30. CAL.FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 11503 (West Supp. 1984).
31. 36 Cal. 3d at 494, 683 P.2d at 1161, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (Kay, J., dissenting).
32. Justice Grodin concurred in the portion of Justice Kaus' dissent dealing
with federal preemption.
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comply, agency-created rules may certainly be "regulations" requiring compliance under the same statutory authority.
XVI.

EQUAL PROTECTION
Parentsof a child placed in statefacilitiesfor public
safety cannot be required to reimburse the
government for the costs of caringfor the child: In re
Jerald C.

In re Jerald C.1 presented the supreme court with the question
of under what conditions relative responsibility statutes 2 could be
enforced.
Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,3 Jerald,
a minor, was named a ward of the court and subsequently held at
a series of state facilities. The County of Santa Clara brought suit
against Jerald's father seeking reimbursement for the care and
support of Jerald.4 The father appealed from an order, based on
Welfare and Institutions Code section 903.1,5 requiring him to pay
1. 36 Cal. 3d 1, 678 P.2d 917, 201 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1984), vacating 33 Cal. 3d 1, 654
P.2d 745, 187 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1982). Opinion by Broussard, J., with Bird, C.J., and
Mosk, J., concurring. Separate opinion by Kaus, J., with Reynoso, Grodin, and
Richardson, JJ., concurring in the judgment.
2. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 202, 903 (West 1984). These sections were
amended after a rehearing was granted in this case; however, the new legislation
has no effect on this case. 36 Cal. 3d at 5 n.3, 678 P.2d at 918 n.3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at
343 n.3.
3. CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984) provides as follows:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of
this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew
based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the: juvenile court, which
may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
4. The county was seeking "$265 per month for juvenile hall and boys ranch
custody for periods prior to September 1980,. . . $33 per day for 33 days in juvenile
hall in October and November 1980, and at the rate of $25 per month for... commitment to the California Youth Authority." 36 Cal. 3d at 4, 678 P.2d at 918, 201
Cal.Rptr. at 343.
5. Prior to its amendment in 1983, this section stated:
The father, mother, spouse, or other person liable for the support of a
minor person, the estates of such persons, and the estate of such minor
person, shall be liable for the cost of his care, support, and maintenance in
any county institution in which he is placed, detained, or committed pursuant to the order of the juvenile court, or for the cost to the county in
which the juvenile court making the order is located, of his care, support,
and maintenance in any other place in which he is placed, detained, or
committed pursuant to the order of the juvenile court. The liability of
such person (in this article called relatives) and estates shall be a joint
and several liability.

for Jerald's care at the rate of $100 per month. The basis of the
appeal was that relative responsibility statutes must be invalidated "when the government charges were not for support which
the relative refused or failed to provide but for the cost of main6
taining public institutions for public benefit."
The underlying premise of the court's decision was that statutes requiring the responsible relative to make reimbursements
have been sustained against equal protection challenges. 7 In support of this proposition, the court pointed to the parents' duty to
provide for a minor's physical injuries, 8 to care for a mentally retarded minor,9 to pay the costs of counsel in juvenile proceedings,O and even the duty of adult children to support needy or
poor elderly parents." In these cases, statutes requiring relative
reimbursement were found to bear a rational relationship to re2
lieving the general public of this burden and were not arbitrary.'
In order to obtain reimbursement under these statutes, the government's expenditures must have been based on the parents'
duty of support and not have been provided for the public's benefit. 13 Consequently, an examination of the county's purpose in
placing Jerald in custody was germane.
When incarceration or commitment is for the protection of society, it is arbitrary and in violation of the basic constitutional guarCAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 903 (West 1972).
6. 36 Cal. 3d at 6, 678 P.2d at 919, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
7. Id. at 5, 678 P.2d at 918, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
8. Statutes providing that parents are liable for reimbursing government
agencies which provide medical treatment to their minor children have been upheld. In re Dudley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 401, 414, 48 Cal. Rptr. 790, 798 (1966).
9. County of Alameda v. Kaiser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 815, 818, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343, 345
(1965).
10. Since legal assistance was essential to protecting the minor's rights, a statute requiring parental reimbursement was neither arbitrary nor a denial of equal
protection. See In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513, 522, 468 P.2d 204, 208, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76,
80 (1970).
11. In reviewing the duty imposed by relative responsibility statutes on adult
children for their parents, the court stated: "Since these sections do not touch
upon a fundamental interest and do not create any suspect classifications, their
constitutionality is to be determined by the normal 'rational relationship' test.
..." Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 506, 516 P.2d 840, 851, 111 Cal. Rptr.
136, 147 (1973) (footnote omitted).
12. See supra notes 8-11.
13. The court relied on a long line of cases which stated that charging the
costs of operating state institutions for public benefit to one particular class of persons denied those persons the equal protection of the law. See Myles Salt Co., v.
Board of Comm'rs, 239 U.S. 478 (1916); Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898);
Furey v. City of Sacramento, 24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 976 (1979); Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 16 Cal. 3d 676, 547
P.2d 1377, 129 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1976); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60
Cal. 2d 716, 723, 388 P.2d 720, 724, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492, vacated and remanded,380
U.S. 194 (1965).
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antee of equal protection to assess relatives for the expense.14
"Whatever the basis for other commitments by the juvenile court
...
the purposes of the confinement and treatment in commitments pursuant to section 602 include 'the protection of society
from the confined person.' "15
The county maintained that, regardless of the basis of the statutory obligation, there still exists a common law obligation of support.16 However, the common law duty only applies to parents'
"neglect" to provide support for their minor children.1 7 Section
602 commitments are clearly based on the violation of laws, not
the failure to provide support.' 8 "Although parents of children
committed under section 602 are thereby relieved of their ordinary burden of support, the reimbursement provision of section
903 is not based on such burden but upon the governmental cost

of confinement."' 19
The court went even farther by saying there was absolutely no
basis for the distinction between common law and statutory origin because the statutory origin of the duty to provide support for
needy parents and adult children reaches back almost four centuries. 20 The costs of confinement may not be recovered for an
adult or a child where the purpose of the confinement is the pro2
tection of society. '
Thus, the county may not recover even that portion of the cost
attributable to the minor's support.22 In so ruling, three court of
appeal decisions allowing reimbursement from parents were over14. The enactment and administration of laws providing for sequestration
and treatment of persons in appropriate state institutions-subject of
course, to the constitutional guarantees-who would endanger themselves
or others if at large is a proper state function; being so, it follows that the
expense of providing, operating and maintaining such institutions should
(subject to reasonable exceptions against the inmate or his estate) be
borne by the state.
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d ;tt 719-20, 388 P.2d at 722, 36
Cal. Rptr. at 490 (quoting Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247,
255-56, 379 P.2d 22, 27-28, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718, 723-24 (1963)) (emphasis in original).
15. 36 Cal. 3d at 7, 678 P.2d at 920, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 9, 678 P.2d at 921, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 207 (West 1982).
18. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE

§ 602

(West 1984).

19. 36 Cal. 3d at 9, 678 P.2d at 921, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
20. 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2 § vi (1601); see also tenBroek, California'sDual System of
Family Law: Its Origin, Development and Present Status, Part II, 17 STAN. L
REV. 614 (1965).

21. 36 Cal. 3d at 10, 678 P.2d at 922, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
22. Even if such a division is possible, section 903 reimbursement goes beyond

turned.23 The purpose of such incarceration, and the benefits derived, are for society in general.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kaus maintained that the
parents still have a duty to reimburse the state for expenditures
in support of a minor child; however, "the applicable statutory
scheme does not lend itself to an efficient segregation between
those costs which may legitimately be charged to the parent and
those which are the responsibility of the general public."24 In

calling for a change in the present law, more consideration must
be placed on the parents' ability to pay. 25 Also, some sort of state-

wide standard should be established for the level of reimbursement required.26 Given the pluralities in this case, legislative review may indeed revive relative responsibility statutes under
section 602 placements.
XVII. EVIDENCE
A. Presumption that child born in wedlock is the issue
of the mother's husband held not to violate due
process: Estate of Cornelious.
In Estate of Cornelious,' the court considered whether the conclusive presumption that a child born in wedlock is the issue of
the mother's husband, a principle codified in Evidence Code section 621,2 violated the appellant's due process rights.
The case arose out of a dispute as to the proper party to administer the estate of Willis Cornelious. Cornelious died intestate,
leaving no surviving spouse or legitimate children. Cornelious'
sisters nominated Hettie Taylor to act as administratrix of the estate. Appellant, Trudy Ann Hall, claimed to be the illegitimate
the common law duty imposed under section 207, and the state's purpose in the
confinement is still the protection of society-not the support of the minor. Id.
23. In re Steven S., 122 Cal. App. 3d 683, 176 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1981); In re Shaieb,
250 Cal. App. 2d 553, 58 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1967); County of Alameda v. Espinoza, 243
Cal. App. 2d 534, 52 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1966). These cases all rejected the equal protection challenge on the basis of the common law distinction and on the purpose of
the confinement.
24. 36 Cal. 3d at 12, 678 P.2d at 923, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
25. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 903-905. These provisions limit orders of reimbursement to parents' ability to pay solely at the time of attempted collection-not
at time of confinement. See 36 Cal. 3d at 13 n.3, 678 P.2d at 924 n.3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at
348 n.3.
26. Id.
1. 35 Cal. 3d 461,674 P.2d 245, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1984). Opinion by Kaus, J.,
with Mosk, Richardson, Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Bird, CJ.
2. CAL EviD. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1984) provides in relevant part that
"the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile,
is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage."
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daughter of the deceased and applied for letters of administration.3 Hall sought to establish that Willis was her biological father
and that a parent-child relationship existed between Willis and
herself prior to his death.4 Hall was born, however, during the
marriage of her mother, Arzina Fuller, to David Fuller. The Fullers were living together as husband and wife at the time of Hall's
conception, and David Fuller was identified as the child's father
on her birth certificate. David Fuller was neither sterile nor impotent. Arzina Fuller testified that she and her husband had not engaged in marital relations during the time of her daughter's
conception, and that Willis Cornelious was Hall's biological father. Evidence established that David Fuller was not Trudy Hall's
biological father.5
Hall maintained that she was informed by her mother that
Cornelious was her father when she was fifteen years old. From
that time until Willis' death, she visited him and was identified by
3. CAL.PROB. CODE § 422 (West Supp. 1984) provides as follows:

(a) Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate must be
granted to one or more of the following persons, who are entitled to letters
in the following order.
(1) The surviving spouse, or some competent person whom he or she
may request to have appointed.
(2) The children.
(3) The grandchildren.
(4) The parents.
(5) The brothers and sisters.
(6) The next of kin entitled to share in the estate.
(7) The relatives of a previously deceased spouse, when such relatives
are entitled to succeed to some portion of the estate.
(8) The public administrator.
(9) The creditors.
(10) Any person legally competent.
(b) A relative of the decedent who is entitled to priority under subdivision (a) is entitled to priority only if either of the following facts exist:
(1) The relative is entitled to succeed to all or part of the estate.
(2) The relative is a parent, grandparent, child or grandchild of the decedent and either takes under the will of, or is entitled to succeed to all or
part of the estate of, another deceased person who is entitled to succeed
to all or part of the estate of the decedent.
4. CAL. PROB. CODE § 255(a) (West Supp. 1984) (repealed effective Jan. 1,
1985) and CAL.PROB. CODE § 6408 (West Supp. 1984) (effective Jan. 1, 1985) allow
an illegitimate child to inherit from the natural father if there exists, prior to the
death of the natural father, a parent and child relationship as defined by the
statutes.
5. Trudy Hall possessed the genetic trait for sickle cell anemia, which was
not carried by Arzina or David Fuller. This makes it biologically impossible for
David Fuller to have been appellant's natural father. 35 Cal. 3d at 464, 674 P.2d at
247, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 545.

him as his daughter. 6
Hettie Taylor successfully urged at the trial court level that the
appellant was not the daughter of Willis Cornelious, under the
conclusive presumption of Evidence Code section 621.7 In upholding the order denying Hall's petition for appointment as administratrix of Cornelious' estate, the supreme court compared
the importance of the conclusive presumption of legitimacy with
the personal interest of Hall in inheriting Cornelious' estate.
The court noted that the ancient principle8 that the law regards
a child born in wedlock as an issue of the marriage "promotes important social policies: preservation of the integrity of the family,
protection of the welfare of children by avoiding the stigma of illegitimacy and keeping them off the welfare rolls, and insurance of
the stability of titles and inheritance."9 The court further noted
that the rule intentionally disregarded the biological accuracy of
the presumption, thus making irrelevant the possibility that scientific testing could establish the identity of the biological
father.1O
The court then discussed the limited exceptions to the conclusive presumption," distinguishing the circumstances encompassed by those exceptions from those of the appellant. The
court adopted the reasoning forwarded in an article appearing in
the Stanford Law Review' 2 that the relationship of a father to a
very young child is predominantly based on biological parentage,
while the relationship of an older child to a man purporting to be
the father is a more strongly developed social relationship. Such
a relationship overshadows the biological origins of the child and
creates a familial bond which should not lightly be dissolved by
the court.
In contrast to the important social policies favoring the conclu6. The court states that the appellant visited Willis, accompanied him on errands, and occasionally stayed overnight at his home, and that Willis identified the
appellant to his friends as his daughter. Id.
7. See supra note 2.
8. The court notes that the principle embodied in Evidence Code § 621 was a
maxim of the Roman law, which was copied by the common law. The court quotes
from Shakespeare's King John to demonstrate that the rule was commonly accepted in the 16th century.
9. 35 Cal. 3d at 465, 674 P.2d at 247, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
10. The court quotes Keaton v. Keaton, 7 Cal. App. 3d 214, 216, 86 Cal. Rptr.
562, 563 (1970), for the principle that "[tihe husband is deemed responsible for the
wife's child if it is conceived while they are cohabitating; he is the legal father and
the issue of biological paternity is irrelevant."
11. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(b)-(g) (West Supp. 1984) provides that the issue of
paternity may be questioned using blood tests, but only upon motion by the
mother or her husband, noticed within two years of the child's birth.
12. Recent Developments, California'sTangled Web: Blood Tests and The Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REv. 754, 761-65 (1968).
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sive presumption, the court characterized appellant's interest as a
solely personal interest in the inheritance of an estate. The court
ruled that this interest was "of a lower order," and was further diminished by the similar, counterbalancing interest of the sisters
of the deceased in the inheritance.
The appellant based her legal arguments on two cases. In Stan3
ley v. Illinois,1
the undisputed biological father had lived with
and supported the children until their mother's death. The
United States Supreme Court held that the automatic removal of
the children from the father's custody was a due process violation. The Court mandated a hearing on the father's fitness as a
parent before his children could be made wards of the state.
In In re Lisa R.,14 the claimed father, Victor, had lived with the
child's mother before and after the child's birth and was named
as the child's father on the birth certificate. The mother had subsequently returned to her husband with the child. After the
death of both the mother and her husband, Victor sought to prove
that he was Lisa's natural father. The California Supreme Court
held that application of the conclusive presumption under those
circumstances would violate due process.
The Cornelious court distinguished both Lisa R. and Stanley.
The court noted that the decision in Lisa R. was based on the lack
of competing societal interests, and that in both Lisa R. and Stanley the relationship between father and child "arose from more
than the biological fact" of parentage.15 In the Cornelious case,
the court found that the interest of appellant was not as weighty
as that of the fathers in Stanley and Lisa R. Further, the court
emphasized the importance of the established father-daughter relationship between appellant and David Fuller, who was never informed that he was not Trudy's natural father.16 The court
concluded that "[iun sum, Trudy has failed to advance a reason
why the Constitution demands that the legislative judgment con17
cerning her parentage should be voided."'
13. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
14. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
15. 35 Cal. 3d at 467, 674 P.2d at 249, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 547. Chief Justice Bird, in
her dissenting opinion, maintained that the relationship between Willis and Hall
also transcended the "mere biological fact" of Hall's true parentage. Id. at 472, 674
P.2d at 252, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 550 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
16. David Fuller died at some time after the trial court hearing in this matter.
35 Cal. 3d at 464 n.3, 674 P.2d at 247 n.3, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 545 n.3.
17. Id. at 467, 674 P.2d at 249, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 547.

The Chief Justice dissented, stating that the assertion of substantial state interest favoring application of the Evidence Code
section 621 was "completely without support, either in the majority's opinion or in the record."18 She noted that the court had
committed itself to weighing competing interests concerning application of the conclusive presumption on a case-by-case basis.19
Examining several possible justifications for the application of
section 621, she concluded that none of the policy reasons commonly asserted could justify its application against Trudy Hall.
The reasons forwarded by Chief Justice Bird as the "recognized
interest of the state in maintaining the conclusive presumption of
paternity" were to preserve the integrity of the family unit, to
safeguard the welfare of minor children by protecting them from
the stigma of illegitimacy and by ensuring that parents fulfill their
support obligations, and to ensure that titles to property and
rights of inheritance will not be disturbed on the basis of evidence which is scientifically unsubstantiated. Since David Fuller
was dead at the time of the court's ruling, and Arzina Fuller supported the efforts of Trudy Hall in establishing her true heritage,
there was no danger of injury to any existing family unit. Further, Chief Justice Bird reasoned that the goals of protecting minor children from the stigma of illegitimacy or ensuring their
adequate support could not apply to the voluntary decision of an
informed adult to challenge the presumption of paternity forwarded by section 621.
Regarding the possibility that a challenge to the conclusive presumption might threaten the stability of titles and inheritance,
Chief Justice Bird questioned the majority's assertion that prior
cases had justified the application of the conclusive presumption
on those grounds.2 0 She went on to state that the protections provided by the system of inheritance under the California Probate
Code sufficiently protected the goal of orderly distribution of
estates.
18. Id. at 468, 674 P.2d at 250, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 548 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
19. The court stated in Lisa R. that:
[T]he reasonableness of a statutory limitation on the right to offer proof of
parentage depends on circumstances prevailing in each particular case.
Accordingly, a court, before receiving evidence thereof, must in each instance make a preliminary determination .. . that due process concepts
would be offended if the particular claimant to parentage were denied an
opportunity to prove his claim.
13 Cal. 3d at 651 n.17, 532 P.2d at 133 n.17, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485 n.17.
20. The Chief Justice noted that County of San Diego v. Brown, 80 Cal. App.
3d 297, 145 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1978), and S.D.W. v. Holden, 275 Cal. App. 2d 313, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 269 (1969), cited by the majority, were factually distinguishable cases, which
actually involved attempted avoidance of support obligations by the presumed
fathers.
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Regarding the majority's characterization of Hall's interest in
establishing her true paternity, the Chief Justice stressed the fact
that Hall had established a social relationship with Cornelious
prior to his death, and noted that the interest of Hall in establishing her paternity was no less legitimate because such action
might provide the tangible benefit of an inheritance. Chief Justice
Bird also noted that any competing interest of the deceased's sisters in inheriting the estate did not outweigh Hall's interest in establishing her paternity, citing the determination by the
California Legislature that the inheritance rights of an illegitimate
child who can fulfill the requirements of the Probate Code2l outweigh those of the deceased's siblings.
In conclusion, Chief Justice Bid stated that Hall had demonstrated a legitimate interest in establishing that Cornelious was
her natural father, and that her interest was not outweighed by
the alleged state interests supporting application of the conclusive presumption. Accordingly, the Chief Justice would hold that
to deny appellant the opportunity to rebut the presumption of paternity would be a violation of due process.
B.

Expert testimony regardingrape trauma syndrome
inadmissible to prove that a rape has occurred:
People v. Bledsoe.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A teenage girl was raped by a man twice her age. The defense
was consent. Although the prosecution had ample evidence of the
defendant's guilt, evidence that the victim suffered from "rape
trauma syndrome" was introduced in an effort to prove that a
rape had in fact occurred. A unanimous court in People v. Bledsoe' declared that evidence of the aftereffects of a rape was inadmissible to prove that a rape occurred, although the evidence may
be admitted for a variety of other purposes. Nevertheless, the
21. Prior to January 1, 1985, the following code provisions are applicable: CAL.
§§ 221-222 (West 1956) (intestate succession rights of children); CAL.
§ 255 (West Supp. 1984) (existence of parent.child relationship necessary for succession by child). After January 1, 1985, the following provisions apply:
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(a) (West Supp. 1984) (intestate succession rights of children); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6408 (West Supp. 1984) (establishment of parent-child
relationship).
1. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). Opinion by Kaus, J.,
with Bird, C.J., Mosk, Broussard, Reynoso, Grodin, and Puglia, JJ., concurring.
Puglia, J., sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
PROB. CODE
PROB. CODE

court determined that although admission of the rape trauma syndrome was error, it was not prejudicial in this case.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
One night in November, 1981, fourteen year-old Melanie went to
a friend's party in Huntington Beach. Twenty-eight year-old defendant Bledsoe also attended the party. Melanie drank some
beer and used a small amount of cocaine. Bledsoe had drunk
only beer. At approximately 11 p.m., Melanie asked Bledsoe to
drive her home. He agreed, but instead drove her to his house.
Melanie entered the house because she needed to use the bathroom. Bledsoe entered the bathroom and covered Melanie's
mouth with a rag with a strong odor2 and dragged her to the living
room. Melanie attempted to escape but was caught and hit by the
defendant. Melanie ceased to resist when the defendant
threatened her with a knife.3 Thereafter, she was raped. The defendant then dropped Melanie off back at the party at her request.
She entered the house bruised and emotionally upset and an4
nounced that the defendant had raped her.
The defense offered at trial was consent. The defendant testified that Melanie had been affectionate all night at the party and
had asked him to take her to his house to smoke marijuana.
While there they had begun kissing, which ultimately led to sexual intercourse. Bledsoe claimed no force was needed or used,
but could not explain Melanie's bruises.
During the course of the trial, the prosecution presented expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome. The evidence was offered to
prove that a rape occurred. The evidence was admitted over the
defendant's objection. 5 The jury found the defendant guilty of
forcible rape, but not guilty as to use of a weapon or assault with
2. Although Melanie's mother and friends testified to smelling an ether-like
odor on Melanie's person, neither the examining doctor nor the investigating officers detected any such odor. Id. at 240 n.1, 681 P.2d at 293 n.1, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 452
n.l.
3. According to Melanie, Bledsoe had also told her that "other guys" were
present in the house and would join him if she did not cooperate. Id. at 239, 681
P.2d at 292-93, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
4. Thereafter, many of Melanie's friends went to Bledsoe's home and attacked the defendant, beating him unconscious. Id. at 240, 681 P.2d at 293, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 452.
5. Defense counsel objected to the evidence as irrelevant and collateral.
Counsel sought a hearing outside the presence of the jury pursuant to Evidence
Code section 402(b), which allows the trial court, in its discretion, to conduct a
hearing on admissibility of evidence outside of the jury's hearing. The court ultimately denied the request and the objection. Id. at 240-41, 681 P.2d at 293-94, 203
Cal. Rptr. at 452-53.
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6
a deadly weapon.

III.

RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME

In an effort to prove that a rape had in fact occurred, the prosecution presented evidence of rape trauma syndrome. This evidence was presented by means of expert testimony from Leslie
Jacobson-Wigg, a rape counselor who had treated Melanie.7 The
counselor explained that rape trauma syndrome is the "umbrella
terminology" that describes the parameters of a pattern of reactions and experiences which most rape victims undergo. 8 Often,
she testified, a sexual assault victim is threatened with her life;
thus, rape trauma syndrome is an acute stress reaction to the
threat of being killed. The counselor then described three phases
of the syndrome. 9
The first phase is called disorientation or, the "immediate impact reaction." The phrase describes the victim's emotional experiences during the course of the rape and over a course of
hours immediately thereafter. The victim may exhibit one of two
style reactions in this phase: stress style and controlled style. In
the stress style, the victim exhibits anxiety, fear, and agitation. In
the controlled style, the victim appears "normal," i.e., her feelings
are masked as though no rape had occurred. Both styles are normal responses.O
The counselor termed the second phase as the reorganization
phase. The victim begins to learn how to deal with the assault
and consequently focuses less on the attack and more so on eve6. The defendant had been charged with: (1) forcible rape; (2) use of weapon
during the commission of a rape; (3) assault with a deadly weapon; and (4) false
imprisonment. Id. at 240, 681 P.2d at 293, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 452. The jury failed to
reach a verdict on the last charge, and the prosecution dismissed the count. Id. at
245, 681 P.2d at 296-97, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56.
7. Jacobson-Wigg was a well-qualified counselor who worked as a technical
reserve officer for the Huntington Beach Police Department, was a director of the
"Rape Prevention and Education Program" at the University of California, Irvine,
and conducted her own private practice. Id. at 241 n.3, 681 P.2d at 294 n.3, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 453 n.3.
8. Id. at 241, 681 P.2d at 294, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
9. Some of the professional literature on the subject split the syndrome into
three categories as did Jacobson-Wigg. See Fox & Scherl, Crisis Intervention with
Victims of Rape, 17 SocIAL WORK 36, 37-42 (1972). Other authors have referred
only to two phases: "the acute phase: disorganization" and "the long-term process:
reorganization." See A. BURGESS & L. HoLMsmoM, RAPE, VICTIMS OF CRISIS 37, 50
(1974).
10. 36 Cal. 3d at 242, 681 P.2d at 294-95, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54.

ryday occurrences. The victim functions more "normally" both
inwardly and outwardly. She is able to concentrate on tasks, and
she experiences less flashbacks to the assault. The rape, however, still retains a powerful effect over her psyche."
The final phase is the integration phase. At that point, a victim
who had been coping well suddenly becomes depressed and relives the incident. The victim must then re-learn to cope. This
phase can occur as late as one year after the actual rape.12
The counselor stated that some victims never pass the reorganization phase. Instead, they experience the "silent reaction" in
which they deny to themselves and others that a rape has occurred. This phase could last a lifetime. In addition, the counselor indicated other general responses of rape victims, which
include a fear of men and a phobia of being alone. According to
the counselor, at the time of trial, Melanie was in the reorganiza3
tion phase and feared both men and being alone.'

IV. ANALYSIS
The defendant argued that admission of the rape trauma syndrome evidence was error. First, the defendant claimed the evidence was precluded by two court of appeal decisions. 14 The
court acknowledged that the two lower court opinions had held
that some expert testimony by a rape counselor may be irrelevant
and inadmissible. But, the court believed, it does not follow that
all such testimony is inadmissible. 15 Instead, "the admissibility of
expert testimony on a given subject must turn both on the nature
of the particular evidence and its relation to a question actually at
issue in the case."' 6 Since the two appellate court cases concerned other issues, they had no bearing on Bledsoe's claim.
The heart of the defendant's claim of error was that evidence of
rape trauma syndrome is not admissible under the Frye stan-

11. Id.
12. Id. at 243, 681 P.2d at 295, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
13. Specifically, the counselor described Melanie as becoming more her normal self, but still experiencing flashbacks, nightmares, difficulty with concentration, and fears of men, crowds, and being alone. The conselor's conclusion:
Melanie suffered from rape trauma syndrome. Id. at 243-44, 681 P.2d at 295-96, 203
Cal. Rptr. at 454-55.
14. The two decisions were People v. Clark, 109 Cal. App. 3d 88, 167 Cal. Rptr.
51 (1980), and People v. Guthreau, 102 Cal. App. 3d 436, 162 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1980).
In both cases, the appellate courts found expert testimony concerning the reasonableness of the degree of resistance displayed by the victim to be inadmissible.
The courts in those cases felt the testimony to be irrelevant to the issue of consent
in a rape prosecution.
15. See infra note 19.
16. 36 Cal. 3d at 246, 681 P.2d at 297, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
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dard.17 The court agreed to review this contention even though
the defendant failed to cite the case to the trial court.18 The court
recognized that rape trauma syndrome is a rather recent concept
and that its use in a judicial setting has been the subject of only a
few cases throughout the country. The court noted many instances in which evidence of rape trauma syndrome would be
proper.1 9 As to the use of evidence of the syndrome to prove the
occurrence of rape, the court cited three jurisdictions which have
previously determined the issue. In applying the Frye test, courts
in two of the jurisdictions found the evidence inadmissible 20 the
2
other court came to the opposite conclusion. '
The supreme court also looked to the California cases upholding the admissibility of expert testimony on "battered child syndrome" under the Frye test.22 A fundamental distinction exists
between the latter syndrome and rape trauma syndrome. Rape
trauma syndrome was developed as a therapeutic tool to help
identify, predict, and treat emotional problems, 23 whereas bat17. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye is a long-standing
test of standards of reliability used to determine the admissibility of new scientific
methods of proof. Specifically, where expert testimony rests on a scientific principle or process, then that principle must "be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014. California courts follow this rule. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30-32, 549 P.2d
1240, 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-49 (1976).
18. The court noted that the defendant had objected to the testimony as irrelevant. See supra note 5. In addition, the court found that the issue of reliability of
that testimony overlapped. In view of those factors and the fact that the court denied the defendant's request for a 402 hearing, the court determined it proper to
consider the claim. 36 Cal. 3d at 247, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
19. See, e.g., Delia S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1982)
(delay in reporting assault a common reaction of rape victims); Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190 (1983) (victim briefly returned to scene of
attack to retrieve belongings); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983)
(inconsistent post-incident statements by 14-year-old incest victim).
In addition, the court noted that evidence of rape trauma syndrome would be
proper to rebut a contention by the defendant that the victim's post-incident actions were inconsistent with a claim of rape. The evidence could also clarify for
the jury myths and misconceptions concerning rape victims. 36 Cal. 3d at 247-48,
681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
20. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663
S.W.2d 235, 236-42 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
21. State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 653-54, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982).
22. See, e.g., Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1976); People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971). The court
looked to these cases at the behest of the California Women Lawyers, amicus curiae for the state.
23. 36 Cal. 3d at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.

tered child syndrome 24 and other methods of proof that have
withstood the Frye test were devised to determine the truth or accuracy of a particular past event. 25 Thus, the court concluded,
"[b] ecause the literature does not even purport to claim that the
syndrome is a scientifically reliable means of proving that a rape
occurred, we conclude that it may not properly be used for that
purpose in a criminal trial." 26 The court added that the evidence
of rape trauma syndrome could be allowed for other relevant
purposes.
Consequently, the court determined that the trial court was in
error in admitting the expert testimony. The court quickly reviewed the evidence, believing the case against Bledsoe to be
strong. Because it felt that the jury already had properly been
provided with the information recounted in the expert's testimony, the court felt that the testimony had little effect on the verdict, and in any case, too little effect to make the error
prejudicial. 27 The judgment was affirmed.
V.

CONCLUSION

In a criminal rape prosecution, the court for the first time faced
the issue of whether expert testimony concerning rape trauma
syndrome, offered to prove the occurrence of a rape, was admissible evidence. The court answered the question in the negative,
but added that such evidence could properly be admitted for
other purposes. Moreover, the court in this case found the error
to be nonprejudicial.
C.

Admission of evidence of rape trauma syndrome not
error in this case because of defendant'sfailure to
adequately object to the evidence: People v. Stanley.

People v. Stanley, 36 Cal. 3d 253, 681 P.2d 1302, 203 Cal. Rptr. 461
(1984), concerned a criminal rape prosecution involving expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome similar to that discussed in
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1984).
The prosecution presented a substantial amount of evidence indicating that the defendant was guilty of rape. The defense contended no sexual activity had occurred. In addition, the
prosecution also presented an expert witness, the victim's rape
24. See generally McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the
Family. Part One, 50 MiNN. L. REV. 1, 3-19 (1965).
25. 36 Cal. 3d at 249, 681 P.2d at 299, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
26. Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
27. Id. at 252, 681 P.2d at 301-02, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460-61.
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counselor, to testify as to rape trauma syndrome and the symptoms which the victim exhibited. The defense objected only to
the expert's qualifications; that objection was overruled after the
court conducted a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section
402(b) concerning the witness' qualifications and testimony.
On appeal, Stanley claimed that the admission into evidence of
the testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome was error because it failed the test of Frye v. United States,293 F.2d 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923). The defendant's sole objection to the evidence at trial
concerned the qualifications of the witness; he did not object to
the substance of the testimony. The court held that for any Frye
issue to be decided on appeal, it must be preserved by defense
counsel at the trial level. It is not sufficient to object only to the
witness' qualifications at trial. Moreover, the court declared that
even if the admission of the testimony into evidence were error, it
was not prejudicial. In view of the strength of the prosecution's
case, the outcome would not have been different. Thus, the conviction was affirmed.
D. Admissibility of evidence of prioruncharged sex
crimes determined the same way as evidence of nonsex crimes; prior convictions may only be used once
to enhance sentences: People v. Tassell.
In People v. Tassell,' the court determined when evidence of a
defendant's prior uncharged crimes can be admitted in a sex-related offense. The case presented the court with the opportunity
to finally clarify the limitations on admitting evidence of prior uncharged crimes 2 where the current charge and prior crimes were
sex-related. Ultimately, the court eliminated any distinction
thought to exist between evidence of sex-related and non-sex-related crimes for which the defendant was never convicted. All. 36 Cal. 3d 77, 679 P.2d 1, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1984). Opinion by Kaus, J., with
Bird, C.J., Mosk, Broussard, and Grodin, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring and
dissenting opinion by Reynoso, J. Separate concurring and dissenting opinion by
Richardson, J., Retired Associate Justice of the supreme court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the prior offenses discussed
here involve crimes or misdeeds which a witness in the case in question claims
that the defendant committed. This should be distinguished from the admission
of evidence for impeachment purposes of prior crimes committed by the defendant for which a conviction resulted. The latter is covered in CAL. EvID. CODE § 788
(West 1966).

though the trial court improperly admitted the prior crimes
evidence, the error did not demand reversal.
The court was also left to interpret a portion of the sentence enhancement provisions of section 1170.1 of the Penal Code.3 Specifically, could the trial court enhance individual portions (i.e.,
convictions of separate counts) of the sentence, or only the aggregate sentence, where the defendant's record included prior convictions. The court ruled that the same prior convictions could
only be used to enhance the sentence once.
I.

USE OF PRIOR CRIMES EVIDENCE, GENERALLY

As a general rule, evidence of prior uncharged crimes and other
misdeeds is inadmissible for the purpose of proving that the defendant has a particular propensity or disposition to commit a
crime. 4 This common law rule is codified in section 1101 of the
Evidence Code,5 and has been widely followed. 6 Subsection (b)
of section 1101, however, permits evidence of prior crimes to
prove such things as motive, intent, plan or identity. And subsection (c) allows such evidence for the purpose of supporting or attacking a witness' credibility. The court was forced to confront
these exceptions to the general rule in Tassell.
A history of inconsistent treatment of past crimes evidence involving sex-related offenses plagued the court. 7 Where the defendant was charged with a sex-involved crime, courts granted
greater leniency in admitting evidence of past sex crimes, both for
the purpose of proving a common plan or scheme, and for supporting the credibility of the prosecuting witness. 8 The overriding
issue for determination, then, was whether prior crimes evidence
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (West Supp. 1984).
4. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 465, 573 P.2d 433, 436, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215,
218 (1978); B. WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 340 (1966).
5. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1101 (West 1966). The comments of the California Law
Revision Commission indicate that section 1101 is a codification of prior law.
6. People v. Guerrero, 16 Cal. 3d 719, 724, 548 P.2d 366, 368, 129 Cal. Rptr. 166,
168 (1976); People v. Kelley, 66 Cal. 2d 232, 238, 424 P.2d 947, 953, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363,
369 (1967).
7. 36 Cal. 3d at 83-84, 679 P.2d at 4, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
8. See, e.g., People v. Kelley, 66 Cal. 2d at 242-43, 424 P.2d at 956, 57 Cal. Rptr.
at 372; People v. Ing, 65 Cal. 2d 603, 612, 422 P.2d 590, 595, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902, 907
(1967); People v. Creighton, 57 Cal. App. 3d 314, 323-26, 129 Cal. Rptr. 249, 254-56
(1976); People v. Kazee, 47 Cal. App. 3d 593, 595-96, 121 Cal. Rptr. 221, 222-23 (1975);
People v. Covert, 249 Cal. App. 2d 81, 88, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224-25 (1967).
The Covert court explained the different treatment depending upon the type of
offense this way: where the offense is sex-related, quite often the alleged crime
took place in private surroundings involving only the perpetrator and the victim.
Perhaps the most important consideration in determining the involvement of the
defendant is the credibility of the prosecuting witness. See also Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d
at 468, 573 P.2d at 538-39, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 220-21.
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should be treated differently in sex-related offenses than it is in
other offenses. The court concluded that no distinction should be
made. In so doing, the court relied on People v. Thompson9 for determining under what conditions prior crimes evidence may be
admitted in all cases.

II.

FACTS

The evidence presented in the case strongly indicated that in
1980, Anne B., a Susanville waitress, was raped and forced to
orally copulate the defendant. The assault included elements peculiar to the specific incident.' 0 Miss B.'s testimony was substantiated by others who could tell that she had been forcibly
abused." The defendant denied abusing the victim; he said that
12
she consented to the sexual acts.
The prosecution was successful in admitting evidence of two
prior uncharged sex offenses. One woman testified that she was
raped by the defendant in Vista, California in 1976 in a manner
factually similar to the present case.' 3 Another woman testified
that the defendant raped her in Redding, California in 1977.14
Both witnesses, like Miss B., testified that the defendant had
choked them.
The defendant was found guilty of kidnapping for which he was
sentenced to seven years with execution stayed pursuant to Penal
Code section 654.15 He was also found guilty of rape and oral copulation, receiving eight year sentences for each. One year enhancements were added to each count for a prior Florida
statutory rape conviction and five year enhancements were added
9. 27 Cal. 3d 303, 314-21, 611 P.2d 883, 887-92, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 293-98 (1980).
10. Miss B. had agreed to give the defendant a ride home. After he tried unsuccessfully to kiss her, the defendant choked Miss B., threw her in the back of
her Volkswagen van, forced her to orally copulate him, and raped her. 36 Cal. 3d
at 80-81, 679 P.2d at 2, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
11. Miss B.'s former boss (whom she called after she got home), the responding police officers, and an examining physician all testified that Miss B. was very
shaken by the incident and showed signs of experiencing forceful physical abuse.

Id. at 81, 689 P.2d at 2-3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 568-69.
12. Id. at 81-82, 679 P.2d at 3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
13. Id. at 82, 679 P.2d at 3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
14. Id. at 82-83, 679 P.2d at 3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West Supp. 1984). This section provides that
where acts are punishable in different ways by more than one provision, the defendant can only be punished under a single code provision.

to each count for a prior California rape conviction.16
II. TREATMENT
The court first considered the question of the admissibility of
the testimony of the defendant's former victims. After acknowledging that "pronouncements in the area of 'other crimes' evidence [has] not been entirely consistent,"17 the court proceeded
to conduct a historical survey of leading decisions involving other
crimes evidence.' 8
The court was most concerned with People v. Covert,19 which
provided both a reasonable discussion of the various contexts in
which prior crimes evidence could be used to show a common
plan or scheme, 20 and the adoption of the corroboration rationale
in sex-related cases. 2 1 The court was in agreement with the Covert discussion with respect to the cautious use of a common plan
or scheme justification for admitting prior crimes evidence. Common plan or scheme evidence has, at times, been admitted even
though it does not go to prove any actual issues presented in the
case. 22 Where common plan or scheme evidence does not go to
prove an actual issue, admitting it places "a respectable label on a
disreputable basis for admissibility-the defendant's dispo23
sition."
Although the court concurred with Covert's common plan or
scheme reasoning for prior crimes, it put the victim corroboration
theory in the same class as an unwanted houseguest; you don't
really like him, but you don't want to be rude and tell him to
leave. The court suggests that the victim corroboration theory is
improper and has not been accepted, but until this case no court
has seen fit to officially reject it.
16. 36 Cal. 3d at 89, 679 P.2d at 8, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
17. Id. at 83, 679 P.2d at 4, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
18. The prosecution introduced the other crimes evidence both to corroborate
the prosecuting witness and to show the defendant's common plan or scheme. Although the court adequately disposed of both uses of the evidence, the historical
discussion of the pertinent cases did not really deal with each issue individually.
19. 249 Cal. App. 2d 81, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1967).
20. The Covert court provided a summary of the uses of common plan or
scheme evidence. 36 Cal. 3d at 84 n.4, 679 P.2d at 5 n.4, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 571 n.4.
21. 249 Cal. App. 2d at 88, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
22. Common plan or scheme evidence is helpful when it is introduced to show
that the particular unusual circumstances of the crime in question are so similar
that the defendant, in all probability, committed the present crime. In that instance the evidence is helpful in identifying the defendant from other possible culprits. The same is true where a concerted plot is suggested and the crime for
which the defendant is charged is an element in the overall plot or scheme. However, when the identity of the party committing the crime is not in question (as in
Tassell) such common plan or scheme evidence has questionable value.
23. 36 Cal. 3d at 84, 679 P.2d at 5, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
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The court's historical discussion continued with an examination
of sex-related cases where prior crimes evidence was improperly
admitted.24 The evidence did not prove any disputed issue except
the defendant's disposition.25 Meanwhile, in non-sex-related
cases, prior crimes evidence was properly admitted to show the
defendant's modus operandi where identity was in issue 26 and excluded where there was no question as to identity. 27 Even though
the prior crimes evidence rule was being properly applied in nonsex-related cases, the Covert corroboration theory would not go
away, and was utilized in some sex-related cases.

28

Finally, in People v. Thoma, 29 where the court had an opportunity to clarify the prior crimes evidence question in sex-related
offenses, it did not do so "because its briefing went off on a tangent." 30 Nevertheless, although the Thomas court determined
that the corroboration theory could not be employed where the alleged prior crime is too remote, it approved its use where the
prior crime involved similar victims and the testimony showed a
common design or plan as well as corroborated the victim's
3
testimony. 1
Left with no guiding light in sex-related cases involving prior
crimes evidence, the court turned to People v. Thompson.3 2 The
Thompson court surveyed the principles of prior crimes evidence
with a cautious eye.3 3 It noted that "[eJven if evidence of other
crimes is relevant under a theory of admissibility that does not
rely on proving disposition, it can be highly prejudicial."3 4 Therefore, the overriding provisions of section 352 of the Evidence
Code3 5 requiring that the probative value outweigh the prejudicial effect must govern. Specifically with respect to evidence of
prior crimes, prejudicial effect is inherent and such evidence is
24. People v. Cramer, 67 Cal. 2d 126, 429 P.2d at 582, 60 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1967);
People v. Stanley, 67 Cal. 2d 812, 433 P.2d 913, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1967).
25. 36 Cal. 3d at 86, 679 P.2d at 6, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
26. People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233, 444 P.2d 91, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1968).
27. People v. Sam, 71 Cal. 2d 194, 454 P.2d 700, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1969).
28. People v. Creighton, 57 Cal. App. 3d 314, 129 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1976); People v.
Kazee, 47 Cal. App. 3d 593, 121 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1975).
29. 20 Cal. 3d 457, 573 P.2d 433, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1978).
30. 36 Cal. 3d at 87, 679 P.2d at 6, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
31. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d at 468-69, 573 P.2d at 439, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
32. 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980).
33. Id. at 314-21, 611 P.2d at 887-92, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 293-98.
34. Id. at 318, 611 P.2d at 890, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
35. CAL. EviD. CODE § 352 (West 1966).

"admissible only if [it has] substantial probative value." 36 Not
only must the probative value be substantial, but the prior crimes
37
evidence must be relevant to prove some disputed fact.
In applying the Thompson rationale, the court determined that
there was truly no need to determine the probative value of the
prior crimes evidence because it did not go to any fact in question.38 There was no dispute as to the identity of the perpetrator
of the alleged crime, and according to the court, no ambiguity as
to the defendant's intent. Therefore, the use of the common plan
or scheme evidence "is merely a euphemism for 'disposition.' "39
Even though the evidence was improperly admitted, the court
held that the error did not demand reversal.4 0 As in many other
rape cases, the victim's credibility must be tested against that of
the defendant. Here, corroborating testimony of others would
have been enough to support the victim's allegations when con4
trasted against the defendant's weak story. 1
IV.

SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS

In addition to the prior crimes evidence, the court had to interpret sentence enhancement statutes which the trial court used to
justify adding twelve years to the defendant's sentence beyond
that which he would have served had he not had prior convictions. One year was added to each count of his sentence for a
prior Florida statutory rape charge, and five years were added to
each count for a prior California rape conviction. 42 The court was
forced to determine whether the trial court properly applied sec43
tion 1170.1 of the Penal Code.
Section 1170.1 deals with enhancements for sex-related offenses
like those in Penal Code section 667.6(a). 44 It provides that "the
number of enhancements which may be imposed shall not be lim45
ited" and "shall be a full and separately served enhancement."
The court determined that, although section 1170.1(i) was writ36. 27 Cal. 3d at 318, 611 P.2d at 890, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (emphasis in original).
37. 36 Cal. 3d at 88, 679 P.2d at 7, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
38. Id. at 88-89, 679 P.2d at 7-8, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 573-74.
39. Id. at 89, 679 P.2d at 8, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. California Penal Code section 667.5(b) requires the court to "impose a
one-year term for each prior separate prison term served for any felony;. . .", CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667.5(b) (West Supp. 1984), and section 667.6(a) requires the court
to impose a five year enhancement for each prior sex offense conviction listed in
the statute. Id. § 667.6(a).
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (West Supp. 1984).
44. See supra note 42.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(i) (West Supp. 1984).
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ten to nullify limitations in sentence enhancement provisions in
other parts of section 1170.1, the trial court read 1170.1(i) too
broadly.46 The enhancement provisions of 1170.1 concern enhancements based on the nature of the offender (i.e., defendant
with prior convictions) and based on the nature of the offense
(e.g., use of a gun). The latter enhancements add to the various
counts of the sentence, while the former type of enhancements do
47
not, and can only be added once to the aggregate sentence.
The court reasoned that since sections 1170.1(i) and 667.6 were
enacted as part of the same legislation to deal more harshly with
48
sex offenders, the essential intent of the statutes was the same.
The court then compared section 667.6 (concerning sex-related offenses) to section 667.5 (concerning all offenses). Its conclusion
was that the legislature did not contemplate any different treatment in the two provisions. Therefore, like section 667.5, sections
667.6 and 1170.1(i) could only be used to add enhancements to the
aggregate sentence, not to each individual count of the sentence.
V.

CONCURRING OPINIONS

Concurring opinions were lodged separately by Justices Reynoso and Richardson. Justice Reynoso presented an interesting
argument that the prior crimes evidence was admissible. Justice
Richardson disapproved of the court's disdain for People v.
Thomas.
Justice Reynoso agreed that common plan or scheme evidence
requires that there be some actual issue which can be proven by
the evidence, such as identity or intent. Although he agreed that
identity was not in question, he felt that the defendant's intent
was an actual issue 49 because the defendant had claimed that
Miss B. was a willing participant. 50
The reasoning of Justice Reynoso is sound; rape, by definition,
requires the intent to accomplish intercour;e by the use of force
or threat. Therefore, where the defendant claims that the victim
is a willing participant, his intent to achieve his goal by threat or
force must be determined and "a reasonable belief of consent will
46. 36 Cal. 3d at 90, 679 P.2d at 8-9, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 574-75.
47. Id. at 90, 679 P.2d at 9, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
48. Id. at 91, 679 P.2d at 9-10, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 575-76.
49. Id. at 92-93, 679 P.2d at 10-11, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77 (Reynoso, J., concurring and dissenting).
50. Id. at 81, 679 P.2d at 3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569.

negate intent."51
The majority dealt with the intent question in a rather simplistic manner. It suggested in a footnote5 2 that the defendant's intent was simply to have intercourse and was not ambiguous.
Being unambiguous, prior crimes evidence did not relate to an issue in dispute except the defendant's disposition to rape.
After Justice Reynoso's opening barrage of sound reasoning,
the application of his comments to the present case fails. He first
determined that the other offenses to which the witnesses testified were logically relevant to prove the defendant's intent apart
from disposition.5 3 He then went on to conclude that in applying
Thompson, the evidence was of the required substantialprobative
value.5 4 Even though the evidence may have been probative, it
certainly was not of substantial probative value. Thus, it is almost
inconceivable to think that it could be so substantially probative
so as to outweigh its obvious prejudicial effect.
Justice Richardson's concurring opinion took exception to the
majority's disapproval of Thomas.5 5 He was of the opinion that
the prior crimes evidence should have been allowed under the
common plan or scheme exception.G His reasoning was that,
where distinctive elements exist in prior crimes and in the present offense, the evidence does not go to prove disposition, but instead shows that since the defendant committed the other crimes
he probably committed the present similar misdeed. As the majority would probably have responded, the evidence Justice Richardson would have admitted is of little or no value unless there
truly was an issue of identity, or perhaps an overall design of
which the present case was an element. No such issues were
presented in this case.
VI.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

The importance of Tassell is that it finally brings sex-related
crimes under the general rules which apply when the prosecution
attempts to admit prior crimes evidence. Instead of finding peculiar sex crimes exceptions to the rule, courts can rely on the reasoning of Thompson in determining whether or not prior crimes
evidence should be admitted. The evidence must be relevant to
51. Id. at 94, 679 P.2d at 11, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 577 (Reynoso, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 88 n.7, 679 P.2d at 7-8 n.7, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 573-74 n.7.
53. Id. at 94-95, 679 P.2d at 12, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (Reynoso, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 95-96, 679 P.2d at 12-13, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 578-79 (Reynoso, J.,
concurring).
55. Id. at 96, 679 P.2d at 13, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (Richardson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
56. Id.
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prove a fact actually in issue and the relevancy must be substantial so that the probative value will outweigh the prejudicial
effect.
The interesting variable in Tassell is that it was a pre-Proposition 8 57 case. As such, the impact of Proposition 8 on prior crimes
evidence is uncertain. Whereas the majority paid little attention
to the possible impact of Proposition 8,58 Justice Richardson's
concurring opinion expressed little doubt that the rules with re5 9
spect to prior crimes evidence would necessarily be relaxed.
Upon examination, Justice Richardson was probably correct
about the effect Proposition 8 will have on prior crimes evidence.
The standard for admitting prior crimes and other evidence will
be that the evidence is relevant and legally admissible under Evidence Code section 352.60 In particular, the new standard is more
open than that pronounced in Thompson, which demanded that
prior crimes evidence be substantially relevant to some fact in issue. As yet, the California Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to address this question.

xviii. FAMILY LAW
Father'signorance of his rights invalidates
agreementfor entry of judgment ordering child
supportpayments: County of Los Angeles v. Soto.
In County of Los Angeles v. Soto,1 the court held that an Agreement for Entry of Judgment in which a non-custodial parent acknowledged the paternity of a child and stipulated to the entry of
judgment ordering payment of child support, 2 could be set aside
57. Among other provisions, Proposition 8, 'The Victims Bill of Rights," added
section 28(d) to article 1 of the California Constitution. It provides that no relevant evidence can be excluded from a criminal action, Evidence Code section 352
and others notwithstanding. CAL.CONsT. art. 1 § 28(d).
58. 36 Cal. 3d at 82 n.1, 679 P.2d at 3 n.1, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569 n.1.
59. Id. at 96-97, 679 P.2d at 13, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (Richardson, J., concurring

and dissenting).
60. See supra note 57.
1. 35 Cal. 3d 483, 674 P.2d 750, 198 Cal. Rptr. 779 (191.14). Opinion by Grodin, J.,
with Bird, C.J., Broussard and Reynoso, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring and
dissenting opinion by Richardson, J., with Mosk and Kaus, JJ., concurring.
2. This agreement was executed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 11476.1, which at that time provided that:
In any case where the district attorney has undertaken enforcement of
support, the district attorney may enter into an agreement with the noncustodial parent, on behalf of the custodial parent, a minor child, or chil-

upon a showing that the non-custodial parent was unaware of his
or her rights concerning the agreement and would not have executed that agreement had he or she been aware of those rights.
Ezequiel A. was born on April 25, 1977. In June of 1978, Enrique
Soto executed an "Agreement for Entry of Judgment" which had
been presented to him by a child support investigator of the Los
Angeles County District Attorney's office. The Agreement recited
that Soto was the father of Ezequiel A., and was able to pay child
support of $120 per month. The Agreement also stipulated to the
entry of judgment ordering such child support payments. Judgment was entered on September 15, 1978.
Two years later, when Soto faced an order to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt for failure to make the required child support payments, he moved to vacate the September 15, 1978 judgment. Soto claimed that the manner in which the
consent was obtained constituted a denial of due process, and
that the agreement had not been executed voluntarily and knowingly. The trial court determined that the investigator had not advised Soto of his right to a judicial proceeding at which the state
would have the burden of proving paternity and the amount of
support to be paid. The court, relying on County of Ventura v.
Castro,3 granted defendant's motion to set aside the judgment.
The Castro holding had invalidated a similar agreement based
on a finding that the agreement did not demonstrate, on its face,
dren, for the entry of a judgment determining paternity, if applicable, and
for periodic child support payments based on the noncustodial parent's
reasonable ability to pay. Prior to entering into this agreement, the noncustodial parent shall be informed that a judgment will be entered based
on the agreement. The clerk shall fie the agreement without the payment
of any fees or charges. The court shall enter judgment thereon without
action...
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11476.1 (West 1980).
This section was amended in 1980 to require that:
A judgment based on the agreement shall be entered only if one of the
following requirements is satisfied:
(1) The noncustodial parent is represented by legal counsel and the attorney signs a certificate stating: "I have examined the proposed judgment and have advised my client concerning his or her rights in
connection with this matter and the consequences of signing or not signing the agreement for the entry of the judgment and my client, after being
so advised, has agreed to the entry of the judgment."
(2) A judge of the court in which the judgment is to be entered, after
advising the noncustodial parent concerning his or her rights in connection with the matter and the consequences of agreeing or not agreeing to
the entry of the judgment, makes a finding that the noncustodial parent
has appeared before the judge and the judge has determined that under
the circumstances of the particular case the noncustodial parent has willingly, knowingly and intelligently waived his or her due process rights in
agreeing to the entry of the judgment.
CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 11476.1 (West Supp. 1984).
3. 93 Cal. App. 3d 462, 156 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1979).
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that the defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
waived his rights and that the statute 4 did not require a prejudgment judicial determination that a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver had been made. 5 The Soto court noted, however, that
the issue to be determined was not the question of whether Castro should be retroactively applied, 6 but whether the requirements of due process had been complied with in the instant case.
The court first determined that freedom from an incorrect imposition of a parent-child relationship was a compelling, fundamental right, equivalent in importance to a parent's interest in
maintaining such a relationship. The court noted that a determination of paternity was potentially disruptive of established family relationships and damaging to personal reputation. Further,
such a finding carried with it an obligation to support and educate
a child, an obligation which is not dischargeable in bankruptcy or
by the child's attainment of majority, and which exposes a defendant to deprivation of property and possibly liberty. 7
However, the court stopped short of holding that agreements
executed under section 11476.1 were automatically void. The
court noted that the defendant had been advised of the fact that
the agreement would lead to the entry of default judgment
against him. Further, had the defendant elected not to sign the
stipulation, he would have been offered a meaningful opportunity
to be heard on the issues prior to a judicial determination of his
rights. The court did rule that a knowing waiver was essential to
a valid judgment under section 11476.1, but stated that "[a] final
judgment need not be invalidated solely because a defendant has
not been advised of his rights, or because that; advice does not appear on the record," 8 noting that the defendant might in fact have
been aware of the rights he was waiving and the consequences of
the agreement. The court held that:
[T Ihe defendant must establish that he was, in fact, unaware of the consequences of the agreement or of the fact that he waived his rights by exeCAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11476.1 (West 1980).
5. It was in response to the Castro decision that § 11476.1 was amended in
1980. See supra note 2.
6. Justice Richardson wrote a dissenting opinion, discussed infra at notes 1011 and accompanying text.
7. See Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979), in
which the California Supreme Court determined that these interests were sufficiently compelling to mandate appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in
paternity actions.
8. 35 Cal. 3d at 491, 674 P.2d at 755, 198 Cal. Rptr. at '784.

4.

cuting the agreement, and that he would not have executed the agreement
had he been aware of these matters. Only then must the judgment be set
aside because the agreement on which it is based was not voluntary and
intelligent .... 9

The case was remanded to the superior court with orders to allow the defendant the opportunity to present evidence of his lack
of knowledge of his rights at the time of the execution of the
agreement, of the effect of that lack of knowledge on his decision
to stipulate to entry of default judgment, and of his diligence in
seeking to have the 1978 judgment set aside.
Justice Richardson, in an opinion in which Justices Mosk and
Kaus concurred, dissented from the holding of the majority insofar as it allowed the defendant to "collaterally attack" the original
judgment. This view was grounded on a determination that the
Castro holding should be denied retroactive effect.1 0 Justice Richardson noted that the wide use of such agreements and widespread reliance on their validity, as well as the ability of the writs
to modify such judgments upon proper showing, compelled a
holding that such judgments should not be voidable except
through the statutory mechanisms which provide for methods of
setting aside judgments."

XIx.

GOVERNMENT AID

A. State must consider ineligible undocumented alien
children in a household when determining the
amount of AFDC benefits to award to eligible
children in the household: Darces v. Woods.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Darces v. Woods,1 an undocumented alien and mother of six
children received Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) for her three eligible native-born citizen children. The
State Department of Social Services (DSS), administrators of the
program, refused to take into account Mrs. Darces' three undocu9. Id. at 492, 674 P.2d at 755-56, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85.
10. This was the holding of the California Court of Appeal in County of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 988, 177 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1981), which was
disapproved by the majority in the Soto case. 35 Cal. 3d at 492 n.4, 674 P.2d at 756
n.4, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 785 n.4.
11. Citing CAi CIV. Paoc. CODE § 473 (West Supp. 1984), which establishes a
six-month limitation within which judgments may be set aside on the grounds of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
1. 35 Cal. 3d 871, 679 P.2d 458, 201 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1984). Opinion by Reynoso,
J., with Bird, C.J., Mosk, and Broussard, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring opinion by Kaus, J., with Grodin and Richardson, JJ., concurring. Richardson, J., Retired Associate Justice of the supreme court sitting under assignment by the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
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mented alien children in its determination of the amount of benefits granted to the three citizen children. Darces brought an
action based upon statutory and constitutional grounds in an attempt to force the DSS to account for all her children. The
supreme court determined that Darces' right to equal protection
had been violated and directed the DSS to take into account all
six children.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2

Prior to March, 1979, Darces had received a monthly AFDC
grant for the benefit of her three eligible citizen children. 3 The
amount of the grant had been calculated according to standards
used for all AFDC recipients. 4 Under those standards, the
amount of the grant was based upon the number of eligible persons living in the home.5 This number is called the family budget
unit (FBU).6 All undocumented aliens are ineligible for AFDC
and therefore excluded from the FBU.7 The DSS, however, did allow a deduction for Mrs. Darces, even though she was also an undocumented alien. 8
In early 1979, Darces' employment income increased. As a result, the DSS in March reduced the amount of her monthly grant.9
Darces requested a fair hearing with the DSS to challenge the
2. The facts had been stipulated to by both parties. Id. at 879, 679 P.2d at 463,
201 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
3. Darces' monthly grant prior to the disputed reduction was $356 for the benefit of her three eligible children. Id. at 877, 679 P.2d at 461; 201 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
4. The method of calculation was set forth in the Manual of Eligibility and
Assistance Standards (EAS). The EAS contains provisions defining eligibility for
the AFDC program and calculating the amount of aid based on the number of eligible persons. This manual was promulgated by the defendant, Marion Woods,
pursuant to his authority as director of the DSS. CALx WELF. & INST. CODE § 10553
(West 1980). 35 Cal. 3d at 877-78, 679 P.2d at 461-62, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1982).
6. 35 Cal. 3d at 877, 679 P.2d at 462, Cal. Rptr. at 811. See EAS, supra note 4.
7. 45 C.F.R. § 233.50 (1983). The section provides in pertinent part:
A state plan under ... title IV-A (AFDC) ... shall provide that an otherwise eligible individual, dependent child, or a caretaker relative or any
other person whose needs are considered in determining the need of the
child or relative claiming aid, must be either.
(a) A citizen, or
(b) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise
permanently residing in the United States under color of law....
Id.
8. 35 Cal. 3d at 878, 679 P.2d at 462, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 811. See EAS, supra note
4.
9. 35 Cal. 3d at 879, 679 P.2d at 462-63, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 811.

grant.o At the hearing, the DSS upheld the proposed reduction."
Thereafter, Darces brought an action for a writ of mandamus
against the director of the DSS seeking an injunction to restrain
application of the DSS policy. Each party moved for summary
judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the DSS, believing that to hold for Darces would allow her to effectively receive additional aid for ineligible persons. 1 2 The
supreme court reversed, directing the trial court to grant Darces'
3
motion for summary judgment.1
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Darces' Statutory Contention

Darces first argued that the DSS policy of excluding undocumented aliens was inconsistent with the state and federal laws
which governed the AFDC program. Darces contended that this
exclusion of the undocumented children and the failure to consider their needs conflicted with the underlying and primary purpose of the AFDC program to protect needy children from
economic deprivation.' 4 The court rejected this contention, holding that the DSS policy of excluding undocumented aliens was
properly based on the governing statutes. 5
AFDC is a cooperative federal-state program financed with federal and state funds.16 In order to receive federal funding, a state
must fully comply with the governing federal law, including federal eligibility standards.' 7 The court reviewed the mandate of
the federal statutes and California's attempt at compliance there10. Id.
11. The hearing officer concluded that the reduction was consistent with existing regulations. Id. at 879, 679 P.2d at 462-63, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12.
12. Id. at 879-80, 679 P.2d at 463, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
13. Id. at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
14. Darces asserted that her citizen children had the right to have the amount
of her income actually available to them calculated in a fair and realistic manner.
35 Cal. 3d at 876, 679 P.2d at 460, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
15. The court did, however, sympathize with Darces' argument, believing it to
"have considerable force as a matter of policy." Id. at 876, 679 P.2d at 460-61, 201
Cal. Rptr. at 809-10.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1982). The program is one of four categorical public
assistance programs established by the Social Security Act of 1935. The other
three programs are Old Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-433 (1982); Aid to the
Blind, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206 (1982); and Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (1982).
17. Specifically, the plan must fulfill the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) and
meet the approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See 45 C.F.R.
§§ 233.10-233.145 (1983) for implementing regulations. For decisional authority concerning compliance with federal eligibility standards, see Conover v. Hall, 11 Cal.
3d 842, 847, 523 P.2d 682, 684-85, 114 Cal. Rptr. 642, 644-45 (1974).
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with. 18 Federal law expressly limits AFDC grants to citizens and
legally admitted aliens.19 The court, therefore, found California in
full compliance.
Although conceding that federal law excluded undocumented
aliens, Darces nevertheless argued that the statutory policies and
prior decisional authority compelled recognition of the amount of
income actually available to the citizen children. 20 In view of the
clear and express legislative intent to exclude any consideration
of the needs of illegal aliens, the court quickly rejected this
contention. 21
B. Constitutional Challenge
In an alternative argument, Darces claimed that the DSS policy
violated the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of
the California Constitution.22 Those sections require "that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of
23
the law receive like treatment."
The court's first task was to determine which standard of review to apply: rational basis test, strict scrutiny, or "middle level"
review. 24 To do so, the court initially looked to the nature of the
classification involved. The DSS policy created two classes of
18. See 35 Cal. 3d at 880-85, 679 P.2d at 463-67, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 812-16.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1982). See also supra note 7 for a federal regulation
containing almost identical language. California statutes and regulations virtually
mirror the federal laws. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11104 (West 1980); EAS,
supra note 4.
20. 35 Cal. 3d at 883, 679 P.2d at 466, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
21. The court stated: "we find this argument unpersuasive in the face of a
statutory scheme that evinces the clear intent to exclude any and all consideration
of the needs of undocumented children." Id.
22. Id. at 876, 679 P.2d at 461, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 810. Darces contended that the
regulations improperly singled out eligible children living with undocumented siblings from eligible children whose siblings were also eligible.
23. Id. at 885, 679 P.2d at 467, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (quoting Purdy &Fitzpatrick
v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 578, 456 P.2d 645, 653, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 85 (1969)). See Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
24. The rational basis test requires that classifications bear a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose. In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 232, 474 P.2d 983, 987,
90 Cal. Rptr. 15, 19 (1971). The strict scrutiny test requires that classifications be
necessary to further a compelling state interest. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d
765, 784-85, 471 P.2d 487, 500-01, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852-53 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
922, vacated, 403 U.S. 915 (1971). The middle level of review requires that a classification be precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

AFDC-eligible children-"those who reside with ineligible persons, and those who do not."25 Within the former classification,
Darces fell into an even narrower subclass, specifically, AFDC-eligible children who reside with ineligible undocumented aliens.
Members of this subclass were always excluded from the FBU,
whereas other ineligible persons in the wider classification could
be included within the FBU.26 Consequently, the court determined that the subclassification discriminated against innocent
children solely on the basis of their familial relationship and resi27
dency with undocumented aliens.
In view of this determination, the court rejected the argument
of the DSS that the rational basis test should apply because the
case concerned regulations in the economic and social welfare
area. The court distinguished the cases cited by the DSS28 and
29
instead relied upon the analysis and reasoning of Plyler v. Doe,
although acknowledging that the case was not squarely applicable. The court believed that in both Plyler and Darces' situation,
the classifying trait was one over which children had no control in
that they were placed in a disadvantaged position as the result of
30
the undocumented status of a family member.
The court, however, then diverted from the Plyler decision.
Whereas in Plyler the United States Supreme Court held that an
intermediate level of review should apply, 3 ' the court in Darces
ruled that because the California Constitution provides stricter
safeguards to citizens, the strict scrutiny test was required. 32 In
order to survive this rigid test, the DSS had the burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest which was furthered by the
classification. 33 The only interests which the DSS offered as support were fiscal concerns which the court quickly rejected as in25. 35 Cal. 2d at 886, 679 P.2d at 468, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
26. Id. at 886-87, 679 P.2d at 468, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
27. Moreover, the court declared: "We should be similarly hostile to legislative classifications which deprive eligible children of governmental beneficence
simply because they are brothers or sisters of undocumented aliens." Id. at 887-88,
679 P.2d at 469, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
28. The DSS had relied on Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), which
had applied the rational basis test to legislation in the economic and social welfare
area. The court distinguished Dandridgeby noting that that case had not involved
"a colorable claim of discrimination," as here.
29. 457 U.S. at 202 (1982).
30. The court stated: "The primary underpinning of Plyler-thatinnocent children cannot be explicitly disadvantaged on the basis of their status of birth-unquestionably applies to the instant case." 35 Cal. 3d at 891, 679 P.2d at 471, 201 Cal.
Rptr. at 820.
31. 457 U.S. at 217.
32. 35 Cal. 3d at 892-93, 679 P.2d at 472, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
33. See supra note 24.
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sufficient. 34 Since the DSS had no compelling state interest, the
policy of excluding illegal aliens failed the strict scrutiny test.
Therefore, the court found the policy to be in violation of the California Constitution. Consequently, the trial court decision was
3 5
reversed.
Three justices concurred in the reversal. They did not believe,
however, that the court should have determined the constitutional issue. Instead, these justices believed that, under federal
law, AFDC benefits may not be reduced on the basis of income
which is not actually available to a recipient. 36 Since a portion of
Darces' income went to the three undocumented aliens, her total
income was not "actually available" to the three eligible children.
Thus, because the DSS regulation did not take this situation into
account, these justices believed it violated federal law. 37

IV.

CONCLUSION

In Darces, the California Supreme Court held that the equal
protection clause of the California Constitution forbids the state
from infringing the rights of citizen children who are eligible for
governmental assistance on the basis that they live with relatives
who are undocumented aliens. The effect of the decision should
not be widespread since the decision was narrowly limited to
those AFDC-eligible children cohabiting with illegal aliens. However, the decision will cost the state additional tax dollars since,
under existing federal law, California will have to bear the entire
brunt of the additional cost of the state AFDC program.
B.

Income tax refunds are not income for purposes of
determining the amount of aid availableunder
AFDC: Vaessen v. Woods.

In response to the federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981,1 the California Department of Social Services maintained
that it was required to treat state and federal income tax refunds
34. The court flatly declared: "Preservation of the flsc is an insufficient justification." 35 Cal. 3d at 894, 679 P.2d at 473, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
35. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
36. 35 Cal. 3d at 897-98, 679 P.2d at 475-76, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25 (Kaus, J.,
concurring).
37. Id. at 897, 679 P.2d at 476, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (K-Lus, J., concurring).
1. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, PuB. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357,
844 (1981).

as income 2 in the month received by participants in the Aid for
Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 3 As a result, some recipients of AFDC had their monthly benefits reduced
or denied, and a class action was initiated.4 At issue in Vaessen v.
Woods5 was whether the Department of Social Services' 6 policy
of treating income tax refunds as income in determining the level
of a recipient's aid comports with the state and federal laws con7
trolling the AFDC program.
Established in 1935,8 AFDC has been characterized as a scheme
of "cooperative federalism" which is financed on a matching fund
basis by the federal government and is administered by the
states. 9 The major goals of AFDC are to provide financial support
to disadvantaged families with dependent children in order to
maintain the family unit10 and to promote economic independence for these families through employment." In accomplishing
these goals, the states are given broad discretion, including power
2
to establish eligibility criteria and levels of assistance.'
In Vaessen, it was contended that the appellant had exceeded
its authority in characterizing state and federal income tax returns as income. In determining the level of financial need, the
2. The federal statute requires the California Department of Social Services
to consider "any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid
to families with dependent children, or of any other individual living in the same

house as such child and relative whose needs the State determines should be considered in determining the need of the child or relative claiming such aid." 42
U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (A) (1982).
3. Hereinafter referred to as AFDC.
4. The named plaintiffs in the suit included Janet Vaessen and Carol Esquibel. Both had been employed for a sufficient amount of time to accrue some
withholdings, but were not self-sufficient within the meaning of California Welfare
and Institutions Code section 11452.
5. 35 Cal. 3d 749, 677 P.2d 1183, 200 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1984). Opinion by Reynoso,
J., with Bird, C.J., Mosk and Broussard, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Richardson, J., with Kaus and Grodin, JJ., concurring. Richardson, J., Retired Associate Justice of the supreme court sitting under assignment by the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
6. Hereinafter referred to as appellant.
7. It was estimated that approximately 22,700 California AFDC recipients received federal refunds in 1976-77. Id. at 753, 677 P.2d at 1185, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
8. This program was created by the passage of the Social Security Act of
1935. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1982). See Wedemeyer &Moore, The American Welfare
System, 54 CALF. L. REV. 326 (1966).
9. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968). However, federal funding is conditioned on compliance with all applicable federal regulations. See 45 C.F.R.
§§ 233.10-233.145 (1983).
10. H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1935). See Note, Eligibility of
the Unbornfor AFDC Benefits: The Statutory and ConstitutionalIssues, 54 B.U.L.
REV. 945, 955-58 (1974).

11. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974).
12. Id. at 253; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 541 (1972) (recognizing the
state of Texas' right to select its own benefits formula).
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federal statute13 requires the state to distinguish between "income" 14 and "resources."' 5 The crucial difference between these
categories is that once the amount of assistance payments has
been established,16 any item characterized as additional nonexempt income is deducted from the family's assessed need for the
7

following month.'
Appellant contended that the decision to treat income tax returns as income is within the discretion vested in the state to promulgate regulations;18 and moreover, that since 1981, federal law
has required that returns be treated as lump sum income.19 In rejecting this position, the court focused on the policy behind
AFDC. In order to encourage the care of dependent children in
the family home, the federal provisions "indicate that only monies
which are regularly and actually available to meet the current
needs of AFDC recipients may be considered income to recipient
families. Treating tax refunds as resources has the additional salutary effects of providing an incentive for employment and pro-

moting administrative efficiency.

'20

13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (7)-(8) (1982).
14. Because of AFDC's goal of promoting self-supporting family units, certain
work-related expenses receive special treatment and may be deducted from "income" so the family is not penalized. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (1982).
15. The term "resources" allows a family to accumulate up to $1,000 in equity,
a home-if owned by the family and occupied by the child-and a car valued at no
more than $1,500. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(B) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (3) (i) (b)
(1983).
16. In California, a "fiat grant" system is used. The maximum level of assistance available is determined by the number of people in the family unit. From
this amount, a deduction is made for all nonexempt income received by members
of the family. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450 (West Supp. 1984); see also Conover
v. Hall, 11 Cal. 3d 842, 523 P.2d 682, 114 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1974) (striking down a state
provision which limited the amount of work-related expenses in contradiction with
federal requirements).
17. The federal government requires all states to use this retrospective budgeting technique for purposes of calculating the amount of assistance available by
reviewing the actual income or circumstances in the preceeding month. 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(13) (1982), 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.31-233.37 (1983).
18. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10600, 10604 (West 1980).
19. While neither Congress nor the California legislature has defined the
terms "income" or "resources," the appellant mAintained that 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a) (17) (1982) was applicable. 35 Cal. 3d at 757, 677 P.2d at 1188, 200 Cal. Rptr.
at 898.
20. 35 Cal. 3d at 757, 677 P.2d at 1188, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 898. Support for this position is found in several federal statutes and regulations. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a) (22) (1982) (when the state seeks to recover overpayments, it shall not reduce the aid paid, when coupled with liquid resources and income, to less than
90% of the level given a family of the same composition with no other income); 45

It is on this point that Justice Richardson based his dissent. He
argued that the function of the court is solely to assure that the
department's regulations are not in conflict with the applicable
federal statutes and regulations. 21 "In summary, in order to find a
conflict, the majority must reject a straightforward reading of the
applicable statutes and instead intuitively glean congressional
and administrative intent from selected portions of the applicable
statutes and regulations." 22 Contending that the conflict had been
"manufactured," 23 Justice Richardson maintained that employment generated withholdings are "income" set aside in anticipation of tax liability. Therefore, these withholdings must be
classified as "net income" when refunded. 24 When returned to
the taxpayer, these funds are again "actually and currently
25
available."
Other cases which have specifically addressed the problem of
characterizing income tax returns refute this view. 26 These cases
relied on a federal regulation which limited "income" to "only
such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis ..
"27 Given that refunds are made and received only
once a year and that relatively small amounts are involved, the
court was unwilling to consider these funds as regularly
28
received.
C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (3) (iii) (1983) (permits states to prorate lump sum income from
employment contracts); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (3) (ii) (d) (1983) (only currently available net income and resources need be considered).
21. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10600, 10604 (West 1980). See Allen v. Bergland,
661 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1981) (in reviewing South Carolina's lump sum provision under the federal food-stamp program, "the relevant inquiry is whether the
department's interpretation is inconsistent with the regulations and not whether
some other interpretation is consistent with those same regulations." (emphasis in
original)).
22. 35 Cal. 3d at 770, 677 P.2d at 1198, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
23. Id.
24. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (11) (i) (1983). This is because such measures do not
fall into any of the recognized exceptions.
25. 35 Cal. 3d at 765, 677 P.2d at 1194, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
26. See, e.g., Kaisa v. Chang, 396 F. Supp. 375 (D. Hawaii 1975); Anderson v.
Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 706, 558 P.2d 155 (1976). But cf.Steere v. State Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 308 Minn. 390, 243 N.W.2d 112 (1976); Walker v. Juras, 16 Or. App. 295, 518
P.2d 663 (1974).
27. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1973). The court stated that the fact that
this specific language does not appear in the current version of the Code of Federal Regulations does not change the import of the overall scheme, which is to insure that minimally adequate care is being given needy children. 35 Cal. 3d at 760,
677 P.2d at 1190, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
28. Id. at 757, 677 P.2d at 1188, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 898. While the department estimated that the average refund to an AFDC participant in 1976 was $131, it also estimated that only 5% of AFDC recipients actually receive refunds. Id. at 753, 677
P.2d at 1185, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
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Until 1971, this was the policy of the appellant department. In
County of Alameda v. Carleson,29 several California counties
sought review of the department's exclusion of involuntary deductions from earned income, while treating tax refunds as resources when they were received. The court approved the
department's policy, finding that this procedure clearly complied
with the federal requirement that only "net income available for
current use" be considered.3 0 However, in 1971, the department
reversed its policy and began treating tax refunds as income.
Offering no persuasive reason for this change in policy, the department maintained that the 1981 revisions of federal laws 31 require the department to consider tax refunds as lump sum
income to AFDC recipients. 32 The department gave the statute a
broad reading, requiring it to consider any amount of lump sum
income not exempted, which, taken together with all other income, reduces the family's eligibility.3 3 The court, however, considered this interpretation to be in conflict with the statute's
legislative history.34 Consequently, it affirmed the trial court's
preliminary injunction prohibiting the appellant from treating tax
refunds as income. 35 Thus, the appellant, California Department
of Social Services, is accountable for promoting the basic goals of
AFDC, as well as avoiding conflict with applicable federal statutes
and regulations.
29. 5 Cal. 3d 730, 488 P.2d 953, 97 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1971).
30. Id. at 749, 488 P.2d at 966, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
31. See supra note 1.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(17) (1982).
33. Id.
34. See S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1981 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 771. This report implies that the section was intended to apply to payments which normally would be received monthly, but were for some reason
delayed-i.e., social security payments.
35. 35 Cal. 3d at 764, 677 P.2d at 1193, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 903. We believe that not
only does this holding further the fundamental statutory purpose of providing economic stability and security to families with dependent children who are in need
of and eligible for governmental assistance, but in the long run it also will further
the legislative desire that California's public assistance system function in the
most efficient and effective manner.

XX.

GOVERNMENTAL TORT IMMUNITY
A.

City immune from liabilityfor damages caused by
motoristfleeing from police officers attempting to
make a traffic stop: Kisbey v. State of California.

Kisbey v. State of California,36 Cal. 3d 415, 682 P.2d 1093, 204
Cal. Rptr. 428 (1984), determined the liability of a city to third persons injured by the negligent driving of a motorist fleeing from
the city's police officers who had stopped, but not detained, the
driver. Two San Francisco police officers had responded to a dispatch concerning a possible felony disturbance. Upon arrival, the
officers saw a vehicle which had been "involved" in the disturbance leave the scene without its lights on. After following for a
short distance, the officers stopped the car in order to question
the occupants and cite the driver for traffic violations. When the
officers had exited their vehicle, the motorist sped off and collided
broadside into plaintiff Kisbey's vehicle.
Kisbey brought a personal injury action against the City of San
Francisco, among others. The trial court granted the city's motion
for nonsuit. The supreme court affirmed.
The first issue with which the court was faced was whether the
officers owed a duty of care to Kisbey. Although the court acknowledged that the issue should have been decided prior to the
issue of governmental immunity, the court believed the latter issue to be easier to resolve. Consequently, the court based its affirmation solely upon the issue of immunity without deciding
whether the officers were negligent. The court suggested, "[ti hat
the life of the law is not logic, but expedience [sic]."
Kisbey argued that the police officers' actions were negligent
ministerial acts. The city claimed the officers' acts were discretionary and not negligent. The court, however, ignored these arguments, believing that the discretionary immunity provision on
which the parties' arguments had been based was inapplicable.
Instead, the court applied Government Code section 845.8 which
bars liability for injuries caused by persons resisting or escaping
from arrest. The court construed this section as a specific immunity statute applicable to both ministerial and discretionary acts.
In addition, the court refused to read technically the words "arrest" and "resisting" contained in the statute, believing that to do
so would violate the legislative intent by allowing cracks in the
governmental immunity where, for example, the police had not
intended a full arrest. As a result, the court held that the nonsuit
was proper because the City was immune from any liability under
section 845.8.
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B.

No liabilityfor failure to implement regulations
regardingfirearms instruction courses due to
governmental immunity: Nunn v. State of California.

In Nunn v. State of California,35 Cal. 3d 616, 677 P.2d 846, 200
Cal. Rptr. 440 (1984), the appellant was the administratrix of the
estate of her husband, a private security guard who was killed
while on duty. He had been unarmed because he had not completed a firearms instruction course. This was because the respondent district had refused to give the decedent an opportunity
to complete his first test-a prerequisite to obtaining a firearm license. Consequently, the appellant brought, inter alia, a wrongful
death action. She alleged that the respondents negligently
delayed promulgating regulations to govern a firearms instruction
course for employees of licensed private security agencies pursuant to former California Business & Professions Code section
7514.1(a).
The court began its discussion by stating that the government's
actions fell within the doctrine of governmental immunity governed by California Government Code sections 818.2 and 821.
Since such immunity attaches only to discretionary functions, it
was necessary to determine whether the governmental action
contemplated by the statutes was purely ministerial in nature.
Such a finding would have meant the respondents were not immune from liability. However, the court determined that the implementation of regulations pursuant to section 7514.1 involved
discretionary policy or "planning" decisions as opposed to operational decisions. Throughout a series of public hearings and administrative review, the respondent balanced expediency with
sufficiency in attaining the statutory purpose: "protecting the public from the danger of incompetent armed private security
guards."
Nevertheless, the appellant maintained that section 7514.1(c)
imposed a mandatory duty on the respondents to establish the
regulation in time to allow private security guards the opportunity to complete firearms training by January 1, 1976. She argued
that if the statute imposed a mandatory duty to promulgate regulations, then regardless of the discretionary character of the provisions, violation of the duty was outside the bounds of
governmental immunity. The court stated that whether such a
mandatory duty was intended was a matter of judicial interpreta-

tion. In light of the procedures followed in promulgating the regulations, it was determined that the legislature intended to give the
respondents sufficient flexibility to insure adequate regulations
and did not intend to impose a mandatory duty.
Because the respondent District had offered a firearms instruction course and refused to give decedent the examination required to obtain a firearm license before December 31, 1975,
appellant contended they were also liable for having "negligently
conducted, planned[,] inspected, implemented and administered
the testing procedures." The respondent District maintained that
the examination was an "integral part of the process" leading to
obtaining a license; consequently, the manner and timing of the
test were discretionary decisions protected by section 818 immunity. Since the court found that there was no mandatory duty to
offer the course, decisions of the respondent on offering the firearms test were also immunized from liability. Hence, the government's actions fell within the doctrine of governmental immunity.
XXI.

LABOR RELATIONS
Employer's unilateralpolicy changes in Arizona
violated Californiarequirements to bargain with the
employees' union since Californiaworkers were
affected by the change; unlawfully discharged
employees entitled to back payfor days they would
actually have worked for the employer: Nish Noroian
Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board.

In Nish Noroian Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board,
35 Cal. 3d 726, 677 P.2d 1170, 201 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1984), the California
Supreme Court reviewed a decision and order of the Agricultural
Labor Relations Board ("Board") concerning the consequences
within California of an agricultural employer's decision concerning work and hiring policies in Arizona. The administrative complaint had alleged that the new policy restricted California
residents from doing irrigation work on the company's Arizona
properties, that California employees were not rehired because of
this policy, and that the company's failure to bargain with the employees' union about this change in policy constituted a violation
of California Labor Code section 1153. The court affirmed the
Board's order in full and directed the petitioner, Nish Noroian
Farms, to reimburse the employees, Becerril and Baca, for back
pay owed due to unlawful discharge.
The threshold question was whether the Board had jurisdiction
over the dispute. Since the employees' union and the appellant
had entered into a written settlement agreement waiving all un-
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fair labor practice charges, Noroian maintained that the scope of
the Board's order exceeded the specific exception in the agreement concerning the two irrigation workers. However, the language of the agreement was determined to be much broader; it
reserved "the alleged layoff and failure... to rehire ... Becerril"
for "further investigation" and "independent resolution" by the
Board. This charge invoked the Board's jurisdiction and resulted
in a full investigation of the policy decisions resulting in the discharge of the irrigation workers.
The appellant contended that it was improper for the Board to
assert jurisdiction over the terms and conditions the company
placed on employment in Arizona. However, the court focused on
the effect discontinuing the dual state irrigator policy had on work
allocations within California. They held that Noroian had a
mandatory duty to bargain with the union, under section 1153,
before making unilateral policy decisions which decreased employees. Since the Board limited its order to the adverse impact
on employment suffered in California, territorial jurisdiction and
due process requirements were satisfied.
The court also determined that the unlawfully discharged employees were entitled to back pay. The primary goal of a back pay
award is to restore the status quo. Recognizing the sporadic nature of agricultural employment, the Board imposed a "daily"
formula for calculating back pay which required that interim employment wages be deducted only for those days when the employee would actually have worked for the petitioner. However,
the petitioner would be allowed to introduce evidence of the irrigation workers' employment histories to determine how the
formula should equitably be applied.
In addition, the appellant-employer was required to post a notice of the Board's action, allow its reading on company time, and
send copies of it to present and certain past employees. The
court viewed these remedies as appropriate in light of the relatively small cost involved and the intimidating manner in which
the company had handled the matter.

XXII. LAND USE
No exemption from subsequently enacted rent
controls was obtained because amounts expended in
reliance on approved subdivision map were
insubstantial: Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control
Board.
Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Board, 35 Cal. 3d 858,
679 P.2d 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984), gave the supreme court the
opportunity to review the question of when a property owner obtains a vested right to complete a condominium conversion without having to comply with subsequently enacted municipal rent
control procedures.
The appellants' primary argument was that they had acquired a
vested right to complete their planned condominium conversion
without regard to rent control provisions by the submission of a
tentative subdivision map and the commitment to spend over
$40,000 prior to the adoption of Santa Monica's rent control
scheme. However, before the court will apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to exempt a land use from subsequently imposed
regulations, a party must demonstrate: "(1) a promise such as
that implied by a building permit that the proposed use will not
be prohibited by a class of restrictions that includes the regulation in question and (2) reasonable reliance on the promise by
the promisee to the promisee's detriment." Absent a showing of
both elements, a party has not established a vested right.
Regardless of whether tentative map approval may be equated
with the promise implied in a building permit for construction,
the court held that the amount of money expended in this case
was inadequate to confer a vested right. While the appellants
claimed to have spent "over $40,000," that figure included $42,000
in licensing fees that were in fact not paid until after the rent control measure was adopted. Although the appellants had committed to pay this sum when the maps were submitted for tentative
approval, the court determined that the appellants were aware of
the possible impact of the rent control laws on their property.
Therefore, all expenditures by the appellants after April 10, 1979the date the rent control laws were adopted-were characterized
by the court as a "calculated risk." Only $1,709 was expended
prior to this date. Finding that $1,709 did not comprise a "substantial" percentage of the total investment anticipated (over
$60,000), the court held that the appellants had not demonstrated
reasonable reliance. Consequently, their claim of a vested right
failed.
It was also alleged that the state Subdivision Map Act pre-
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empted regulation of condominium conversion through rent control laws. However, the court affirmed the view that rent control
was properly within the municipality's police powers. None of
Santa Monica's requirements for condominium conversion permits were in conflict with the state act. Furthermore, the respondents maintained that such provisions were essential to the
success of the rent control laws. The court agreed and held that
the local licensing requirements were not preempted by the Subdivision Map Act.
XXIII.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Code of Civil Proceduresection 667.7 providingfor
the periodicpayment of judgments in medical
malpracticesuits held constitutional: American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga,
Inc.

In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los
Gatos-Saratoga, Inc.,' the court ruled that section 667.7 of the
Code of Civil Procedure 2 does not violate due process or equal
protection principles, and does not detrimentally impact on a litigant's constitutional right to a jury trial. Section 667.7 permits
health care providers who incur judgments of $50,000 or more due
to professional negligence to pay the judgment through a court
determined plan of periodic payments. 3 The statute was adopted
1. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984). Opinion by Kaus, J.,
with Broussard, Grodin and Feinberg, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion
by Mosk, J., with Rattigan, J., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Bird,
C.J., with Rattigan, J., concurring. Feinberg and Rattigan, JJ., sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
This case was previously heard and decided by the supreme court. See American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 33 Cal. 3d 664, 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 371 (1983). A rehearing was granted, however, after the court's membership
changed in 1983. The original opinion for the court was authored by Justice Mosk
who repeated much of the reasoning he used there in his dissent in the present
case. Justice Mosk's earlier opinion was joined by Chief Justice Bird and Justices
Rattigan and Racanelli. Justices Broussard and Feinberg joined in the dissent authored by Justice Kaus.
2. CAL. CrV. PRoc. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980). Unless otherwise specified, all
statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. Relevant portions of section 667.7 are:
(a) In any action for injury or damages against a provider of health care
services, a superior court shall, at the request of either party, enter a judgment ordering that money damages or its equivalent for future damages of
the judgment creditor be paid in whole or in part by periodic payments
rather than by a lump-sum payment if the award equals or exceeds fifty

during the medical malpractice insurance crisis in the mid-1970's
as part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 19754
(MICRA). In addition to setting provisions for tighter government control of health care providers 5 and permitting alternative
methods of insurance coverage for health care providers, 6 the bill
established new rules for medical malpractice litigation. 7 The apparent purpose of the medical malpractice litigation measures
was to reduce the size and number of judgments against health
care providers in hopes of keeping malpractice insurance costs
down. 8
thousand dollars ($50,000) in future damages. In entering a judgment ordering the payment of future damages by periodic payments, the court
shall make a specific finding as to the dollar amount of periodic payments
which will compensate the judgment creditor for such future damages.
(b)'(1) The judgment ordering the payment of future damages by periodic
payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of the payments, the
dollar amount of the payments, the interval between payments, and the
number of payments or the period of time over which payments shall be
made. Such payments shall only be subject to modification in the event of
the death of the judgment creditor.
(c) However, money damages awarded for loss of future earnings shall
not be reduced or payments terminated by reason of the death of the
judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment
creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by law, immediately prior to
his death...
(f) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to authorize
the entry of judgments in malpractice actions against health care providers which provide for the payment of future damages through periodic
payments rather than lump-sum payments. By authorizing periodic payment judgments, it is the further intent of the Legislature that the courts
will utilize such judgments to provide compensation sufficient to meet the
needs of an injured plaintiff and those persons who are dependent on the
plaintiff for whatever period is necessary while eliminating the potential
windfall from a lump-sum recovery which was intended to provide for the
care of an injured plaintiff over an extended period who then dies shortly
after the judgment is paid, leaving the balance of the judgment award to
persons and purposes for which it was not intended....
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980).

4. 1975 CAL. STATS. 3949-4007.
5. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2320-2335 (West Supp. 1984).
6. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11587, 11588 (West Supp. 1984).

7. Malpractice litigation measures included establishing a 90-day notice of intention to fie suit, enforceable by attorney discipline proceedings, CAL. CrV. PROC.
CODE §§ 364, 365 (West 1982), a limitation of $250,000 on recovery for "noneconomic
losses," CAL. Crv. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West Supp. 1984), the pe:-mitting of collateral
source evidence, CAL. CrV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1984), and limitations imposed on attorney's contingency fee arrangements, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146
(West Supp. 1984).
8. The governor convened a special session of the legislature for the express
purpose of dealing with the malpractice insurance crisis. In his order calling for a
special session, the governor declared:
The cost of medical malpractice insurance has risen to levels which
many physicians and surgeons find intolerable. The inability of doctors to
obtain such insurance at reasonable rates is endangering the health of the
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Mary English 9 was admitted to the defendant hospital for surgery on a brain tumor. The night before her scheduled surgery,
she fainted or fell in a shower stall and sustained severe burns
from the overheated water. Her injuries required substantial
treatment, including plastic surgery. Testimony at trial indicated
that she could suffer periods of total and partial disability due to
the burns.
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff for
$190,069.88. The defendant moved for an order setting periodic
payment of the judgment under section 667.7, but the motion was
denied. The trial court ruled that section 667.7 violated both due
process and equal protection principles, and was therefore unconstitutional. On appeal, the due process and equal protection issues were raised, as was the plaintiff's assertion that because the
court has the power to fix the amount of future damages subject
to periodic payments, the plaintiff was denied her constitutional
right to a jury trial.10
I. MAJORrrY OPINION
A.

Due Process

The plaintiff argued that her due process rights were violated
by section 667.7 because the effect of the periodic payment was to
diminish the value of her action1" without a quid pro quo. The
court declined to weigh the benefits and detriments of the legislapeople of this State, and threatens the closing of many hospitals. The
longer term consequences of such closings could seriously limit the health
care provided to hundreds of thousands of our citizens.
In my judgment, ,no lasting solution is possible without sacrifice and
fundamental reform. It is critical that the Legislature enact laws which
will change the relationship between the people and the medical profession, the legal profession and the insurance industry, and thereby reduce
the costs which underlie these high insurance premiums.
Proclamation by the Governor Convening the Legislature in Second Extraordinary
Session, reprintedin 1975 CAL. STAT. 3947. The governor'o proclamation went on to
list several issues which he wished the legislature to address, including the institution of a periodic payments system. Id.
9. Mary English died while the appeal was pending. American Bank and
Trust Co., special administrator of her estate, was substituted as plaintiff. 36 Cal.
3d at 364 n.3, 683 P.2d at 673 n.3, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 674 n.3.
10. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
11. By paying a judgment by means of periodic payments instead of a lump
sum, the judgment debtor receives the benefit of the use of the funds throughout
the duration of the period-assuming, for the purposes of this statute, that the
plaintiff survives the duration of the intended period. If, under this statute, the
plaintiff dies before the end of the duration of the payments, losses for future

tion, noting that such was the job of the legislature. It was not
necessary that the plaintiff receive an adequate quid pro quo inasmuch as plaintiffs possess no vested property rights in particular measures of damages.12 Therefore, the legislation only had to
meet the "rational relationship" test: as long as the legislation is
rationally related to some legitimate state interest, it will not be
declared invalid. Since the legislature had specifically spelled out
its intent in passing the measure, 13 legitimate state interests were
simple to find: assurance that funds would be available for an injured plaintiff throughout the period of anticipated need; and
elimination of a windfall to the plaintiff's heirs who may collect
many years worth of damages not actually incurred because of
the plaintiff's earlier than anticipated death.14
B. Equal Protection
As a result of section 667.7-and most of the other malpractice
litigation legislation in MICRA-victims of medical malpractice
are classified differently than are other plaintiffs. Those who commit malpractice are treated differently than other tortfeasors. As
it did with the plaintiff's due process claim, the court held that the
equal protection argument could not be sustained. As long as the
provisions of section 667.7 were rationally related to a legitimate
objective, the measure withstood the constitutional challenge.
The legitimate objective of the legislature was to reduce medical malpractice insurance costs. In the face of a crisis which included soaring malpractice insurance rates, insurance companies
refusing to insure health care providers, and doctors opting to "go
bare"15 (choosing to not even purchase malpractice insurance),
the objective of the legislature to reduce malpractice insurance
rates was a proper one. The court refused to accept the argument
that the inverse relationship between malpractice insurance premiums and overall health care costs suggests a failure of section
667.7 to meet the legislature's objective. It felt that the legislation
had not been fully implemented in light of the trial court's determination of unconstitutionality.1 6 Moreover, the court properly
damages are effectively forfeited to the judgment debtor. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE
§ 667.7(b) (1) (West 1980). But see infra note 18.
12. Feckenscher v. Gamble, 12 Cal. 2d 482, 499-500, 85 P.2d 885, 893 (1938).
13. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 667.7(f) (West 1980).
14. The plaintiff also argued that the due process rights of the deceased
party's spouse are violated by § 667.7. The court summarily dismissed this contention, noting that if the victim has no vested property right in a particular measure
of damages, then neither could a spouse. 36 Cal. 3d at 369-70, 683 P.2d at 676, 204
Cal. Rptr. at 677.
15. Id. at 371, 683 P.2d at 677-78, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 678-79.
16. Apparently, after the trial court's ruling, many courts and litigants were re-
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noted that there is no requirement that the legislation actually
meet the stated objective.17 The only requirement is that the objective be legitimate, and that the legislation rationally relate to it.
C. Right to Jury Trial
The final argument with which the court was forced to deal concerned plaintiffs claim that the judicial determination of future
damages denied her the constitutional right to jury trial.18 The
plaintiff contended that the right to jury trial requires that the
jury fix the amount of future damages as well as determine subsidiary issues, such as the structure of periodic payments. Any
interference by the court with such a determination, argued the
plaintiff, constituted an "impairment of the substantial features of
a jury trial."19
The language of the pertinent section made the court's conclusion somewhat awkward. Because section 667.7(b)(1)20 does not
specifically designate who determines the future damages portion
of the award vis-a-vis other elements of damages, the court reviewed the legislative history and concluded that the statute was
ambiguous on the point. 21 The court was therefore left to determine the way in which the ambiguous portion should be interpreted since, noted the court, "a statute should be construed to
avoid all doubts as to its constitutionality." 22 The court decided
that the statute should be interpreted to require a determination
by the jury of the amount of damages assigned to compensate for
luctant to utilize the periodic payment method. Id. at 373-74, 683 P.2d at 679, 204
Cal. Rptr. at 680.
17. Id. at 374, 683 P.2d at 679, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
18. The determination of future damages is important because, under section
667.7(b) (1), the periodic payments can be modified or terminated when the plaintiff dies. Hypothetically, a jury could award $100,000 to a plaintiff, intending $50,000
of it to go for future damages. But if the trial court structured the award so that
$75,000 was designated as future damages, the plaintiff ndght never see a substantial portion of the award if she died early.
In this context, it is important to distinguish future damages (e.g., future medical and living expenses) from future earnings which are lost due to the plaintiff's
incapacity. Under the statute, future earnings continue to be awarded after the
death of the plaintiff to those persons to whom the plaintiff "owed a duty of sup-

port." CAL. CIV. PROC.
19.
276, 281
20.
21.
22.

CODE

§ 667.7(c) (West 1980).

Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 829, 427 P.2d 988, 993, 59 Cal. Rptr.
(1967).
See supra note 3.
36 Cal. 3d at 375 n.13, 683 P.2d at 680 n.13, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 681 n.13.
Id. at 376, 683 P.2d at 681, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 682.

future damages. Once the jury has assessed the amount that is
intended to compensate the plaintiff for future damages, the court
does not invade the province of the jury by structuring the details
23
of the periodic payment plan.
II.

DISSENTING OPINIONS

Dissenting opinions were registered by Justice Mosk and Chief
Justice Bird. Justice Mosk dissented on the grounds that the
equal protection analysis of the majority improperly stated the
purpose of the questioned legislation, and failed to consider certain statistical information which was required in the equal protection decision. 24 Justice Mosk's premise was that the purpose
of the legislation (MICRA) was to lower medical costs to the public; that lowering the costs of malpractice insurance was only a
means to a more inclusive end.
Armed with statistics introduced in amicus curiae briefs, the
dissent emphasized that even though the cost of malpractice insurance decreased, the cost of hospital care increased following
the passage of MICRA. Instead of adopting the majority view that
actual success or failure does not affect equal protection analysis,
Justice Mosk argued that later facts may be considered where
"the assumption on which the legislation was premised has
ceased to exist."25 For support, he cited California's judicial rejection of the guest statute as being contrary to equal protection 26
and scattered lower court opinions from other states suggesting
that information learned after legislation is enacted may be considered in reviewing that legislation.
Regardless of the persuasiveness of Justice Mosk's legal argument, his factual premise-that MICRA was passed for the purpose of reducing medical costs to the public-is flawed. The
concern of the legislation was insurance costs. 27 The statistical
23. The court suggested that the use of the special verdict, see CAL. Crv. PRoc.
CODE § 625 (West Supp. 1984), would be the best method of determining that
amount of the verdict intended to compensate the plaintiff for future damages. 36
Cal. 3d at 377, 683 P.2d at 682, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
24. Justice Mosk also contended that the majority opinion should have considered the impact of the legislation on the class of people which it affects-victims of
medical malpractice. Although he argues that the effect of the statute is to burden
the plaintiff with any loss incurred where the court miscalculates how the periodic
payments are to be made, Justice Mosk suggested that in trying to avoid a windfall
which unfairly benefits the heirs of a plaintiff, the legislature has provided the real
windfall to the tortfeasor and his insurer. 36 Cal. 3d at 379-80, 683 P.2d at 683-84,
204 Cal. Rptr. at 684-85 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 383, 683 P.2d at 686, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
26. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
27. See supranote 8.
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evidence pointed out in the dissent itself28 indicated that MICRA
led to a reduction in malpractice insurance premiums. Inasmuch
as the Justice's factual premise is incorrect, his legal conclusion
also loses its efficacy.
Justice Mosk concluded by reviewing provisions of malpractice
crisis statutes of other states which have been struck down. How29
ever, a review of cases discussed in the dissent, vis-a-vis those
30
noted by the majority, illustrating malpractice legislation which
has withstood constitutional challenge, indicates little more than
a numbers contest which supports the majority.
Chief Justice Bird dissented because, she believed, section 667.7
violated the plaintiff's right to a jury trial as well as equal protection principles. She argued that the potential effect of section
667.7 is to allow the trial judge to amend the jury's award to the
plaintiff by misconstruing or misapplying it. 31 By giving the trial
court the power to set the duration and amount of the periodic
payments, the statute has made the court a key fact-finding entity, and has taken that responsibility away from the jury. Additionally, argued the Chief Justice, the statute gives the defendant
a second chance in the litigation to minimize the damages it will
actually have to pay. Regardless of the size of the verdict, a defendant making periodic payments may save considerable
amounts of money if the plaintiff dies earlier than expected. The
trial court's power to infringe on a function of the jury recognized
at common law-the award of damages-violates the right to jury
trial.32
28. Justice Mosk pointed out that "malpractice premiums for most of the
state's hospitals declined by 25 percent in the years following enactment of
MICRA." 36 Cal. 3d at 383, 683 P.2d at 685, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
29. Id. at 385-87, 683 P.2d at 687-88, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89.
30. Id. at 370-71 n.10, 683 P.2d at 677 n.10, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 678 n.10.
31. An improper assessment by the trial court of the amount of future damages, and the period of time for which they are needed could be very costly. See
supra note 18.
32. The Chief Justice convincingly refuted the majority's argument that analogous procedures existed for permitting trial courts to have some control over jury
verdicts and the payment of funds. The majority suggested that the procedure of
additur, Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 427 P.2d 988, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1967), court administration of awards to minors, CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 3601-3603
(West 1981), and court apportionment of wrongful death recoveries among heirs,
CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1984), illustrate such permissible judicial
control. But as the Chief Justice indicated, none of the analogous situations cited
by the majority substantially infringe on rights guaranteed at common law.

The Chief Justice also refuted the majority's determination that
section 667.7(b) (1) is ambiguous in stating who should make the
determination of the amount of future damages. She argued that
the legislature clearly intended to give the power to the court.
Had the majority read the legislative history in the same way, it
could not have validated the law under the premise that statutes
should be construed to avoid doubts as to lack of constitutionality.
The majority's equal protection argument, urged the Chief Justice, "reduce[d] the rational relationship test to a rubber
stamp."3 3 Although the court properly chose to apply the rational
relationship test, it should have considered the vulnerable nature
of the affected group-malpractice victims-and the burden imposed on it. Where laws place severe burdens on defenseless
groups, Chief Justice Bird argued, the rational relationship test
34
has been and should be used to invalidate the laws.
XXIV.

STATE REGULATION

Federallaw preempts the state regulationof offreservationsale or possession offish caught by an
Indian on his reservation: People v. McCovey.
In People v. McCovey, 36 Cal. 3d 517, 685 P.2d 687, 205 Cal. Rptr.
643 (1984), a unanimous court held that federal law preempts the
state from regulating the off-reservation sale, or possession for
sale, of fish caught by Hoopa Valley Reservation Indians on the
reservation. In 1980, McCovey, a Yurok Indian from the Hoopa
Valley Reservation, gill netted a large quantity of salmon on the
reservation which he attempted to commercially sell off the reservation. He was arrested by California Fish and Game Department officers and later convicted of violating a California state law
prohibiting the sale of gill netted salmon. The supreme court
reversed.
The court looked to federal statutory and decisional law to determine the preemption issue. In cases involving Indians, the preemption doctrine is applied in a "special sense" due to
"'Congress' overriding goals of encouraging 'tribal self-sufficiency
and economic development."' Accordingly, such cases focus on
the scope and nature of federal regulation in the area. "Where
33. 36 Cal. 3d at 398, 683 P.2d at 696, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 697 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
34. The most noteworthy example of such a law failing the rational relationship test is Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973),
where California's automobile guest statute was declared to be in violation of
equal protection principles.
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there exists a 'persuasive' or 'comprehensive' federal regulatory
scheme, state laws are preempted if they appear to 'disturb and
disarrange' that scheme."
The court reviewed federal legislation and discovered a number
of statutes and regulations governing Indian fishing rights, many
of which were specifically targeted to the Hoopa Valley Reservation. Thus, the court easily determined that the state's exercise of
criminal sanctions disturbed and disarranged the federal scheme,
supplanting it with "an inconsistent dual system."
The remaining issue was whether the state interests at stake
were sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority and
thereby fall within an exception to the preemption doctrine. "A
State's regulatory interest will be particularly substantial if the
state can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate State intervention." New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct.
2378, 2387 (1983). The only asserted state interest was that of conservation. The court, however, found this interest to be sufficiently safeguarded by federal legislation. Consequently, the
court determined that federal law preempted the state from the
regulation of Indian fishing rights. The court narrowly construed
the statute, however, and upheld the conviction of McCovey's codefendant who was a member of a different Indian tribe not covered by the federal statute.
XXV.

TAXATION

An otherwise tax exempt "occasionalsale" is not
taxable because the seller is a "unitarybusiness"
Ontario Community Foundation, Inc. v. State Board of
Equalization.
In Ontario Community Foundation, Inc. v. State Board of
Equalization,35 Cal. 3d 811, 678 P.2d 378, 201 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984),
the supreme court invalidated an administrative regulation under
which the State Board of Equalization ("Board") sought to impose a sales tax on tax exempt "occasional sales" made by "unitary businesses."
California Revenue & Tax Code section 6367 exempts "occasional sales" from the state sales tax. See CAL. REV. & TAx CODE
§ 6006.5(a) (West 1970) (definition of occasional sale). The plaintiffs were hospitals who sold their total assets and were assessed
sales tax by the Board. Although the majority of the property

sold by the plaintiff came under the "occasional sales" exception,
the Board claimed that its regulations permitted the sales tax on
all of the property sold. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, R.
1595(a) (3) (1984). Regulation 1595 provides that an otherwise tax
exempt "occasional sale" can be taxed if the seller is a "unitary
business" which has other non-exempt sales. The Board determined that this regulation applied to the hospitals because of regularly made non-exempt sales in their cafeterias and pharmacies.
The plaintiffs argued that regulation 1595 was invalid since it contradicted the statutory exemption.
The supreme court agreed with the hospitals. The court thus
rejected the Board's attempt to reconcile its regulation with section 6006.5, holding that the regulation was invalid since it deprived the plaintiffs of a tax exemption for which they qualified
under the statute.
XXVI. TORTS
A.

No error in jury instructionswhich spoke of the
exercise of reasonable care when plaintiffs theory
at trial againsta drug manufacturerwas not
based on strict liability: Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co.

In Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 677 P.2d 1147, 200
Cal. Rptr. 870 (1984), the supreme court held that a modified jury
instruction which discussed a drug manufacturer's duty to exercise reasonable care in warning of a drug's side effects was proper
in light of the plaintiff's theory at trial and proposed jury
instructions.
The plaintiff became blind after using a drug manufactured by
one of the defendants. He sued the manufacturer and the doctor
who prescribed the medicine. The claim against the manufacturer was based on an alleged failure to give adequate warnings
of possible side effects of the drug. The jury found in favor of
both defendants and the plaintiff appealed.
The plaintiff's principal argument on appeal was that the trial
court impaired the plaintiff's strict liability claims against the
manufacturer by modifying the proposed jury instructions to include negligence principles, i.e., the exercise of reasonable care.
The supreme court concluded that the plaintiffs theory of the
case and his proposed jury instructions premised liability on failure to warn of "known or knowable" side effects of the drug. In
the court's view, this was not truly a strict liability standard and
thus the modified jury instructions were reasonable. In addition,
the court expressly declined the opportunity to decide if drug
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manufacturers could be held strictly liable for the injurious side
effects of their prescription drugs.
The court resolved the plaintiff's additional arguments in favor
of the defendants and affirmed the judgment. Chief Justice Bird
wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion summarizing strict liability in
California, arguing that it should be applied to drug manufacturers when their prescription drugs cause injury, including injuries
caused by inadequate warnings.
B.

Owner of stolen vehicle may be liablefor damages
caused to third persons by the thief if the theft was
foreseeable under the circumstances;party seeking a
peremptory writ must notify opposing party: Palma v.
U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.

In Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 171, 681
P.2d 893, 203 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1984), the supreme court decided an
issue of substantive tort law and defined a rule of appellate procedure. On the substantive issue, the court determined under what
circumstances the owner of a stolen vehicle may be liable to an
unsuspecting third party who is struck and injured by the vehicle.
Generally, owners are not liable for harm done when their vehicles are stolen and used to injure a third party-even when the
car is unlocked and the keys are left inside. However, where sufficient special circumstances are found, a question of foreseeability
is raised. Palma was struck by the defendant's large commercial
truck, which, according to some accounts, was left unlocked with
the keys inside. The truck was parked in an open lot in a commercial area known to be plagued by crime. The court ruled that
such conditions presented a question of foreseeability which required a jury trial concerning liability. Therefore, the trial court
erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
In addressing the procedural issue, the court held that a petitioner seeking a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition in the
first instance (i.e., in lieu of seeking an alternative writ) is required to notify adversely affected parties that such an action is
being considered. By imposing such a requirement, the court
sought to eliminate the inequity existing in the writ application
and notification system. Previously, a party seeking an alternative writ of mandate or prohibition effectively provided his opponent with greater notice than if he sought a peremptory writ in
the first instance. The court concluded that an appellate court

should not issue a peremptory writ in the first instance without
receiving, or at least soliciting, opposition from the party which
would be adversely affected.
C.

Evidence of post-accident warnings admissible in a
strict liability suit; inappropriatefor trial court to
use remittitur to reapportionliability among parties:
Schelbauer v. Butler Manufacturing Co.

In Schelbauer v. Butler Manufacturing Co., 35 Cal. 3d 442, 673
P.2d 743, 198 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1984), the supreme court held that evidence of post-accident warnings to consumers was admissible in a
strict liability action against a manufacturer. The court also
stated that a trial court may not use remittitur to reapportion liability among the parties when the court feels the damage award is
excessive only because the jury's apportionment is not supported
by the evidence.
The plaintiff was injured in a fall that occurred while he was
laying roofing panels manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff filed suit claiming that an oil coating on the panels was the
cause of the accident. The jury found that the defendant was
strictly and negligently liable for the plaintiffs injuries and that
the plaintiff and his employer were not contributorily negligent.
The defendant's motion for a new trial was granted, subject to the
condition that it would be denied if the plaintiff accepted a fifteen
percent reduction in the amount of the judgment. The trial court
indicated that the reduction was intended to reflect its finding of
contributory negligence by the plaintiff and his employer. The
plaintiff accepted the remittitur and the defendant then appealed
both the judgment and the denial of its motion for a new trial.
The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the warnings which the defendant began including with the roofing panels following the plaintiffs accident.
The supreme court ruled in Ault v. InternationalHarvester Co., 13
Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974), that evidence of
a change in a product following an accident was admissible in
strict liability cases. The instant defendant argued that the addition of a warning is not a change in the product and therefore the
evidence of the warning was inadmissible under California Evidence Code section 1151. The supreme court disagreed, holding
that the rationale of Ault applied to evidence of post-accident
warnings in strict liability actions and that the evidence was
therefore properly admitted.
The defendant's second argument was that the trial court
abused its discretion in using remittitur to reapportion liability
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among the parties. The supreme court agreed, stating that remittiturs may only be used when a new trial could be granted solely
on the grounds of excessive damages. CAL. CIv.

PROC. CODE

§ 662.5 (West 1976). Since the trial court did not find the damages
to be excessive, but only misapportioned, it was error to condition
its order granting a new trial on acceptance of the remittitur.
The supreme court concluded that the trial court's order should
be modified to provide for a new trial limited to deciding how the
damages should be apportioned. Such a modification was justifled by the trial court's express determination that all other issues
decided by the jury were supported by the evidence. A new trial
on all issues would simply be a waste of time and money.
XXVII.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

Worker terminatedfor good faith refusal to perform
work assignment which she felt threatened safety of
others held entitled to receive unemployment
insurance benefits: Amador v. Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board.
When a worker reasonably and in good faith believes that performance of an assignment will endanger the health of others, can
she be denied unemployment insurance benefits because she was
discharged for refusing to perform the assigned work? This issue
was presented to the California Supreme Court in Amador v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.' The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board had ruled that the appellant was
ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits because of the
"misconduct" which resulted in her discharge, 2 and the superior
court rejected her writ of mandate to vacate that ruling.
The appellant was hired by the San Mateo County Community
Hospital ("Chope") in 1976 as a histotechnician to prepare tissue
samples for microscopic analysis so the medical staff could inter1. 35 Cal. 3d 671, 677 P.2d 224, 200 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1984). Opinion by Bird, C.J.,
with Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, and Collins, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring
opinion by Grodin, J. Separate dissenting opinion by Mosk, J. Collins, J., sitting
under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. The Board's review of the appellant's conduct was pursuant to CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West Supp. 1984), which provides in pertinent part: "An

individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director
finds that he or she left his or her most recent work voluntarily without good
cause or that he or she has been discharged for misconduct connected with his or
her recent work."

pret and diagnose changes in tissues caused by disease. 3 After approximately six months at Chope, two of the doctors on the staff
requested that the appellant perform a procedure known as
"grosscutting."4 While the appellant did not object to grosscutting
on the organs of a cadaver, she declined to perform the procedure
on tissue removed from live patients. She believed that such a
procedure exceeded her capabilities as a histotechnician.5
Eventually, the appellant was warned that her continued refusal to perform the work could subject her to discipline. She
maintained her position and was suspended for two days. A full
adversary hearing was held on the matter before the county civil
service commission, and the suspension was upheld. 6 Shortly after the commission's ruling, the appellant was discharged for continuing to refuse to do the work. When the appellant applied for
unemployment benefits, Chope objected. It contended that pursuant to section 1256 of the California Unemployment Insurance
Code, employees discharged for "misconduct" were disqualified
7
from receiving benefits.
While appellant's discharge was based on her continuing "misconduct," 8 the court focused on whether she had "good cause" for
3. The following job description was posted by Chope to announce the opening for a "tissue technician" at that facility:
Under supervision, prepares surgical and autopsy tissue specimens by
paraffin method, including imbedding, cutting, and staining sections;
prepares frozen tissue sections; may photograph gross and microscopic
preparations for use in teaching and for other purposes; prepares and
stains cytology smears and millipore preparations; prepares and stains
bone marrow smears; uses microtome, autotechnicon, and related equipment; maintains fies of microscope slides and tissue blocks; assists in filing and coding tissue records; maintains laboratory tools, equipment and
stocks of supplies; performs related duties as required.
35 Cal. 3d at 676 n.2, 677 P.2d at 226 n.2, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 300 n.2.
4. Grosscutting consists of the selection and removal of small tissue samples of approximately one centimeter in breadth from organs or other
large (gross) specimens removed by a doctor from a patient. On the basis
of a microscopic examination of these samples, a pathologist diagnoses
the patient's condition.
Id. at 676, 677 P.2d at 226, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
5. The appellant contended that a pathologist's diagnosis, and consequently
the patient's life and health, depended on the quality of the selection and cutting
of the tissue sample. The appellant supported her position by referring to her previous employment with hospitals operated by Stanford University and by Oxford
University, where histotechnicians were not permitted to perform the procedure.
Id.
6. The lower court determined that the appellant's suspension was proper
because, under the county civil service rules, she had been insubordinate for failing to perform "reasonable" tasks assigned by Chope. Id. at 684, 677 P.2d at 232,
200 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
7. CAu. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West Supp. 1984); see supra note 2 for pertinent text.

8. The case law definition of "misconduct" is limited to:
conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's inter-
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her actions. 9 "The conduct may be harmful to the employer's interest and justify the employee's discharge; nevertheless, it
evokes the disqualification for unemployment insurance benefits
only if it is wilful, wanton or equally culpable."o Where the employee was not at fault," due to a good faith error in judgment,
she can not be denied benefits solely on that basis.12 Thus, the
court held that where a worker's discharge was based on the willful refusal to perform work which she "reasonably and in good
faith believed" threatened the health of others,13 she had not
14
committed "misconduct.'
ests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in
carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest
equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional
and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's
duties and obligations to his employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result
of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated
instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be
deemed "misconduct" within the meaning of the statute.
Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cal. App. 2d 719, 724, 339 P.2d 947, 950-51 (1959)
(emphasis added); accord Lacy v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 17
Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1132, 95 Cal. Rptr. 566, 570 (1971).
9. The court determined that if there was "good cause" sufficient to justify
resignation, then there would be justification for refusing a particular work assignment. 35 Cal. 3d at 679, 677 P.2d at 228, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
10. Jacobs v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1035,
1037, 102 Cal. Rptr. 364, 366 (1972).
11. Fault has been held to be the basic element in considering cases under the
unemployment compensation code. See Rowe v. Hansen, 41 Cal. App. 3d 512, 521,
116 Cal. Rptr. 16, 22 (1974); Sherman Bertram, Inc. v. California Dep't of Employment, 202 Cal. App. 2d 733, 736, 21 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132 (1962).
12. Delgado v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 788, 792, 116
Cal. Rptr. 497, 499-500 (1974).
13. While California case law has allowed compensation where the employee
quit his work due to concern for his personal health, Rabago v. Unemployment
Ins. Appeals Bd., 84 Cal. App. 3d 200, 148 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1978), this was the first
instance where concern for the health of others was the basis for the termination.
14. 35 Cal. 3d at 683, 677 P.2d at 231, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 305. This holding was
reached by a review of other jurisdictions' standards of reasonableness and good
faith concern for others. See, e.g., Webster v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 68 Idaho 1, 187
P.2d 527 (1947) (failure to express grievance through union did not disqualify employee from receiving unemployment compensation); Wilkes-Barre Transit Corp.
v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 215 Pa. Super. 353, 257 A.2d 275 (1969) (refusal to drive school bus out of concern for safety held to be good cause), affd, 438
Pa. 554, 265 A.2d 519 (1970); City of Dallas v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 626
S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (where the employee's actions were viewed from
his standpoint and in light of the knowledge he possessed at the time); Kuhn v.
Department of Employment Sec., 134 Vt. 292, 357 A.2d 534 (1976) (where employee's award of unemployment insurance benefits was upheld because of his

The court also faced the issue of whether the appellant's suit
was blocked by the suspension hearing on the basis of collateral
estoppel. In rejecting the argument, the court acknowledged that
the issue of "insubordination," under the county rules, was substantially different from the "misconduct" contemplated by the
code. 15 "In short, the commission's findings do not estop Amador
from establishing that her refusal to perform grosscutting resulted from a reasonable and good faith concern for the health of

patients."16
When the appellee had met the initial burden of proving misconduct, the burden shifted and the appellant should have been
allowed to demonstrate good cause for her actions.17 Since there
was no dispute as to the essential facts, the court held that the
appellant had met her burden and was entitled to benefits.' 8
XXVIII.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Negligence of injured employee not imputed to
employer when determining employer's creditfor
employee's recovery from a third party tortfeasor:
Rodgers v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.

Although many law school professors may disagree, the true issues of most cases are who pays and how much. Workers' compensation cases are no exception. Workers' compensation
statutes provide, for the most part, the answers to these two questions. Among other provisions, the statutes provide for an employees' recovery from his employer' and, when applicable, from
a third party tortfeasor.2 When a third party is partly liable for
good faith belief he was not qualified to be a motor vehicle inspector and that his
refusal to act as such promoted the best interests of society).
15. 35 Cal. 3d at 685, 677 P.2d at 232, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 306. It is on this point that
Justice Mosk dissents. Because there was no challenge to the finding that the appellant had indeed been insubordinate and that the requested work was reasonably within her job description, he felt these findings should control on appeal.
"In view of the foregoing record, reviewed over and over by five successive layers
of administrative and judicial authority, I cannot allow sympathy for one who is
denied unemployment benefits to outweigh the well established principle that
misconduct and insubordination should not be rewarded." Id. at 689, 677 P.2d at
235, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 309 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 685, 677 P.2d at 232, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
17. Id. at 681 n.7, 677 P.2d at 229 n.7, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 303 n.7.
18. The court found the undisputed facts were not subject to opposing inferences, and that appellant had clearly demonstrated good cause. Consequently,
there was no basis for upholding the superior court's finding. Id. at 685-86, 677 P.2d
at 233, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
1. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1984). The statute provides that an employee may recover workers' compensation benefits without regard to the negligence of either party.
2. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852 (West Supp. 1984). This section preserves the right

(Vol. 12: 215, 1984]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

the employee's injuries, an employer may be granted a credit
against its future workers' compensation liabilities. 3 That credit
is denied the employer, however, until the ratio of his contribution to the employee's damages corresponds to the employer's
4
proportional share of fault.
Be that as it may, what happens when an employee's injury is
caused by his own negligence in addition to the negligence of his
employer and a third party? The supreme court faced this question in Rodgers v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.5 The
court ruled that comparative negligence principles apply so that
an employee must bear the responsibility and costs of his own
6
negligence-that negligence may not be imputed to his employer.
Consequently, the formula for determining the applicability of the
employer's credit remains the same, i.e., the threshold figure for
determining at what point the credit is to be applied should be determined by reference to the employer's own degree of fault with7
out regard to the employee's degree of fault.
Transcon Lines, Inc. ("Transcon") was Rodgers' employer in
1974 when he fell and injured himself on the property of Melvin
Sosnick Co. ("Sosnick"). Rodgers filed a civil action against Sosnick and a workers' compensation claim against Transcon. Transcon intervened in the civil action seeking reimbursement for
temporary disability payments made to Rodgers. The workers'
compensation proceeding was then suspended for the remainder
of the civil action.
In the civil action, the jury found Sosnick 70 percent at fault,
Rodgers 25 percent at fault, and Transcon 5 percent at fault. The
of the employee to bring an ordinary civil action against a third party tortfeasor
and still maintain a claim against the employer for compensation benefits.
3. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3861 (West 1971). This section provides in pertinent part:
The (WCAB) .. . shall allow, as a credit to the employer to be applied
against his liability for compensation, such amount of any recovery by the
employee for his injury . .. as has not theretofore been applied to the
payment of expenses or attorneys' fees .... or has not been applied to reimburse the employer.

Id.
4. Associated Constr. & Eng'g Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d
829, 843, 587 P.2d 684, 692, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888, 896 (1978).
5. 36 Cal. 3d 330, 682 P.2d 1068, 204 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1984). Opinion by Kaus, J.,
with Mosk, Broussard, Shaw and Mana, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Reynoso, J. Separate dissenting opinion by Bird, C.J. Shaw and Mana, JJ.,
sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
6. Id. at 337, 682 P.2d at 1072, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
7. Id. at 342, 682 P.2d at 1075-76, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 410.

jury determined the damages to be $25,000. The trial court then
deducted the expenses designated in Labor Code section 38618
from the gross amount of Rodgers' recovery from Sosnick and certiffed $7,734.28 as Rodgers' "net recovery."
At the close of the civil action, the workers' compensation matter resumed. The parties stipulated that Rodgers suffered a 20.25
percent permanent disability, thereby entitling him to $5,022.50 in
permanent disability benefits. Both parties also agreed that
Transcon was entitled to the full statutory credit-$7,734.28. The
parties disagreed, however, as to the application of the credit.
Transcon contended it was eligible for the credit upon payment of
benefits equal to the proportional share of the employer's fault.9
Rodgers claimed the proportion should include "employment negligence,"'10 i.e., the employer's and the employee's fault combined." The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB)
found no justification for imputing the employee's negligence to
his employer and therefore determined that the ratio should account for the employer's fault only. An order was entered accordingly and Rodgers appealed.
The underlying maxim of the California workers' compensation
program holds the employer liable for employee injuries regardless of fault.12 In other words, the program is no-fault. The economic burden is placed upon the employer according to the
fundamental premise that an on-the-job injury is merely a cost of
doing business.' 3 "In exchange for carrying the responsibility for
injury compensation, the employer avoids the cost, delay and risk
of greater liability of court proceedings. The employee receives
guaranteed compensation in exchange for giving up the right to
4
sue the employer."'
In tort actions, damages are an attempt to make whole the in8. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3861 (West 1971). The expenses deducted included attorneys' fees and expenses.
9. Under this calculation, Transcon would be eligible for the credit upon payment of $1,275-i.e., 5% (the percentage of fault placed on Transcon) of $25,500
(the amount of damages awarded to Rodgers). 36 Cal. 3d at 333, 682 P.2d at 1069,
204 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
10. See Comment, Employer Subrogation: The Effect of Injured Employee Negligence in Workers' Compensation Third Party Actions, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301,
313 (1981).
11. Under this calculation, Transcon would be eligible for the credit upon payment of $7,650-i.e., 30% (the 5 percent of fault placed on Transcon plus the 25 percent of fault placed on Rodgers) of $25,500 (the amount of damages awarded to
Rodgers). 36 Cal. 3d at 334, 682 P.2d at 1069, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
12. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4.
13. See 1 S. HERLICK, CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW HANDBOOK
§ 1.1 at 13 (2d ed. 1978).
14. 36 Cal. 3d at 352, 682 P.2d at 1083, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).

[Vol. 12: 215, 19841

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

jured party-a form of indemnification. 5 The purpose of workers'
compensation, in contrast, is to rehabilitate. 16 As a result, the
benefits under workers' compensation differ from civil damages.
An employee who receives benefits under the program may not
7
also sue his employer.'
Where a third party tortfeasor is involved, however, the injured
employee may also bring a civil action against the negligent third
party for damages in addition to seeking workers' compensation
from his employer.18 When such a third party action is brought,
the employer is entitled to claim a credit against future payment
of benefits based upon the third party recovery by the injured employee.19 This action also creates a unique tripartite relationship
among the parties: (1) the employee/third party dispute is governed by comparative negligence principles; 20 (2) the employer
reimbursement claim against the third party is governed by principles of comparative negligence and joint and several liability;21
(3) the employer credit claim against the employee stands in relation to the workers' compensation no-fault concept. 22 This latter
relationship was at issue in Rodgers.
The court began its analysis by reviewing its decision in Associated Construction & Engineering Co. v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board,23 a case involving the relationship between an
employee and a third party tortfeasor. In Associated Construction, the employer and a third party were negligent; the employee
had not been negligent. The employer sought a credit against future benefit payments to the extent that the employee's settlement award from the third party exceeded the amount of
damages attributed to the employer's negligence. 24 The employee
argued that the negligent employer was barred from recovery of
either credit or reimbursement. The court disagreed, holding for
15. See 4 B. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 842 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp.
1984); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 901, 903, 905.
16. Solari v. Atlas-Universal Serv., Inc., 215 Cal. App. 2d 587, 600, 30 Cal. Rptr.
407, 414 (1963). See also CAL. LAB. CODE § 139.5 (West Supp. 1984).
17. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1984).
18. See supra note 2.
19. See supra note 3.
20. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1973).
21. 36 Cal. 3d at 343, 682 P.2d at 1076, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 411 (Reynoso, J.,
dissenting).
22. CAL. LAB.

CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1984).
23. 22 Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978).
24. Id. at 835, 587 P.2d at 687, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 891.

the first time that the doctrine of comparative negligence could
apply in workers' compensation proceedings. That court stated
that "the concurrently negligent employer should receive either
credit or reimbursement for the amount by which his compensation liability- exceeds his proportional share of the injured em25
ployee's recovery."
The Associated Constructioncourt went on to discuss the credit
procedure:
When the issue of an employer's concurrent negligence arises in the context of his credit claim based upon a third party settlement, the board
must determine the appropriate contribution of the employer since the
employee's recovery does not represent a judicial determination of tort
damages. Specifically, the board must determine (1) the degree of fault of
the employer, and (2) the total damages to which the employee is entitled.
The board must then deny the employer credit until the ratio of his contribution to the employee's damages corresponds to his proportional share
of fault. Once the employer's workers' compensation contribution reaches
this level, he should be granted a credit for the full amount available
under section 3861. Only when such level of contribution has been
reached, however, will grant of the statutory credit adequately accommodate the principle
that a negligent employer should not profit from his
26
own wrong.

The court in Associated Constructionthen went on to state that
the above reasoning furthers the objective "that the employer and
third party should, to the extent consistent with the employee's
statutory immunity from tort liability, share the burden of the
employee's recovery as joint tortfeasors." 27 From this the court in
Rodgers reasoned that those principles would not be furthered by
25. Id. at 842, 587 P.2d at 692, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
26. Id. at 843, 587 P.2d at 692, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
The court also discussed the reimbursement procedure:
When the issue of an employer's concurrent negligence arises in a judicial
forum, application of comparative negligence principles is relatively
straightforward. The third party tortfeasor should be allowed to plead the
employer's negligence as a partial defense, in the manner of Witt [v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961)1. Once this issue is
injected into the trial, the trier of fact should determine the employer's degree of fault according to the principles of American Motorcycle [Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) ]. The
court should then deduct the employer's percentage share of the employee's total recovery from the third party's liability-up to the amount
of the workers' compensation benefits assessed against the employer.
Correspondingly, the employer should be denied any claim of reimbursement--or any lien under [Labor Code] section 3856, subdivision (b)-to
the extent that his contribution would then fall short of his percentage
share of responsibility for the employee's total recovery.
Associated Constr., 22 Cal. 3d at 842, 587 P.2d at 692, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 895 (footnote
omitted). Although Rodgers was a credit case rather than reimbursement case,
the court treated both as parallel remedies and implied that comparative negligence principles should be consistently applied in both contexts. Consequently,
the court afforded great weight to reimbursement decisions subsequent to Associated Constr. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
27. Associated Constr., 22 Cal. 3d at 842, 587 P.2d at 692, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
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denying an employer a credit until it had made payments equal to
the proportion of damages attributable to the employee's fault. 28
This is so because, under the comparative negligence theory, the
employer would not be responsible for damages attributable to an
29
employee's negligence.
Moreover, the court continued, should the rule proposed by
Rodgers be adopted, it would have "the anomalous effect of rewarding employee negligence by increasing an employee's recovery vis-a-vis his employer whenever the employee's fault
increases."3 0 The court found additional support for its holding in
a number of reimbursement cases 31 which, although distinguishable in some regards, worked the same detrimental result upon
the employer, i.e., greater liability.
In addition, the court summarily rejected three other argu28. 36 Cal. 3d at 335, 682 P.2d at 1070, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
29. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1973).
30. 36 Cal. 3d at 338, 682 P.2d at 1073, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
The court stated:
Assume that the employee has suffered $100,000 in tort damages, and
that-as in this case-the employee's attorney's fees and expenses in the
civil action consume 50 percent of the employee's recovery from the third
party. If the third party were 100 percent at fault, the employee would receive a gross tort recovery of $100,000 and a net recovery-after deductions-of $50,000. Thus, the nonnegligent employee would receive a net
tort recovery of $50,000, and-because in this hypothetical neither the employer nor employee were at all at fault and thus the employer would immediately claim its section 3861 credit-the employee would obtain no
additional workers' compensation benefits unless such benefits exceeded
$50,000.
On Rodgers' theory, if instead of being totally free of fault, the employee
in the above hypothetical were 4 percent at fault, he would receive a
greater total recovery than the nonnegligent employee. His total tort damages would be reduced by 4 percent, and his gross tort damages would
thus be $96,000. Assuming that attorney's fees and expenses would still
consume 50 percent of the gross recovery, his net tort recovery would be
$48,000. If the employee's fault were imputed to the employer in determining the section 3861 threshold, the employer would have to pay $4,000 in
benefits-the percentage of tort damages attributable to employer and employee fault-before it could claim its $48,000 credit. Thus, the 4-percentnegligent employee would receive $52,000 total recovery as compared to
the $50,000 obtained by the totally nonnegligent employee. Further, the
disparity would generally increase as the percentage of the employee's
fault increased.
Id. at 339 n.6, 682 P.2d at 1073 n.6, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.6.
31. Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 595 P.2d 619, 156 Cal. Rptr.
41 (1979); Jarvis v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 246, 191 Cal. Rptr. 29
(1983); Johnson v. Cayman Dev. Co., 108 Cal. App. 3d 977, 167 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1980);
Kemerer v. Challenge Milk Co., 105 Cal. App. 3d 334, 164 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1980);
Kramer v. Cedu Found., Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979).

ments which Rodgers posed in support of his position. Rodgers
claimed that his "imputation" rule was directly supported by the
decision in Witt v. Jackson.32 The court, however, did not believe
that Witt applied to the credit situation. Rodgers also claimed
that the court's decision improperly injected the issue of employee negligence into workers' compensation cases. The court
believed that only Rodgers' formula involved employee negligence as the court's rule concerned employer negligence. Finally,
the court declared that Rodgers' proposal added complexity and
burdensome litigation to workers' compensation matters. The end
result was that the court ruled that an employee's negligence may
not be imputed to the employer when determining the threshold
figure at which the employer's credit becomes effective.
Chief Justice Bird33 and Justice Reynoso dissented in separate
opinions. Each, however, used similar reasoning to arrive at the
same conclusion. The dissenters noted the triangular relationship
involved when a third party is drawn by civil action into a workers' compensation proceeding. Each of those relationships must
be treated separately because only in that manner may the workers' compensation proceedings between the employer and employee maintain its no-fault status. Since the no-fault
employer/employee relationship is based on statutory law, the
court may not inject into the relationship principles of comparative negligence. Moreover, Associated Construction was distinguishable in that it involved an employer/third party relationship,
whereas Rodgers involved an employer/employee relationship. 34
The dissenters agreed that the majority holding would often allow an employer to be absolved of much of his statutory workers'
compensation liability. 35 The end result "is to give employers the
benefit of the system while not insisting they shoulder the burden."36 More importantly, the dissenters noted, "in the absence
of a third party defendant, the employer would be obliged to pay
workers' compensation up to the statutory limit, even if the employee were completely at fault."37 Thus, there is no reason why
32. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 69, 366 P.2d 641, 647, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1961). At the time
of Wit however, the doctrine of contributory negligence applied; thus, the court
paid scant attention to its holding. 36 Cal. 3d at 340, 682 P.2d at 1074, 204 Cal. Rptr.
at 409.
33. Chief Justice Bird simply adopted the opinion of Justice John J. Miller of
the court of appeal, with the concurrence of Justices Allison M. Rouse and Jerome
A. Smith.
34. 36 Cal. 3d at 343, 682 P.2d at 1076, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 411 (Reynoso, J.,
dissenting).
35. Id. at 358, 682 P.2d at 1087, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 422 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 345, 682 P.2d at 1077-78, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13 (Reynoso, J.,
dissenting).
37. Id.
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an employer should be allowed to pay less than the full statutory
amount of workers' compensation when third parties have contributed to the injury.
The effect of the court's decision is unclear. If a third party is
not involved, the decision, of course, would be inapplicable since
the credit provisions would not have reason to take effect. When
a third party is involved, however, the variables in a workers'
compensation proceeding are many: the number of parties who
are negligent; which parties are negligent (if not all); the degree
of negligence of each party; the amount of damages sustained by
the injured employee; the statutory amount of the workers' compensation benefits. All of these variables could affect an employee's award, but to what degree is unknown. What is clear is
that benefits paid by employers to employees will be affected,
often with the result of reducing the amount paid by the employer. Such a result must of necessity occur with the injection of
comparative negligence principles into the domain of "no-fault"
workers' compensation proceedings.
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